On Point blog, page 39 of 49
Counsel – Waiver – Self-Representation
State v. Rashaad A. Imani, 2010 WI 66, reversing 2009 WI App 98;habeas relief granted 6/22/16; for Imani: Basil M. Loeb; BiC; Resp.; Reply
¶3 We conclude that the circuit court properly denied Imani’s motion to represent himself. First, we determine that Imani did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel. The circuit court engaged Imani in two of the four lines of inquiry prescribed in Klessig and properly determined that Imani (1) did not make a deliberate choice to proceed without counsel,
Obstructing, § 946.41 – Sufficiency of Evidence
State v. Roy B. Ismert, No. 2009AP1971-CR, District IV, 7/1/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Ismert: Kristen D. Schipper; BiC; Resp.; Reply
The evidence was sufficient to support the obstructing element that Ismert knew the police officer had legal authority to stop, question and arrest him.
¶14 We conclude that Lossman and Grobstick are persuasive on the facts before us.
Plea Bargain – Rejection; Recusal – Judge as Party
State v. Joshua D. Conger, 2010 WI 56, on certification; for Conger: Anthony L. O’Malley; Brief (State); Brief (Conger); Brief (Judge Grimm); Reply (Conger); Amicus (Prosecution Project, UW)
Plea Bargain – Rejection
A circuit court has post-arraignment authority to reject a proposed plea bargain that would result in amendment to the charge; State v.
Appellate Review – Implicit Findings; Statement – Voluntariness
State v. Armando J. Castanada, No. 2009AP1438-CR, District I, 6/15/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Castanada: Jeremy C. Perri; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Appellate Review – Implicit Findings
¶30 The postconviction circuit court did not make any express findings as to the credibility of any of the witnesses’ testimony. However, as the State observes, when the circuit court does not make express findings,
County of Milwaukee v. Caleb L. Manske, 2009AP1779, District I, 6/8/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Manske: Jennifer R. Drow; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Traffic Stop – Reasonable Suspicion
¶16 Manske submits that because his driving was in some respects not consistent with an impaired driver, Galipo did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. However, the test for reasonable suspicion is not whether all of the driver’s actions constituted erratic driving.
Brown Co. DHS v. Brenda B., No. 2010AP321, District III, 6/2/10; affirmed 2011 WI 6
court of appeals decision, affirmed 2011 WI 6; for Brenda: Leonard D. Kachinsky
TPR – Plea to Grounds
In taking a plea to TPR grounds, the court need not inform the parent of “sub-dispositions,” i.e., those which “pertain only to the effect on the child, addressing who will have guardianship and custody in the event the parent’s rights are terminated as a primary disposition,”
Plain Error Review: Continuing Offense and Ex Post Facto
U.S. v. Marcus, USSC No. 08-1341, 5/24/10
… (A)n appellate court may,in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an “error”; (2) the error is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute”; (3) the error “affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means” it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings”; and (4) “the error seriously affect[s] the fairness,
Zarder v. Acuity, 2010 WI 35
supreme court decision; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Court of Appeals Authority to Declare Dicta
¶57 By concluding that a statement in a supreme court opinion is dictum, the court of appeals necessarily withdraws or modifies language from that opinion, contrary to our directive in Cook. …
¶58 If the court of appeals could dismiss a statement in a prior case from this court as dictum,
State v. Carl A. Lewis, Jr., 2010 WI App 52
court of appeals decision; ror Lewis: John T. Wasielewski; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.
Appellate Procedure – Standard of Review: Government Informant
¶16 Our discussion must begin, as it almost always does, with the standard of review. In deciding whether a person is a government informant or agent for purposes of this Sixth Amendment analysis, the determination regarding the relationship or understanding between the police and the informant is a factual determination.
State v. Quovadis Conyice Evans, 2009AP889-CR, District I, 4/20/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge; not recommended for publication); for Evans: George Tauscheck; BiC: Resp.; Reply
Testimony from 4 (of a total of 9) false imprisonment victims wasn’t necessary to sustain the convictions on those counts:
… (A) reasonable jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt from circumstantial evidence that Nathan B., Nicholas B., Nigel B. and Rashod H. did not consent to being restrained by Evans.