On Point: b. Harm to others

Winnebago County v. C.H., 2023AP505, 8/30/23, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In this Ch. 51 appeal, COA swats aside familiar 51 arguments, expresses its frustration with a “flood” of Ch. 51 appeals and, with approving citation to a dissent from SCOW, hints that we may not have heard the last of the mootness doctrine in COA with respect to 51 appeals.

Kenosha County v. L.A.T., 2022AP1730, District II, 8/23/23, 1-judge decision ineligible for publication; case activity (briefs not available)

L.A.T. (“Linda”) convinced the court of appeals the circuit court erred by admitting and relying on hearsay testimony from a psychiatrist to support its dangerousness finding. However, the court holds that sufficient non-hearsay evidence established that “Linda’s pattern of anger and aggressive behavior that caused others to seek law enforcement assistance…was sufficient to establish that others were in reasonable fear of violent behavior and/or serious physical harm at Linda’s hands.” (Op., ¶3).

Racine County v. P.J.L, 2023AP254, District 2, 7/19/23, 1-judge decision ineligible for publication; case activity (briefs not available)

In Outagamie County v. L.X.D.-O., 2023 WI App 17, ¶36, 407 Wis. 2d 518, 991 N.W.2d 518 (PFR denied), the court of appeals rejected a sufficiency challenge to an involuntary medication order and held that an examiner’s report need not be entered into evidence in order for the circuit court to consider the information contained therein. Now, the court extends L.X.D.-O. to an initial commitment order itself under the same rationale. Opinion, ¶20 n.6.

Winnebago County v. T.G., 2022AP2078, District 2, 6/14/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

At the final hearing on a petition to commit T.G. (“Thomas”) under § 51.20, the County presented evidence he threw urine and feces at a guard on one occasion and later made a threat that he’d act in a way that would require staff to “suit up” and do a cell extraction and then “hurt” staff. (¶¶3-5). Considered together, this evidence satisfied the dangerousness standard under § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.

Dane County v. D.F.B., 2022AP1852, District 4, 05/11/2023 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

A jury found D.F.B. dangerous under the second standard, which required evidence of a “substantial probability of physical harm to other individuals as manifested … by evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm to them, as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do serious physical harm.” See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. At trial, two witnesses testified about threats D.F.B. allegedly made by email to a University of Wisconsin-Madison employee. The circuit court overruled D.F.B.’s objection that the testimony was not the “best evidence” of the contents of the emails. The court of appeals disagrees, holding that the circuit court admitted testimony about the contents of D.F.B.’s alleged emails contrary to Wis. Stat. § 910.02 and that the error was not harmless. (Opinion, ¶¶ 1-2). 

Rock Count v. H.V., 2022AP1585-FT, 1/20/23, District 4; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is an appeal from a ch. 51 recommitment under the 2nd standard– dangerousness to others. H.V.’s main argument was that the circuit court erroneously relied on hearsay to find that he is dangerous when not committed. The court of appeals disagreed and further found the county’s evidence sufficient to support the commitment.

Trempealeau County v. C.B.O., 2021AP1955 & 2022AP102, 8/30/22, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is a double defense win! You might even call it a quadruple defense win! The court of appeals consolidated “Chris’s” appeals from his initial commitment order and his recommitment order. It reversed his initial commitment order because (1) the circuit court violated Langlade County v. D.J.W. and (2) the county’s evidence was insufficient. It reversed the recommitment order because (3) the circuit court’s fact findings were clearly erroneous, and (4) all the county proved was that if treatment were withdrawn Chris would engage in the same conduct that was insufficient to support the initial commitment.

Milwaukee County v. A.J.G., 2021AP1338, 5/3/22, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

When a circuit court orders a ch. 51 recommitment, it must specify which standard of dangerousness the patient will satisfy if treatment is withdrawn. Langlade County. v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶40, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 941 N.W.2d 277. This case holds that a circuit court must also specify the standard of dangerousness that the patient meets when ordering an initial commitment.

Rock County v. J.J.K., 2020AP1085, 4/29/21, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity

This is an appeal from the initial commitment and involuntary medication order entered against J.J.K. The court of appeals affirmed both contrary to published precedent on the rule against hearsay, the plain error doctrine, and procedural and substantive due process.

Monroe County v. D.J., 2019AP1133, 1/2/19, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Oh, this issue again. Monroe County pursued a Chapter 51 original commitment against D.J. but didn’t say which of the 5 standards of dangerousness it was proceeding under. One doctor opined that commitment was warranted under the 1st or 2nd standards. The other doctor specified 2nd or 5th standards. The trial court instructed the jury on all 3 standards. D.J.’s trial counsel didn’t object. And the jury found commitment warranted.