On Point blog, page 9 of 11
Substitution of judge — § 971.20(4),(5); reassignment of original judge does not make the judge “new” for substitution purposes. Admission of evidence — limiting the playing of audio recordings. Armed robbery, § 943.32 — sufficiency of the evidence.
State v. Keith M. Bohannon, 2013 WI App 87; case activity
Substitution of judge; “new” judge under § 971.20(5)
When a case is reassigned from the original judge to a second judge and then reassigned again back to the first judge, the first judge is the “original” judge assigned to the case under § 971.20(4), not a “new” judge under § 971.20(5). Therefore, a motion to substitute the original judge had to be filed before the arraignment,
Disorderly conduct — sufficiency of the evidence
State v. Christina V., 2013AP405-FT, District 3, 6/11/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s order adjudicating Christina delinquent of disorderly conduct despite the judge’s comments that what happened in the case was “somewhat of a guess” and that his conclusions were “[m]y best guess” and based on what “I suspect” happened. (¶¶12-13).
Though the trial court found none of the witnesses “all that reliable”
Court of appeals tosses jury verdict in CHIPS case
Polk County v. Norman S., 2012AP2801, District 3, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity.
Given the court of appeals’s highly deferential standard of review for jury verdicts, it doesn’t throw them out very often. In this case, it did. A jury found by clear and convincing evidence that Norman S. was unable to provide necessary care so as to seriously endanger the physical health of his son,
Sufficiency of the evidence. Plain error — leading questions, closing arguments, jury instructions.
State v. Brian L. Jackson, 2012AP1008-CR, District 1, 5/14/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Sufficiency of the evidence
In a necessarily fact-specific discussion (¶¶4-5, 10-12), the court of appeals holds there was sufficient evidence to support Jackson’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm despite the existence of evidence to the contrary, which included the lack of Jackson’s DNA on the gun (and other objects) he supposedly discarded during a foot pursuit and the fact the officers lost sight of the men they were pursuing at various times during the chase:
¶13 The …
Evidence sufficent to show parent/child go-kart ride amounts to physical abuse of child; ditto as to parent’s decision to treat injuries at home rather than seek medical attention
State v. Nicholas M. Gimino, 2012AP1498-CR, District II/IV, 3/7/13 (unpublished); case activity.
While this decision is not recommended for publication, it highlights a very touchy subject–when does conduct many parents engage in rise to the level of physical abuse of a child? The answer may surprise you.
Here’s what happened. Gimino took his 2-year-old daughter for a ride on a motorized go-kart having no sides or roof.
Protective placement – sufficiency of evidence
Wood County v. Zebulon K., 2011AP2387, and Wood County v. Forest K., 2011AP2394, District 4, 2/7/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity: Zebulon K.; Forest K.
The evidence was not sufficient to prove that Zebulon and Forest need to be protectively placed. Though Zebulon and Forest are developmentally disabled, the evidence does not establish they are “so totally incapable of providing for [their] own care and custody as to create a substantial risk of serious harm to [themselves] or others” under Wis.
Disorderly conduct, § 947.01 — sufficiency of the evidence
State v. William G. Bennett, 2012AP1757-CR, District 2, 1/30/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Evidence that Bennett sent a lewd and obscene letter to a person was sufficient to support conviction for disorderly conduct because the content of the letter placed it beyond a mere “personal annoyance” to the victim. Purely written speech can constitute disorderly conduct even if that written speech fails to cause an actual disturbance,
Milwaukee County v. Mary F.-R., 2012AP958, petition for review granted, 2/11/13
Review of unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity
Issues (composed by On Point)
1. Whether there was sufficient proof that Mary F.-R. evidenced a “substantial probability of physical harm” to herself or others and was therefore dangerous under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)(2).
2. Whether Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11) is an unconstitutional violation of equal protection because it provides for a jury of six in ch.
Defense win! Insufficient evidence of dangerousness under any of the 5 standards of dangerousness
Milwaukee County v. Cheri V., 2012AP1737, District 1, 12/18/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Mental health commitment, § 51.20, requires proof of mental illness and dangerousness. Cheri V. limits this challenge to the latter; the court agrees:
¶7 As seen from our recitation of the facts adduced at the trial, however, there is absolutely no evidence that any of the statutory prerequisites were met—yelling at and pointing a finger at another person,
Sufficiency of Evidence: Standard of Review – Possession with Intent to Deliver; Right to Jury Trial – Apprendi – Harmless Error
State v. Roshawn Smith, 2012 WI 91, reversing in part, affirming in part unpublished decision; case activity
Standard of Review: Sufficiency of Evidence
¶29 We understand Smith’s central argument regarding the standard of review on the evidentiary question to be summed up in the proposition that a jury verdict of guilt[9] must be reversed on appeal if “[t]he inferences that may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence are as consistent with innocence as with guilt.”