On Point: f. 51.20(1)(a)2. Dangerousness

Winnebago County v. J.D.J., 2022AP1357-FT, 11/23/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

J.D.J. has schizophrenia. At his recommitment hearing, Dr. Monese testified that if treatment were withdrawn, he would become a proper subject of commitment under §51.20(1)(a)2.c. J.D.J. does not believe he has a mental illness, so he would stop treatment and become “violent.” Third-standard recommitments are increasingly common. This decision highlights the need for more vigorous defense strategies in these cases.

Sauk County v. A.D.S., 2022AP550, 11/17/22, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court recommitted A.D.S. based on §51.20(1)(a)2.c, which seems to be the standard du jour for ch. 51 recommitments.  Even though A.D.S. hadn’t recently behaved dangerously, the court of appeals affirmed because recommitments may be based on past evidence of dangerousness, and credible evidence indicated that if not committed he would stop taking his medication and return to his former dangerous behavior.

Marathon County v. T.J.M., 2022AP623, 11/8/22, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Trevor” appealed an order recommitting him for 12 months because (1) the circuit court orally failed to indicate a standard of dangeorusness per Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, and (2) the county’s evidence was insufficient under either the 1st or 3rd standards. He prevailed on the latter argument. The opinion is helpful to lawyers defending clients against recommitment under these standards.

Trempealeau County v. C.J., 2022AP286, 10/11/22, District 3 (one judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity

C.J. (“Carter” in the opinion) is diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. He was initially committed after an incident in which he drove recklessly with his girlfriend in the car, threatening to kill her and himself along with the president and vice president. As the six-month commitment neared its end, the county petitioned to extend.  It did so even though C.J. had not had further incidents or problems in his group home, was taking his medications voluntarily; recognized his mental illness, and expressed that he wished to continue medication because it was helping him a great deal. (¶¶3-8).

Waukesha v. L.J.E., 2022AP292, 10/5/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Evans”  was diagnosed with bipolar disorder with psychotic features, a condition considered permanent but manageable with medication. When the County sought to commit her under the 5th standard, she argued that it failed to prove that she did not satisfy one of the “exclusions” to the 5th standard. Specifically, the 5th standard does not apply where the individual may be provided protective placement or services under ch. 55. The court of appeals rejected that argument.

Sheboygan County HSD v. P.W.S., 2022AP426, District 2, 9/28/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In this fact-intensive decision (¶¶2-17), the court of appeals rejects P.W.S.’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that there was a substantial probability he was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.

Trempealeau County v. C.B.O., 2021AP1955 & 2022AP102, 8/30/22, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is a double defense win! You might even call it a quadruple defense win! The court of appeals consolidated “Chris’s” appeals from his initial commitment order and his recommitment order. It reversed his initial commitment order because (1) the circuit court violated Langlade County v. D.J.W. and (2) the county’s evidence was insufficient. It reversed the recommitment order because (3) the circuit court’s fact findings were clearly erroneous, and (4) all the county proved was that if treatment were withdrawn Chris would engage in the same conduct that was insufficient to support the initial commitment.

Milwaukee County v. A.J.G., 2021AP1338, 5/3/22, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

When a circuit court orders a ch. 51 recommitment, it must specify which standard of dangerousness the patient will satisfy if treatment is withdrawn. Langlade County. v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶40, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 941 N.W.2d 277. This case holds that a circuit court must also specify the standard of dangerousness that the patient meets when ordering an initial commitment.

Walworth County v. P.S., 2021AP2090-FT, 4/13/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court entered an initial commitment order against P.C. without specifying a standard of dangerousness. The court of appeals shrugged. It did not matter because the circuit court’s findings “were specific, tracked the statutory criteria, and are supported by the record.” Opinion, ¶10 n.2.

Waupaca County v. H.I.B., 2021AP2026, 4/7/22, District 4 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity

It is uncontested that “Hazel” has done well for three commitments in a row. Yet the court of appeals has affirmed her 4th Chapter 51 recommitment  because the jury could have inferred a “substantial probability” of death or serious injury from evidence that was “only suggestive” and that “lacked details such as dates and clear descriptions of conduct.”