On Point: c. Pattern of acts

Ozaukee County v. R.T.H., 2018AP1317, 2/27/19, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity; Marathon County v. C.M.L., 2017AP2220, 2/26/19, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

These two, unrelated decisions highlight a recurring due process violation at Chapter 51 hearings. For an original commitment, the county must prove that the person is “dangerous” under 1 of 5 standards of dangerousness. §51.20(1)(a)2.a-e. Some counties don’t bother identifying any particular standard of dangerousness before or during the hearing. Others give notice of one standard and then prove a different standard of dangerousness at the hearing. Makes it hard to prepare a defense, no?

Chippewa County v. M.M., 2017AP1325, 5/1/18, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

You don’t see this very often. A jury found M.M. mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous under §51.20(1)(a)2.c based on testimony by not 1, not 2, but 3 doctors–all of whom said that M.M.’s paranoia and conduct would cause others to feel fearful and threatened and possibly assault him in an effort to protect themselves. This idea that M.M. was “indirectly” dangerous to himself did not wash with the court of appeals. It reversed and also rejected the County’s claim that M.M.’s appeal from this 6-month commitment was moot.

Marathon County v. R.O., 2016AP1898-FT, 2/27/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In 2016 R.O. was detained under § 51.15 after she was evicted and went to a local shelter but wasn’t able to do the paperwork to stay at the shelter. According to the two doctors who examined her while she was under emergency detention, R.O. was angry, defiant, irritable, displayed some paranoia, refused to cooperate with certain parts of the exams, and ‘lacked insight” into her illness. (¶¶2-6). These observations, in conjunction with information in her records describing past episodes that ended in hospitalization, were sufficient to justify the circuit court’s finding she was dangerous to herself.

Outagamie County v. Adam B., 2015AP718, 4/12/16, District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court neglected to specify which of the 5 statutory “dangerousness” standards in §51.20(1)(a)2.a-e supported the Ch. 51 commitment of Adam B. But that did not trouble the court of appeals. Given the “de novo” standard of review, it could (and did) decide for itself which statutory “dangerousness” test the facts satisfied.

Ozaukee County v. M.L.G., 2015AP1469-FT, 9/23/15, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

More specifically, the court of appeals held that the County had offered evidence sufficient to establish that MLG was dangerous under §51.20(1)(a)2.c and that he was substantially incapable of understanding his treatment options under § 51.61(1)(g)4b:

Walworth County DHS v. M.M.L., 2014AP2845, 7/15/15, District 2 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals affirms the involuntary commitment for M.M.L. under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., which requires evidence of impaired judgment based on recent acts or omissions showing a substantial probability that she would physically impair or injure herself or others. It rejects her challenges to the sufficiency of evidence and the testifying examiner’s references to  hearsay he relied on when forming his opinion.

Rock County v. J.N.B., 2014AP774, District 4, 3/26/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Having rejected the no merit report filed by J.N.B.’s appellate counsel and ordered counsel to brief the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, the court of appeals declares “the County presented ample evidence demonstrating that J.N.B. is dangerous because he evidences such ‘impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself,’” § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.

Outagamie County v. Lori D., 2014AP1911, District 3, 1/27/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was sufficient evidence to commit Lori under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. because her behavior over one night showed a “pattern of recent acts or omissions” that evidenced impaired judgment and because the lack of services available in the community established a “substantial probability of physical impairment or injury” to Lori if she wasn’t committed.

Outagamie v. Michael H., 2014 WI 127, 12/16/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity

Section 51.20(1)(a)2.a authorizes the involuntary commitment of a person who is “dangerous,” a test that may be met by showing recent threats of, or attempts at, suicide. This unanimous decision holds that in the right circumstances just thinking about suicide–without articulating a plan for committing it–constitutes a sufficient “threat” to satisfy the involuntary commitment statute.

Winnebago County v. William A.M., 2014AP977-FT, District 2, 9/10/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence at trial was sufficient to prove William was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., which requires a showing of “such impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself or herself.”