On Point blog, page 2 of 14
COA affirms 51.20 commitment for alcoholism as matter of first impression
Vernon County v. F.W.R., 2024AP203, District IV, 11/6/24 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
COA rejects F.W.R.’s challenges to his involuntary commitment order under Wis. Stat. § 51.20 for alcohol dependence, concluding that a person may be involuntarily committed for treatment for alcoholism, the circuit court followed the proper procedures and the county met its burden to prove that he was drug dependent and dangerous.
COA rejects challenges to commitment under the 51.20(1)(a)2.b. dangerousness standard
Waukesha County v. M.D.S., Jr., 2024AP1315, District II, 11/6/24 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
COA rejects “Smith’s” challenges raising commonly-litigated appellate issues and affirms in this chapter 51 case, concluding that the circuit court applied the correct legal standard and the county met its burden to show that Smith was dangerous under sub. 2.b.
COA rejects challenges to 51 commitment, involuntary medication orders
Brown County v. L.M.R., 2023AP2314, District III, 8/6/24 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
COA rejects all of L.M.R.’s challenges raising commonly-litigated appellate issues and affirms in this Chapter 51 case given some less-than favorable facts.
COA affirms ch. 51 commitment under third standard
Brown County v. J.D.T., 2023AP2339, 7/23/24, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
J.D.T. challenges the his commitment under ch. 51 (second and third standards). The COA concludes that the county presented sufficient evidence of dangerousness under the third standard, Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., and therefore does not address the second standard.
Defense Wins: COA reverses commitment order
St. Croix County v. B.T.C., 2023AP2085, 6/11/24, District III (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In the second decision this week reversing a circuit court’s commitment order under Chapter 51, the COA concludes that respondent telling a police officer that he would “bring the chief to justice” not sufficient to establish the respondent is “dangerous.”
Defense Win! Insufficient evidence of dangerousness under first or second standards of dangerousness
Marinette County v. C.R.J., 2023AP1695-FT, 4/16/24, District III (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
C.R.J. (“Caleb”) challenged his commitment on two fronts: (1) the circuit court’s failure to comply with Langlade County v. D.J.W.’s “specific factual findings” mandate and (2) the county failed to introduce sufficient evidence of dangerousness under either standard. After critiquing the circuit court’s factual findings, the court agrees with Caleb that insufficient evidence existed to involuntarily commit him.
COA rejects challenges to finding of dangerousness, incompetency to refuse medication and upholds trial court’s decision to admit expert’s report at 51 hearing
Winnebago County v. C.J.H., 2023AP1263, 3/6/24, District II (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In a 51 appeal presenting several commonly litigated issues, COA finds no error and affirms.
COA rejects challenges to recommitment and involuntary medication
Ozaukee County D.H.S. v. M.A.G., 2023AP681, 11/29/23, District II (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
M.A.G. challenged the extension of her Chapter 51 commitment and the order finding her incompetent to refuse medication. The court of appeals affirms both orders after concluding that the county presented sufficient evidence of dangerousness under the the third standard and sufficient evidence that she is not competent to refuse medication.
Fear of “decompensation” and recurrence of dangerous behavior dooms challenge to recommitment
Sauk County D.H.S. v. R.K.M., 2023AP912, 10/12/23, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
R.K.M. raised a variety of arguments seeking to challenge the often cited “decompensation” theory for extending a chapter 51 commitment where the subject has (1) made substantial progress while under commitment, (2) engaged in no recent dangerous behavior, and (3) is generally compliant with medication and treatment provided under commitment. However, his challenge runs into the buzzsaw of fears of decompensation and “recurrence of his symptoms.” (Op., ¶¶6-7).
COA affirms initial commitment order; expresses critical thoughts as to “flood” of 51 appeals and hints at a renewed willingness to find at least some appeals moot
Winnebago County v. C.H., 2023AP505, 8/30/23, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In this Ch. 51 appeal, COA swats aside familiar 51 arguments, expresses its frustration with a “flood” of Ch. 51 appeals and, with approving citation to a dissent from SCOW, hints that we may not have heard the last of the mootness doctrine in COA with respect to 51 appeals.