On Point: f. 51.20(1)(a)2. Dangerousness

Ozaukee County v. J.D.A., 2021AP1148, District 2, 12/15/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, requires a circuit court ordering a ch. 51 recommitment petition to make specific factual findings with reference to the relevant subdivision paragraph of § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment order is based. At “Jane’s” recommitment proceeding, the circuit court cited a subdivision paragraph—specifically, § 51.20(1)(a)2.e.—but said little about the substance of the standard articulated under that subdivision paragraph and how the evidence proved the statutory elements of that standard. Thus, its findings were insufficient under D.J.W. and the recommitment order and medication order are reversed.

Portage County v. C.K.S., 2021AP1291-FT, 11/24/21, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court recommitted C.K.S. but apparently neglected to specify the applicable standard(s) of dangerousness. C.K.S. appealed arguing that the court violated D.J.W. and that the county’s evidence of dangerousness was insufficient. The court of appeals declined to address the D.J.W. error. Instead, it reviewed the county’s evidence of dangerousness and held it insufficient under the only standards that could apply: the 1st, 3rd, and 4th standards.

Outagamie County v. D.G.M., 2020AP967, District 3, 9/21/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence at the final hearing on the petition to commit D.G.M. under ch. 51 was sufficient to establish all the statutory elements and D.G.M.’s incompetence to refuse medication.

Shawano County v. S.L.V., 2021AP223, District 3, 8/17/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, requires a circuit court to make specific fact findings about dangerousness at a ch. 51 commitment hearing. The circuit court didn’t do that in this case, so the commitment order is reversed.

Trempealeau County v. B.K., 2020AP1166, District 3, 7/27/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

B.K. (“Brian”) argues he was denied procedural due process because he was not given particularized notice of which standard of dangerousness the County intended to prove at the final commitment hearing. He also contends the evidence presented at the hearing was insufficient to prove he was dangerous. The court of appeals rejects with both claims.

Outagamie County DHHS v. M.D.H., 2020AP86, District 3, 7/13/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence at M.D.H.’s final commitment hearing proved he was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.d.

Marathon County v. T.A.T., 2019AP1709, District 3, 6/29/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The testimony of the the three witnesses called by the County provided sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that T.A.T. (“Travis”) was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.

Outagamie County v. X.Z.B., 2020AP2058, 6/22/2121, District 3, (1 judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This case involves the recommitment of a protectively placed person based on §51.20(1)(a)2.c., the 3rd standard of dangerousness.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit courts’ recommitment order for insufficient evidence. And, for the second time in one week, it held that when circuit courts fail to make the requisite factual findings for a commitment that has expired, the remedy is reversal not remand for further fact-finding.

Rock County v. J.J.K., 2020AP1085, 4/29/21, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity

This is an appeal from the initial commitment and involuntary medication order entered against J.J.K. The court of appeals affirmed both contrary to published precedent on the rule against hearsay, the plain error doctrine, and procedural and substantive due process.

Fond du Lac County v. J.L.H., 2020AP2049, 3/24/21, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)e. lays out the “fifth standard” for dangerousness; a person can be committed under it if his or her mental illness prevents him or her from understanding the advantages and disadvantages of treatment, and a lack of treatment will cause a substantial probability that the person will be harmed and become unable to function. But there’s a limitation on this standard that the other standards lack: a person can’t be dangerous under it if care is available, either in the community at large or through ch. 55, that diminishes the threat of harm so that it is not substantial.