On Point blog, page 4 of 10

Evidence at recommitment hearing established mental illness and dangerousness under 3rd standard

Waukesha County v. G.M.M., 2022AP1207, 1/18/23, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This appeal involves a recommitment under the 3rd standard of dangerousness. G.M.M. argued that the county presented insufficient evidence of both mental illness and dangerousness. She also argued that the circuit court failed to make the findings required under Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶59, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.  The court of appeals rejected all 3 claims.

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COA finds evidence for 4th standard recommitment was sufficient

Calumet County DH&HS v. T.M.S., 2022AP1563-FT, 1/11/23; District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court recommitted T.M.S. based on the 3rd and 4th standards of dangerousness. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the county’s evidence and underscored Dr. Bales’ admission that he couldn’t point to any specific information in T.M.S.’s treatment records showing that T.M.S. was currently dangerous. The court of appeals, applying only the 4th standard, affirmed.

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Evidence sufficient for initial commitment under 4th standard

Marathon County v. L.A.R., 2022AP1226-FT, 12/29/22, District 3 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

“Laura” has suffered from bipolar disorder for over 30 years. At her initial commitment hearing, one examiner testified that she met the 2nd standard of dangerousness. Another testified that she also met the 4th standard. The circuit court held that Laura satisfied only the latter standard. The court of appeals affirmed.

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COA affirms 5th standard recommitment despite “sparse” record

Winnebago County v. C.L.S., 2022AP1155-FT, 12/14/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

C.L.S. sought reversal of his recommitment under §51.20(1)(a)2.e arguing that the county’s evidence of dangerousness was insufficient, and the circuit court failed to make the findings required by Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.  The court of appeals rejected both arguments. But if its description of the examiner’s testimony is accurate, C.L.S. should have, at the very least, won on insufficient evidence.

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Recommitment based on 3rd standard of dangerousness upheld

Winnebago County v. J.D.J., 2022AP1357-FT, 11/23/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

J.D.J. has schizophrenia. At his recommitment hearing, Dr. Monese testified that if treatment were withdrawn, he would become a proper subject of commitment under §51.20(1)(a)2.c. J.D.J. does not believe he has a mental illness, so he would stop treatment and become “violent.” Third-standard recommitments are increasingly common. This decision highlights the need for more vigorous defense strategies in these cases.

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Another 3rd standard recommitment affirmed

Sauk County v. A.D.S., 2022AP550, 11/17/22, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court recommitted A.D.S. based on §51.20(1)(a)2.c, which seems to be the standard du jour for ch. 51 recommitments.  Even though A.D.S. hadn’t recently behaved dangerously, the court of appeals affirmed because recommitments may be based on past evidence of dangerousness, and credible evidence indicated that if not committed he would stop taking his medication and return to his former dangerous behavior.

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Defense win! Another ch. 51 recommitment tossed for insufficient evidence of dangerousness

Marathon County v. T.J.M., 2022AP623, 11/8/22, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Trevor” appealed an order recommitting him for 12 months because (1) the circuit court orally failed to indicate a standard of dangeorusness per Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, and (2) the county’s evidence was insufficient under either the 1st or 3rd standards. He prevailed on the latter argument. The opinion is helpful to lawyers defending clients against recommitment under these standards.

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COA reverses ch. 51 extension for trial court’s failure to specify type of dangerousness

Trempealeau County v. C.J., 2022AP286, 10/11/22, District 3 (one judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity

C.J. (“Carter” in the opinion) is diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. He was initially committed after an incident in which he drove recklessly with his girlfriend in the car, threatening to kill her and himself along with the president and vice president. As the six-month commitment neared its end, the county petitioned to extend.  It did so even though C.J. had not had further incidents or problems in his group home, was taking his medications voluntarily; recognized his mental illness, and expressed that he wished to continue medication because it was helping him a great deal. (¶¶3-8).

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COA rejects defense based on ch. 55 exclusion to 5th standard

Waukesha v. L.J.E., 2022AP292, 10/5/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Evans”  was diagnosed with bipolar disorder with psychotic features, a condition considered permanent but manageable with medication. When the County sought to commit her under the 5th standard, she argued that it failed to prove that she did not satisfy one of the “exclusions” to the 5th standard. Specifically, the 5th standard does not apply where the individual may be provided protective placement or services under ch. 55. The court of appeals rejected that argument.

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Evidence at final ch. 51 commitment hearing established dangerousness

Sheboygan County HSD v. P.W.S., 2022AP426, District 2, 9/28/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In this fact-intensive decision (¶¶2-17), the court of appeals rejects P.W.S.’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that there was a substantial probability he was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.

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