On Point: 1. Original commitment

Waukesha v. L.J.E., 2022AP292, 10/5/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Evans”  was diagnosed with bipolar disorder with psychotic features, a condition considered permanent but manageable with medication. When the County sought to commit her under the 5th standard, she argued that it failed to prove that she did not satisfy one of the “exclusions” to the 5th standard. Specifically, the 5th standard does not apply where the individual may be provided protective placement or services under ch. 55. The court of appeals rejected that argument.

Sheboygan County HSD v. P.W.S., 2022AP426, District 2, 9/28/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In this fact-intensive decision (¶¶2-17), the court of appeals rejects P.W.S.’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that there was a substantial probability he was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.

Trempealeau County v. C.B.O., 2021AP1955 & 2022AP102, 8/30/22, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is a double defense win! You might even call it a quadruple defense win! The court of appeals consolidated “Chris’s” appeals from his initial commitment order and his recommitment order. It reversed his initial commitment order because (1) the circuit court violated Langlade County v. D.J.W. and (2) the county’s evidence was insufficient. It reversed the recommitment order because (3) the circuit court’s fact findings were clearly erroneous, and (4) all the county proved was that if treatment were withdrawn Chris would engage in the same conduct that was insufficient to support the initial commitment.

Walworth County v. M.R.M., 2022AP140-FT, certification granted 9/14/22,  reversed, 2023 WI 59; case activity

Issues (from the COA certification):

1. Does the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2021 WI 85, ¶38, 399 Wis. 2d 471, 966 N.W.2d 590, apply retroactively or only prospectively?

2. In a ch. 51 case involving a petition to extend a commitment order, is circuit court competency determined from the expiration of the earlier commitment order or from the expiration of the extension order, even where the extension order is determined on appeal to be invalid?

Wood County v. J.L.S., 2022AP299, 8/25/22, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court entered orders for initial commitment order and involuntary medication order. Later (not sure how much later), the County persuaded the circuit court to dismiss these orders. On appeal, J.L.S. argued, among other things, that the appeal of orders was not moot due to their collateral consequences. The County filed a letter saying that it wouldn’t file a response brief because J.L.S.

Walworth County v. M.R.M., 2022AP140-FT, certification filed 7/14/22, certification granted, 9/14/22, reversed, 2023 WI 59; District 2; case activity

1. Does the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2021 WI 85, ¶38, 399 Wis. 2d 471, 966 N.W.2d 590, have retroactive application or only prospective application?

2. In a ch. 51 case involving a petition to extend a commitment order, is circuit court competency determined from the expiration of the earlier commitment order or from the expiration of the extension order, even where the extension order is determined on appeal to be invalid?

Outagamie County v. C.J.A., 2022 WI App 36; case activity

On April 12th the court of appeals issued an opinion holding that due process does not require a county to give particularized notice of the standard of dangerousness that a person will satisfy if treatment is withdrawn. It also found that special verdict given to the jury defective. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on a recommitment that had expired. Happy news! The court of appeals withdrew that opinion. The reissued opinion omits the due process decision, retains the special verdict win, and now reverses outright.

Milwaukee County v. A.J.G., 2021AP1338, 5/3/22, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

When a circuit court orders a ch. 51 recommitment, it must specify which standard of dangerousness the patient will satisfy if treatment is withdrawn. Langlade County. v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶40, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 941 N.W.2d 277. This case holds that a circuit court must also specify the standard of dangerousness that the patient meets when ordering an initial commitment.

Walworth County v. P.S., 2021AP2090-FT, 4/13/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court entered an initial commitment order against P.C. without specifying a standard of dangerousness. The court of appeals shrugged. It did not matter because the circuit court’s findings “were specific, tracked the statutory criteria, and are supported by the record.” Opinion, ¶10 n.2.

Waupaca County v. H.I.B., 2021AP2026, 4/7/22, District 4 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity

It is uncontested that “Hazel” has done well for three commitments in a row. Yet the court of appeals has affirmed her 4th Chapter 51 recommitment  because the jury could have inferred a “substantial probability” of death or serious injury from evidence that was “only suggestive” and that “lacked details such as dates and clear descriptions of conduct.”