On Point blog, page 30 of 51
Theft-by-fraud conviction upheld based on indirect “communication” from defendant to victim
State v. David Phillip Foley, 2013AP1722-CR/2013AP1723-CR; district 1, 6/17/14 (unpublished); case activity
Under § 943.20(1)(d), theft by fraud requires, among other things, that the defendant made a false representation to the owner of the property that the defendant stole. This does not require direct communication between the defendant and the victim. It is sufficient that the defendant made a statement to a third party with the intent or reasonable expectation that it would be communicated to the victim.
No new trial despite newly-discovered evidence that cops involved in arrest and trial were “dirty”
State v. Jesse J. Franklin, Jr., 2013AP1447, District 1, 6/17/14 (unpublished); case activity
Milwaukee Police Officers Paul Lough and James Campbell testified against Franklin at his trial for possession of marijuana and cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of a firearm by a felon. Franklin was convicted and lost his appeal. A few years later he filed a § 974.06 motion arguing that he should be granted a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence–namely evidence that Officers Campbell and Lough had beaten, planted evidence on, and falsely arrested 6 individuals during the same period in which they arrested Franklin. Franklin argued that this evidence supported his defense that someone else had placed in his van the drugs and guns that the police found there.
Court of appeals grants discretionary reversal for a 1st-degree intentional homicide conviction
State v. Charles R. Kucharski, 2013AP557-CR, District 1, 5/6/14, petition for review granted 9/24/14, reversed, 2015 WI 64; case activity
This is a nice defense win, and the majority opinion makes sense. Kucharski shot and killed his parents and pled not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The only issue at his court trial was whether he lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and comply with the law. The uncontested expert opinions answered “yes.” So the majority granted a new trial. The dissent took issue with the majority’s application of § 752.35, the discretionary reversal standard.
Trial court didn’t err in excluding evidence of lab mistakes from years before defendant’s blood sample was tested
Fond du Lac County v. Douglas L. Bethke, 2013AP2297, District 2, 4/30/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it excluded evidence of particular crime lab errors that happened years before Bethke’s blood sample was analyzed.
Circuit court properly denied plea withdrawal after it found witness recantations to be incredible and uncorroborated
State v. John Francis Ferguson, 2014 WI App 48; case activity
The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Ferguson’s plea withdrawal motion, which was based on recantations by two witnesses who had previously said Ferguson fatally shot a man. The circuit judge applied the proper standard under State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997), when it found the recantations were incredible as a matter of law and uncorroborated by other newly-discovered evidence, and its findings are not clearly erroneous.
Evidence that defendant asked victim to lie and choked her admitted as “other acts” evidence
State v. Daniel K. Rogers, 2012AP186-CR, District 4, 4/17/14; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
The defendant, having been charged with sexual assault and released on bond, allegedly choked his victim to make her to lie on his behalf at trial. The circuit court admitted this as § 904.04(2) “other acts” evidence at the sexual assault trial, and the COA affirmed because the evidence showed consciousness of guilt.
Trial court’s failure to explain reasons for sentence saved by postconviction remarks
State v. Venceremos Crump, 2013AP2163-CR, District 1, 3/18/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court articulated its reasons for the sentence imposed on Crump as required by State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, in light of the court’s comments in its order denying Crump’s postconviction motion, where it explicitly addressed the three primary sentencing factors and applied those factors to the facts of Crump’s case.
Counting out-of-state “zero tolerance” OWI violations as prior offenses doesn’t violate Equal Protection Clause
State v. Daniel M. Hirsch, 2014 WI App 39; case activity
The equal protection clause isn’t violated by § 343.307(1)(d)‘s differing treatment of Wisconsin and out-of-state” zero tolerance” OWI offenses (which penalize drivers under the legal drinking age who drive with any alcohol concentration).
Hirsch had two prior driver’s license suspensions for violation Illinois’s zero tolerance law. Under § 343.307(1)(d),
Discovery violation didn’t require mistrial, and evidence was sufficient to support possession of firearm conviction
State v. Francisco Luis Canales, 2013AP1435-CR, District 1, 3/11/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Though the state violated its discovery obligation by failing to disclose multiple computer-aided dispatch (CAD) reports describing 9-1-1 calls regarding the incident, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Canales’s motion for mistrial after the discovery violation came to light.
A mistrial is appropriate only when there is a “manifest necessity,” for “the law prefers less drastic alternatives,
No error in failure to give instructions on lesser included homicide charges where defendant’s trial testimony didn’t support them
State v. Tammy S. Cole, 2013AP947-CR, District 4, 2/27/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The trial court did not err in declining to instruct on second-degree reckless homicide or homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, as Cole requested at her trial on one count of first degree intentional homicide for shooting Evans, her boyfriend:
¶14 The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Cole does not support submission of these lesser-included offenses.