On Point: f. 51.20(1)(a)2. Dangerousness

Sauk County D.H.S. v. R.K.M., 2023AP912, 10/12/23, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

R.K.M. raised a variety of arguments seeking to challenge the often cited “decompensation” theory for extending a chapter 51 commitment where the subject has (1) made substantial progress while under commitment, (2) engaged in no recent dangerous behavior, and (3) is generally compliant with medication and treatment provided under commitment. However, his challenge runs into the buzzsaw of fears of decompensation and “recurrence of his symptoms.” (Op., ¶¶6-7).

Winnebago County v. C.H., 2023AP505, 8/30/23, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In this Ch. 51 appeal, COA swats aside familiar 51 arguments, expresses its frustration with a “flood” of Ch. 51 appeals and, with approving citation to a dissent from SCOW, hints that we may not have heard the last of the mootness doctrine in COA with respect to 51 appeals.

Marinette County v. A.M.N., 2022AP1395, District III, 8/29/23, 1-judge decision ineligible for publication; case activity (briefs not available)

Faced with a weak record, COA holds that A.M.N. cleared imposing hurdles to relief and reverses the lower court’s medication order as there was no proof he received a reasonable explanation of the proposed medication. However, despite a hearing rife with inadmissible hearsay, COA upholds the underlying commitment order under a harmless error analysis. 

Kenosha County v. L.A.T., 2022AP1730, District II, 8/23/23, 1-judge decision ineligible for publication; case activity (briefs not available)

L.A.T. (“Linda”) convinced the court of appeals the circuit court erred by admitting and relying on hearsay testimony from a psychiatrist to support its dangerousness finding. However, the court holds that sufficient non-hearsay evidence established that “Linda’s pattern of anger and aggressive behavior that caused others to seek law enforcement assistance…was sufficient to establish that others were in reasonable fear of violent behavior and/or serious physical harm at Linda’s hands.” (Op., ¶3).

Winnebago County v. J.L.C., 2023AP200, District II, 8/23/23, 1-judge decision ineligible for publication; case activity (briefs not available)

Although most litigators believed that arguments about mootness in 51 appeals were now settled, COA resurrects the mootness doctrine to deny relief in this appeal of an expired order.

Racine County v. P.J.L, 2023AP254, District 2, 7/19/23, 1-judge decision ineligible for publication; case activity (briefs not available)

In Outagamie County v. L.X.D.-O., 2023 WI App 17, ¶36, 407 Wis. 2d 518, 991 N.W.2d 518 (PFR denied), the court of appeals rejected a sufficiency challenge to an involuntary medication order and held that an examiner’s report need not be entered into evidence in order for the circuit court to consider the information contained therein. Now, the court extends L.X.D.-O. to an initial commitment order itself under the same rationale. Opinion, ¶20 n.6.

Winnebago County v. T.G., 2022AP2078, District 2, 6/14/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

At the final hearing on a petition to commit T.G. (“Thomas”) under § 51.20, the County presented evidence he threw urine and feces at a guard on one occasion and later made a threat that he’d act in a way that would require staff to “suit up” and do a cell extraction and then “hurt” staff. (¶¶3-5). Considered together, this evidence satisfied the dangerousness standard under § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.

Dane County v. D.F.B., 2022AP1852, District 4, 05/11/2023 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

A jury found D.F.B. dangerous under the second standard, which required evidence of a “substantial probability of physical harm to other individuals as manifested … by evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm to them, as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do serious physical harm.” See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. At trial, two witnesses testified about threats D.F.B. allegedly made by email to a University of Wisconsin-Madison employee. The circuit court overruled D.F.B.’s objection that the testimony was not the “best evidence” of the contents of the emails. The court of appeals disagrees, holding that the circuit court admitted testimony about the contents of D.F.B.’s alleged emails contrary to Wis. Stat. § 910.02 and that the error was not harmless. (Opinion, ¶¶ 1-2). 

Marathon County v. T.R.H., 2022AP1394, 3/14/23, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Counties often seek recommitment under §51.20(1)(a)2.c, the third standard of dangerousness. It is the easiest standard to satisfy–especially at the recommitment stage. But not this time. The court of appeals held that the county can’t just offer testimony that, at some point in the past, the person failed to care for himself, experienced delusions, and struggled with social interactions when not on medication.  The county’s evidence must be more specific.

Milwaukee County v. D.H., 2022AP1402, 3/7/23, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

To obtain an involuntary medication order, a county must satisfy the multi-step test for incompetency to make medication decisions in §51.61(1)(g)4. The first step requires the county to prove that the person received a “reasonable explanation” of the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to medication. The examiner can’t just testify that she complied with the statute. She must tell the court what she told the person about the medication. In “Dan’s” case, the court of appeals reversed the involuntary medication order because the county failed this step.