On Point: e. Dangerousness

Marathon County v. T.J.M., 2022AP623, 11/8/22, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Trevor” appealed an order recommitting him for 12 months because (1) the circuit court orally failed to indicate a standard of dangeorusness per Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, and (2) the county’s evidence was insufficient under either the 1st or 3rd standards. He prevailed on the latter argument. The opinion is helpful to lawyers defending clients against recommitment under these standards.

Trempealeau County v. C.J., 2022AP286, 10/11/22, District 3 (one judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity

C.J. (“Carter” in the opinion) is diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. He was initially committed after an incident in which he drove recklessly with his girlfriend in the car, threatening to kill her and himself along with the president and vice president. As the six-month commitment neared its end, the county petitioned to extend.  It did so even though C.J. had not had further incidents or problems in his group home, was taking his medications voluntarily; recognized his mental illness, and expressed that he wished to continue medication because it was helping him a great deal. (¶¶3-8).

Trempealeau County v. C.B.O., 2021AP1955 & 2022AP102, 8/30/22, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is a double defense win! You might even call it a quadruple defense win! The court of appeals consolidated “Chris’s” appeals from his initial commitment order and his recommitment order. It reversed his initial commitment order because (1) the circuit court violated Langlade County v. D.J.W. and (2) the county’s evidence was insufficient. It reversed the recommitment order because (3) the circuit court’s fact findings were clearly erroneous, and (4) all the county proved was that if treatment were withdrawn Chris would engage in the same conduct that was insufficient to support the initial commitment.

Winnebago County v. D.E.S., 2022AP251, 8/31/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Langlade County v. D.J.W. requires a circuit to make specific factual findings with reference to the dangerousness standard that its recommitment order is based upon.  The circuit court failed to follow D.J.W. but the court of appeals affirmed because the circuit court’s words and the county’s closing argument supposedly made it clear that they were relying on the second and fifth standards of dangerousness.

Barron County v. K.L., 2021AP133, District 3, 8/9/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶3, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, held that “going forward circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are to make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based.” Deciding an issue addressed in the dissenting opinion in Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, the court of appeals holds the failure to comply with D.J.W.‘s findings requirement can be a harmless error and was harmless in this case.

Manitowoc County v. J.M.K., 2022AP122, 7/27/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

J.M.K.  is currently diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. He has been committed several times since 2015. Right now he is doing well. He lives in a supervised apartment but holds a job, participates in community activities, and works out at the YMCA. The county monitors his medication compliance because in the past when he has stopped taking them he deteriorated rapidly.

Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2019AP1033; case activity

Unlike other states, Wisconsin appellate courts have for decades dismissed most appeals from expired ch. 51 orders as moot. As a result, there was been little appellate review of circuit court decisions declaring people mentally ill, committing them to government custody, and medicating them against their will. Not any more. In a 4-3 decision, SCOW holds that appeals from expired recommitment orders are not moot due to their collateral consequences. While S.A.M. won the war on mootness, he lost his due process and sufficiency of evidence claims. His recommitment was affirmed.

Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity

The crisp majority opinion of this 50-page split decision confirms a narrow but important point of law for ch. 51 cases. When an appellate court reverses a commitment order that has expired, the circuit court lacks competency to conduct remand proceedings in the case. The majority opinion does not address whether, in all cases, an appellate court must reverse a “D.J.W. error” outright or whether it may instead conduct a harmless error analysis. The dissent does not fully grasp this point and thus presents a long, confusing attack on an imaginary majority opinion.

Waupaca County v. H.I.B., 2021AP2026, 4/7/22, District 4 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity

It is uncontested that “Hazel” has done well for three commitments in a row. Yet the court of appeals has affirmed her 4th Chapter 51 recommitment  because the jury could have inferred a “substantial probability” of death or serious injury from evidence that was “only suggestive” and that “lacked details such as dates and clear descriptions of conduct.”

Taylor County Human Services v. L.E., 2021AP1292, 2/15/22, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

A circuit court extended “Luca’s” commitment, directed that he be placed in a locked ward, and ordered involuntary medication. On appeal, Luca challenges his placement in a locked ward and the involuntary medication order. At a minimum, the court of appeals analysis of Luca’s right to refuse involuntary medication merits review by SCOW.