On Point: K. Standards of Review

State v. David E. Steinke, 2009AP3207-CR, District 4, 8/26/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Steinke: Cody Wagner; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Driving with a prohibited alcohol content of .08 or more, second offense, is a crime and therefore subject to beyond-reasonable-doubt burden of proof. Sitting as trier of fact in a bench trial, the circuit arguably misapprehended the burden as greater weight of the credible evidence,

Blum v. 1st Auto & Casualty Insurance Company, 2010 WI 78

¶42 We next address whether a court of appeals decision retains any precedential value when it is overruled by this court. We hold that when the supreme court overrules a court of appeals decision, the court of appeals decision no longer possesses any precedential value, unless this court expressly states otherwise.

A less obscure problem than you might think.

State v. Dwight Glen Jones, 2010 WI 72, affirming unpublished opinion; for Jones: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply

¶43  The issues presented are first, whether Jones is entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the circuit court wrongly denied his request for substitution of counsel, and second, whether he is entitled to a new trial on the grounds that such a denial violates rights guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

State v. Rashaad A. Imani, 2010 WI 66, reversing 2009 WI App 98;habeas relief granted 6/22/16; for Imani: Basil M. Loeb; BiC; Resp.; Reply

¶3   We conclude that the circuit court properly denied Imani’s motion to represent himself. First, we determine that Imani did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel. The circuit court engaged Imani in two of the four lines of inquiry prescribed in Klessig and properly determined that Imani (1) did not make a deliberate choice to proceed without counsel,

State v. Roy B. Ismert, No. 2009AP1971-CR, District IV, 7/1/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Ismert: Kristen D. Schipper; BiC; Resp.; Reply

The evidence was sufficient to support the obstructing element that Ismert knew the police officer had legal authority to stop, question and arrest him.

¶14 We conclude that Lossman and Grobstick are persuasive on the facts before us.

State v. Joshua D. Conger, 2010 WI 56, on certification; for Conger: Anthony L. O’Malley; Brief (State); Brief (Conger); Brief (Judge Grimm); Reply (Conger); Amicus (Prosecution Project, UW)

Plea Bargain – Rejection

A circuit court has post-arraignment authority to reject a proposed plea bargain that would result in amendment to the charge; State v.

State v. Armando J. Castanada, No. 2009AP1438-CR, District I, 6/15/10

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Castanada: Jeremy C. Perri; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Appellate Review – Implicit Findings

¶30     The postconviction circuit court did not make any express findings as to the credibility of any of the witnesses’ testimony. However, as the State observes, when the circuit court does not make express findings,

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Manske: Jennifer R. Drow; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Traffic Stop – Reasonable Suspicion

¶16     Manske submits that because his driving was in some respects not consistent with an impaired driver, Galipo did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. However, the test for reasonable suspicion is not whether all of the driver’s actions constituted erratic driving.

court of appeals decision, affirmed 2011 WI 6; for Brenda: Leonard D. Kachinsky

TPR – Plea to Grounds

In taking a plea to TPR grounds, the court need not inform the parent of “sub-dispositions,” i.e., those which “pertain only to the effect on the child, addressing who will have guardianship and custody in the event the parent’s rights are terminated as a primary disposition,”

U.S. v. Marcus, USSC No. 08-1341, 5/24/10

… (A)n appellate court may,in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an “error”; (2) the error is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute”; (3) the error “affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means” it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings”; and (4) “the error seriously affect[s] the fairness,