On Point: b. Harm to others

Milwaukee County v. A.J.G., 2021AP1338, 5/3/22, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

When a circuit court orders a ch. 51 recommitment, it must specify which standard of dangerousness the patient will satisfy if treatment is withdrawn. Langlade County. v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶40, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 941 N.W.2d 277. This case holds that a circuit court must also specify the standard of dangerousness that the patient meets when ordering an initial commitment.

Rock County v. J.J.K., 2020AP1085, 4/29/21, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity

This is an appeal from the initial commitment and involuntary medication order entered against J.J.K. The court of appeals affirmed both contrary to published precedent on the rule against hearsay, the plain error doctrine, and procedural and substantive due process.

Monroe County v. D.J., 2019AP1133, 1/2/19, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Oh, this issue again. Monroe County pursued a Chapter 51 original commitment against D.J. but didn’t say which of the 5 standards of dangerousness it was proceeding under. One doctor opined that commitment was warranted under the 1st or 2nd standards. The other doctor specified 2nd or 5th standards. The trial court instructed the jury on all 3 standards. D.J.’s trial counsel didn’t object. And the jury found commitment warranted.

Ozaukee County v. R.T.H., 2018AP1317, 2/27/19, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity; Marathon County v. C.M.L., 2017AP2220, 2/26/19, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

These two, unrelated decisions highlight a recurring due process violation at Chapter 51 hearings. For an original commitment, the county must prove that the person is “dangerous” under 1 of 5 standards of dangerousness. §51.20(1)(a)2.a-e. Some counties don’t bother identifying any particular standard of dangerousness before or during the hearing. Others give notice of one standard and then prove a different standard of dangerousness at the hearing. Makes it hard to prepare a defense, no?

Marathon County v. D.K., 2017AP2217, 8/7/18, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); petition for review granted 7/10/19, affirmed, 2020 WI 18; case activity

“Donald” is the pseudonym the court of appeals opinion assigned to D.K., who was committed under §51.20(a)2.b. Although Dr. Dave, the examining physician, waffled on the odds of whether Donald might do serious physical harm without commitment and treatment, the court of appeals found that his conclusion–that Donald posed a “substantial risk of danger to others”–got the job done.  It also acknowledged a potential antidote to mootness arguments in Chapter 51 appeals.

Dodge County v. J.T., 2016AP613, District 4, 2/9/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The threats J.T. made in a letter provided sufficient evidence to find him dangerous to others under § 51.30(1)(a)2.b.

Iowa County v. J.L.R., 2016AP1459, 1/12/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

J.L.R. challenges her ch. 51 commitment on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that she was dangerous to herself or others. The court of appeals finds sufficient evidence as to danger to others, and so affirms.

Rock County v. S.J.M., 2016AP255-FT, 5/19/16, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

A circuit court involuntarily committed S.J.M. under §51.20(1)(a)1 -2 after finding him mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous.  S.J.M. challenged the “dangerous” determination and, specifically, the finding that he threatened his mother with serious physical harm, which made her reasonably fear violent behavior and serious harm from him.

Kenosha County v. Steven H., 2014AP1435-FT, District 2, 10/15/14 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals here affirmed an order finding Steven H. “dangerous” under §51.20(1)(a)2.b, which requires, among other things, evidence that people were placed in reasonable fear of Steven’s violent behavior. Under this standard, a court may consider threats voiced to third parties rather than to the potential victims.  R.J. v. Winnebago County, 146 Wis. 2d 516, 521-22, 431 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1988).

Outagamie County v. Michael H., 2013AP1638-FT, District 3, 11/26/13 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 6/12/14, affirmed, 2014 WI 127; case activity

Michael H. challenges a jury verdict finding him “dangerous” under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2a and involuntarily committing him for mental health treatment.  Given this procedural posture, the court of appeals’ holding seems confined to the facts of this case.