On Point: K. Standards of Review

Review of unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (composed by On Point)

1. Whether there was sufficient proof that Mary F.-R. evidenced a “substantial probability of physical harm” to herself or others and was therefore dangerous under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)(2).

2. Whether Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11) is an unconstitutional violation of equal protection because it provides for a jury of six in ch.

State v. Brian Avery, 2013 WI 13 (Wis. S. Ct. 1/30/13), reversing 2011 WI App 148; case activity

The supreme court affirms the trial court’s denial of Brian Avery’s Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, concluding there isn’t a reasonable probability a jury would have a reasonable doubt about Avery’s guilt. The court also holds Avery was not entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice.

Chaidez v. United States, USSC No. 11-820, affirming 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011)

Issue:  We know that Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) requires counsel to advise a defendant about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea.  The question presented by Chaidez is whether or not that rule applies retroactively so that a person whose conviction became final before Padilla can benefit from it. 

Dane County v. Steven D. Koehn, 2012AP1718, District 4, 1/10/13

Court of appeals decision (1 judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Motion to suppress evidence of intoxication properly denied because arresting officer had probable cause to administer a preliminary breath test. The court of appeals rejects Koehn’s claims that the officer’s failure to testify about the significance of the results of field sobriety tests means those results should have “minimal significance” in determining probable cause to administer the PBT:

¶10      I first conclude that,

Milwaukee County v. Cheri V., 2012AP1737, District 1, 12/18/12

 court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Mental health commitment, § 51.20, requires proof of mental illness and dangerousness. Cheri V. limits this challenge to the latter; the court agrees:

¶7        As seen from our recitation of the facts adduced at the trial, however, there is absolutely no evidence that any of the statutory prerequisites were met—yelling at and pointing a finger at another person,

State v. Mark A. Gierczak, 2012AP965-CR, District 4, 12/13/12

court of appeals decision (1 judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

For purposes of obstructing an officer § 946.41, “officer” includes someone with authority “to take another into custody,” and therefore includes a correctional officer at a county jail, ¶¶11-12. The court of appeals thus rejects Gierczak’s challenge to the factual basis for his obstructing plea where as a county jail inmate,

State v. Christopher J. Felton, 2012 WI App 114 (recommended for publication); case activity

Search & Seizure – PBT – Probable Cause 

Notwithstanding that Felton passed field sobriety tests, probable cause existed to administer a preliminary breath test.

¶8        This section does not require that the officer have probable cause to arrest a driver for drunk driving before giving that driver a preliminary-breath test. 

State v. David W. Stevens, 2012 WI 97, affirming unpublished decision; case activity

Miranda-Edwards Rule – Invocation of Counsel, Initiation of Contact by Suspect

Where an in-custody suspect invokes his right to counsel and interrogation immediately ceases, but the suspect himself then initiates a request to continue the interrogation, the police may proceed with questioning if fresh Miranda warnings are given and validly waived. 

State v. Roshawn Smith, 2012 WI 91, reversing in part, affirming in part unpublished decision; case activity

Standard of Review: Sufficiency of Evidence 

¶29  We understand Smith’s central argument regarding the standard of review on the evidentiary question to be summed up in the proposition that a jury verdict of guilt[9] must be reversed on appeal if “[t]he inferences that may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence are as consistent with innocence as with guilt.” 

Sandy Williams v. Illinois, USSC No. 10-8505, 6/18/12, affirming People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 939 N.E. 268

A split Court (4-1-4) upholds against Confrontation objection, admissibility of expert testimony that a DNA profile, produced by a different lab, matched Williams’ profile. Because the rationale favoring admissibility doesn’t earn a clear majority of votes, the opinion should be approached with the following principle in mind,