On Point: K. Standards of Review

State v. Dwight M. Sanders, 2007 WI App 174, affirmed, 2008 WI 85
For Sanders: Patrick M. Donnelly, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶26   The State argues that our supreme court’s decision in Hughes validates the officers’ hot pursuit entry in this case. In Hughes, the court held that the crime of possession of marijuana was serious enough to justify the warrantless entry of an apartment under the exigent circumstance of preventing the destruction of evidence. 

Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. State of Wisconsin Division of Hearings and Appeals, 2006 WI 86

Issue/Holding:

¶14      By granting deference to agency interpretations, the court has not abdicated, and should not abdicate, its authority and responsibility to interpret statutes and decide questions of law. Some cases, however, mistakenly fail to state, before launching into a discussion of the levels of deference, that the interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law to be determined by a court. 

State v. Justin D. Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143, PFR filed 7/14/06
For Gudgeon: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Where the appellate court is positioned equally to review the matter, whether labeled one of fact or of law, no deference need be given the trial court:

¶19      … (T)his court is in just as good a position as the circuit court to answer that question.

State v. Kevin Brown, 2006 WI App 41
For Brown: Richard D. Martin, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶10      We first examine the trial court’s reliance on the earlier order and its determination that it was “the law of the case.” Citing Univest Corp. v. General Split Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 29, 38, 435 N.W.2d 234 (1989), Brown argues:

The law of the case doctrine is inapplicable.

State ex rel. Kenneth Onapolis  v. State, 2006 WI App 84, PFR filed 5/25/06
Pro se

Issue/Holding: Extradition from Australia to Wisconsin to face bank fraud and federal tax charges did not preclude, under the Rule of Specialty, Onapolis’s return on an outstanding parole violation warrant, at least where the parole violations included the fraud and tax offenses. (“The Rule of Specialty generally requires that an extradited defendant be tried for the crimes on which extradition has been granted,

State v. Steven A. Harvey, 2006 WI App 26
For Harvey: Christopher William Rose

Issue/Holding:

¶18      However, our rejection of the Committee’s definition of cunnilingus does not fully resolve this issue since, as we have observed, this definition met with at least tacit approval by the Childs court. However, we are not bound by theChilds case because it was not a cunnilingus case ….¶19      The court of appeals’ reference to cunnilingus in Childs occurred only because that term and its definition were part of the larger instruction that also addressed fellatio,

Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. State of Wisconsin Division of Hearings and Appeals, 2006 WI 86

Issue/Holding:

¶14      By granting deference to agency interpretations, the court has not abdicated, and should not abdicate, its authority and responsibility to interpret statutes and decide questions of law. Some cases, however, mistakenly fail to state, before launching into a discussion of the levels of deference, that the interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law to be determined by a court. 

State ex rel. Leroy Riesch v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 11, summary order
For Riesch: Christopher J. Cherella

Issue/Holding:

¶13. Certiorari review for parole revocation is limited to four questions: “(1) whether the agency stayed within its jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable, representing its will, not its judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or determination in question.” 

State v. Christopher Anson, 2005 WI 96, affirming, 2004 WI App 155
For Anson: Stephen J. Watson

Issue/Holding: Given a statement taken in violation of the Anson’s 6th amendment right to counsel, in which Anson admitted to facts underlying one of the charges and was prominently mentioned in the opening statements and “evidentiary phase of the trial,” and as to which he filed an unsuccessful interlocutory appeal asserting that admission of the statement would “strategically force” him to testify,

State v. Joseph P. DeFilippo, 2005 WI App 213
For DeFilippo: Leonard D. Kachinsky

Issue/Holding: To be valid, waiver of right to counsel in criminal trial proceeding must be supported by adequate record, ¶5 (citing State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 203-04, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997)). Where, as here, the record fails to make such a showing (because waiver occurred in an unrecorded conference),