On Point: K. Standards of Review

State v. Desmond Dejuan Laster, 2012AP1739-CR, District 1, 4/2/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

The trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in making two evidentiary rulings or in denying Laster’s  motion for a mistrial.

On the first evidentiary ruling, the court of appeals holds the trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to ask Hunt, a defense witness,

State v. Nicholas M. Gimino, 2012AP1498-CR, District II/IV, 3/7/13 (unpublished); case activity.

While this decision is not recommended for publication, it highlights a very touchy subject–when does conduct many parents engage in rise to the level of physical abuse of a child?  The answer may surprise you.

Here’s what happened.  Gimino took his 2-year-old daughter for a ride on a motorized go-kart having no sides or roof.  

Wood County v. Zebulon K., 2011AP2387, and Wood County v. Forest K., 2011AP2394, District 4, 2/7/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity: Zebulon K.; Forest K.

The evidence was not sufficient to prove that Zebulon and Forest need to be protectively placed. Though Zebulon and Forest are developmentally disabled, the evidence does not establish they are “so totally incapable of providing for [their] own care and custody as to create a substantial risk of serious harm to [themselves] or others” under Wis.

State v. William G. Bennett, 2012AP1757-CR, District 2, 1/30/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Evidence that Bennett sent a lewd and obscene letter to a person was sufficient to support conviction for disorderly conduct because the content of the letter placed it beyond a mere “personal annoyance” to the victim. Purely written speech can constitute disorderly conduct even if that written speech fails to cause an actual disturbance,

Review of unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (composed by On Point)

1. Whether there was sufficient proof that Mary F.-R. evidenced a “substantial probability of physical harm” to herself or others and was therefore dangerous under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)(2).

2. Whether Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11) is an unconstitutional violation of equal protection because it provides for a jury of six in ch.

State v. Brian Avery, 2013 WI 13 (Wis. S. Ct. 1/30/13), reversing 2011 WI App 148; case activity

The supreme court affirms the trial court’s denial of Brian Avery’s Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, concluding there isn’t a reasonable probability a jury would have a reasonable doubt about Avery’s guilt. The court also holds Avery was not entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice.

Chaidez v. United States, USSC No. 11-820, affirming 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011)

Issue:  We know that Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) requires counsel to advise a defendant about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea.  The question presented by Chaidez is whether or not that rule applies retroactively so that a person whose conviction became final before Padilla can benefit from it. 

Dane County v. Steven D. Koehn, 2012AP1718, District 4, 1/10/13

Court of appeals decision (1 judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Motion to suppress evidence of intoxication properly denied because arresting officer had probable cause to administer a preliminary breath test. The court of appeals rejects Koehn’s claims that the officer’s failure to testify about the significance of the results of field sobriety tests means those results should have “minimal significance” in determining probable cause to administer the PBT:

¶10      I first conclude that,

Milwaukee County v. Cheri V., 2012AP1737, District 1, 12/18/12

 court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Mental health commitment, § 51.20, requires proof of mental illness and dangerousness. Cheri V. limits this challenge to the latter; the court agrees:

¶7        As seen from our recitation of the facts adduced at the trial, however, there is absolutely no evidence that any of the statutory prerequisites were met—yelling at and pointing a finger at another person,

State v. Mark A. Gierczak, 2012AP965-CR, District 4, 12/13/12

court of appeals decision (1 judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

For purposes of obstructing an officer § 946.41, “officer” includes someone with authority “to take another into custody,” and therefore includes a correctional officer at a county jail, ¶¶11-12. The court of appeals thus rejects Gierczak’s challenge to the factual basis for his obstructing plea where as a county jail inmate,