On Point: 26. Sufficiency of evidence

Court of appeals request for certification granted; case activity

Issue (per court of appeals certification)

Whether, under the circumstances of this case, a suffiency of the evidence challenge requires an appellate court to measure the evidence against the instructions the jury received, as the court did in State v. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 143, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997), or instead against statutory requirements,

State v. Michael C. Hess, 2014AP268-CR, District 3, 11/11/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

While the trial evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Hess possessed methamphetamine, Hess is entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice because the verdict may have been influenced by evidence offered to proved drugged-driving charges that were dismissed during trial.

Court of appeals certification request, certification granted 12/18/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 75; case activity

Issue Presented (from Certification)

We certify this case to the supreme court because we are uncertain which of two decisions is controlling: State v. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 143, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997), or State v. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681. The issue is whether, under the circumstances here, a sufficiency of the evidence challenge requires us to measure the evidence against the instructions the jury received, as the court did in Wulff, or instead against statutory requirements, as the court did in Beamon.

State v. Adam J. Gajeski, 2014AP612-CR, District 3, 10/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdict on a theft charge because the jury could have reasonably inferred Gajeski intended to permanently deprive the owner of the property at the time he took the property.

State v. Brian A. Patterson, Appeal No. 2013AP749-CR, District 1, 7/22/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The State charged Patterson with 1st-degree intentional homicide in a shooting death, but the jury convicted him of a lesser-included offense: 1st degree reckless homicide.  In a cut-and-dried decision, the court of appeals held the evidence sufficient to support the conviction, and found no circuit court error in allowing the jury to consider 1st-degree reckless homicide, instructing the jury, or sentencing Patterson.

State v. David Phillip Foley, 2013AP1722-CR/2013AP1723-CR; district 1, 6/17/14 (unpublished); case activity

Under § 943.20(1)(d), theft by fraud requires, among other things, that the defendant made a false representation to the owner of the property that the defendant stole.  This does not require direct communication between the defendant and the victim.  It is sufficient that the defendant made a statement to a third party with the intent or reasonable expectation that it would be communicated to the victim.

State v. Mark K. Schrick, 2013AP1166-CR, District 4, 12/27/13 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

Actually, this case concerns more than just dentures.  A jury convicted Schrick of operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration in violation of §346.63(1)(b). On appeal, Schrick challenged (1) the trial court’s decision to deny his motion for a directed verdict, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, and (3)  a jury instruction saying that by statute the administered breath test was considered accurate. 

State v. Evan K. Saunders, 2013AP1229-CR, District 1, 11/5/13 (1 judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

This case concerns a gynecologist’s sexual assault of 4 different patients over 2 1/2 years.

Sufficiency of evidence:  Fourth degree sexual assault requires proof that the defendant had “sexual contact” with the victim without her consent.  Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3m).  And “sexual contact,” among other things, requires evidence that the defendant acted either with intent to harm the victim,

State v. Keith M. Bohannon, 2013 WI App 87; case activity

Substitution of judge; “new” judge under § 971.20(5)

When a case is reassigned from the original judge to a second judge and then reassigned again back to the first judge, the first judge is the “original” judge assigned to the case under § 971.20(4), not a “new” judge under § 971.20(5). Therefore, a motion to substitute the original judge had to be filed before the arraignment,

State v. Christina V., 2013AP405-FT, District 3, 6/11/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s order adjudicating Christina delinquent of disorderly conduct despite the judge’s comments that what happened in the case was “somewhat of a guess” and that his conclusions were “[m]y best guess” and based on what “I suspect” happened. (¶¶12-13).

Though the trial court found none of the witnesses “all that reliable”