On Point: 1. Original commitment

Marathon County v. T.A.T., 2019AP1709, District 3, 6/29/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The testimony of the the three witnesses called by the County provided sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that T.A.T. (“Travis”) was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.

Outagamie County v. X.Z.B., 2020AP2058, 6/22/2121, District 3, (1 judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This case involves the recommitment of a protectively placed person based on §51.20(1)(a)2.c., the 3rd standard of dangerousness.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit courts’ recommitment order for insufficient evidence. And, for the second time in one week, it held that when circuit courts fail to make the requisite factual findings for a commitment that has expired, the remedy is reversal not remand for further fact-finding.

Last fall, SCOW granted review on the question of whether a doctor’s failure to file an examiner’s report 48 hours before a commitment hearing deprived the circuit court of competence to adjudicate the case. See our post on Fond du Lac County v. S.N.W., Appeal No. 2019AP2073. This is a recurring problem, so Chapter 51 lawyers eagerly awaited the answer. Unfortunately, after briefing and oral argument, SCOW has dismissed yet another Chapter 51 case without a decision.

Rock County v. J.J.K., 2020AP1085, 4/29/21, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity

This is an appeal from the initial commitment and involuntary medication order entered against J.J.K. The court of appeals affirmed both contrary to published precedent on the rule against hearsay, the plain error doctrine, and procedural and substantive due process.

State v. Davonta J. Dillard, 2020AP999, 4/13/21, District 1, (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Officers patrolling in Milwaukee noticed a vehicle idling and apparently unoccupied. One approached the vehicle and shined his flashlight through a window; he saw a person (Dillard) in the back seat who immediately ducked out of view (most of the windows were highly tinted, impeding the officer’s view). The officer opened the rear driver’s side door, and the person then opened and ran out the door on the other side. Other officers tasered and detained him. The officer who’d opened the door saw a handgun on the floor of the car, which ultimately led to Dillard’s conviction for carrying a concealed weapon.

Fond du Lac County v. J.L.H., 2020AP2049, 3/24/21, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)e. lays out the “fifth standard” for dangerousness; a person can be committed under it if his or her mental illness prevents him or her from understanding the advantages and disadvantages of treatment, and a lack of treatment will cause a substantial probability that the person will be harmed and become unable to function. But there’s a limitation on this standard that the other standards lack: a person can’t be dangerous under it if care is available, either in the community at large or through ch. 55, that diminishes the threat of harm so that it is not substantial.

Jefferson County v. S.M.S., 2020AP814, 3/11/21, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

It is blackletter law that the probable cause hearing for a Chapter 51 commitment must be held within a statutorily-prescribed time from the subject individual’s detention or the circuit court must dismiss the proceeding for lack of competency to adjudicate it. See §51.20(7)(a) and Dodge Cnty. v. Ryan E.M., 2002 WI App 71, ¶5, 252 Wis. 2d 490, 642 N.W.2d 592. In this case, the court of appeals held that the Ryan E.M. rule did not apply because the individual’s conduct (he was pro se) made it necessary for the circuit court to adjourn the probable cause hearing beyond the 72-hour period expired.

Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2020AP370, petition for review granted 2/26/21, reversed, 2021 WI 85; case activity

Issue for review:

Section 51.20(11) provides that the subject of a commitment proceeding must demand a jury trial 48 hours in advance of the time set for the final hearing. When the court adjourns the hearing for good cause to appoint new counsel, does that reset the 48 hours for demanding a jury trial?

Adams County v. D.R.D., 2020AP1426, 1/28/21, District 4; case activity

This appeal posed a simple question about due process in a Chapter 51 commitment proceeding. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) held that the 14th Amendment requires the county to give a person sufficient notice of the legal standard under which she is being detained so that she has a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense. D.R.D. raised this issue on appeal but since trial counsel had not preserved the objection, the court of appeals held the issue forfeited.

Outagamie Countyv. G.S., 2019AP1950, 1/20/21, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“George” called law enforcement claiming to be a federal authority who wanted to make a citizen’s arrest of some duck hunters. When a deputy arrived at the lake he saw George in a boat with 2 encased firearms about 100 yards from shore where a group of duck hunters were upset about George’s verbal encounter with them. George never pointed a gun at anyone.  Based on this evidence, a doctor’s report, and substantial hearsay evidence, the circuit court committed Geoge under the 3rd standard of dangerousness, which requires a pattern of recent acts demonstrating a substantial probability that he would injure himself or others.