On Point blog, page 30 of 51
Court of appeals grants discretionary reversal for a 1st-degree intentional homicide conviction
State v. Charles R. Kucharski, 2013AP557-CR, District 1, 5/6/14, petition for review granted 9/24/14, reversed, 2015 WI 64; case activity
This is a nice defense win, and the majority opinion makes sense. Kucharski shot and killed his parents and pled not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The only issue at his court trial was whether he lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and comply with the law. The uncontested expert opinions answered “yes.” So the majority granted a new trial. The dissent took issue with the majority’s application of § 752.35, the discretionary reversal standard.
Trial court didn’t err in excluding evidence of lab mistakes from years before defendant’s blood sample was tested
Fond du Lac County v. Douglas L. Bethke, 2013AP2297, District 2, 4/30/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it excluded evidence of particular crime lab errors that happened years before Bethke’s blood sample was analyzed.
Circuit court properly denied plea withdrawal after it found witness recantations to be incredible and uncorroborated
State v. John Francis Ferguson, 2014 WI App 48; case activity
The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Ferguson’s plea withdrawal motion, which was based on recantations by two witnesses who had previously said Ferguson fatally shot a man. The circuit judge applied the proper standard under State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997), when it found the recantations were incredible as a matter of law and uncorroborated by other newly-discovered evidence, and its findings are not clearly erroneous.
Evidence that defendant asked victim to lie and choked her admitted as “other acts” evidence
State v. Daniel K. Rogers, 2012AP186-CR, District 4, 4/17/14; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
The defendant, having been charged with sexual assault and released on bond, allegedly choked his victim to make her to lie on his behalf at trial. The circuit court admitted this as § 904.04(2) “other acts” evidence at the sexual assault trial, and the COA affirmed because the evidence showed consciousness of guilt.
Trial court’s failure to explain reasons for sentence saved by postconviction remarks
State v. Venceremos Crump, 2013AP2163-CR, District 1, 3/18/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court articulated its reasons for the sentence imposed on Crump as required by State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, in light of the court’s comments in its order denying Crump’s postconviction motion, where it explicitly addressed the three primary sentencing factors and applied those factors to the facts of Crump’s case.
Counting out-of-state “zero tolerance” OWI violations as prior offenses doesn’t violate Equal Protection Clause
State v. Daniel M. Hirsch, 2014 WI App 39; case activity
The equal protection clause isn’t violated by § 343.307(1)(d)‘s differing treatment of Wisconsin and out-of-state” zero tolerance” OWI offenses (which penalize drivers under the legal drinking age who drive with any alcohol concentration).
Hirsch had two prior driver’s license suspensions for violation Illinois’s zero tolerance law. Under § 343.307(1)(d),
Discovery violation didn’t require mistrial, and evidence was sufficient to support possession of firearm conviction
State v. Francisco Luis Canales, 2013AP1435-CR, District 1, 3/11/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Though the state violated its discovery obligation by failing to disclose multiple computer-aided dispatch (CAD) reports describing 9-1-1 calls regarding the incident, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Canales’s motion for mistrial after the discovery violation came to light.
A mistrial is appropriate only when there is a “manifest necessity,” for “the law prefers less drastic alternatives,
No error in failure to give instructions on lesser included homicide charges where defendant’s trial testimony didn’t support them
State v. Tammy S. Cole, 2013AP947-CR, District 4, 2/27/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The trial court did not err in declining to instruct on second-degree reckless homicide or homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, as Cole requested at her trial on one count of first degree intentional homicide for shooting Evans, her boyfriend:
¶14 The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Cole does not support submission of these lesser-included offenses.
Court of appeals bungles denial of motion for reconsideration of decision on petition for writ coram nobis
Sawyer County v. Maurice J. Corbin, 2013AP650; 1/22/14; District 3 (one-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity
This is an odd little case with some interesting potential. In 2004, Corbine was arrested for OWI and refused to submit to a chemical blood test under implied consent law. Supposedly Corbine received a “notice of intent to revoke operating privilege” but failed to request a refusal hearing, so the court entered default judgment revoking his license.
What standard of review applies to circuit court decisions re the admission of expert testimony?
Here’s an issue in search of a published decision. In 2011, Wisconsin amended Wis. Stat § 907.02 to require circuit courts to apply the Daubert test for the admissibility of expert testimony. Thus far, no Wisconsin appellate court has interpreted and applied the new § 907.02, so we don’t know the standard for reviewing circuit court decisions pursuant to the statute. The old test for the admission/exclusion of expert testimony wasn’t too complicated,