On Point: 2. Recommitment

Portage County v. J.W.K., 2017AP1574, petition for review of a memorandum opinion granted, 6/11/18; affirmed, 5/21/19; case activity

Whether an appeal of the extension of a Chapter 51 commitment based on insufficient evidence becomes moot when the circuit court enters a new extension order?

Whether an examining physician’s testimony is sufficient to support the extension of a commitment where the physician merely recites the statutory language?

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2018AP145-FT, 5/1/18, District 3 (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication), petition for review granted, 7/10/19, reversed, 2020 WI 41; case activity

This decision makes you wonder whether §51.20(1)(am), Wisconsin’s recommitment statute, is unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to D.J.W.

Waukesha v. S.L.L., 2017AP1468, 5/2/18, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 8/15/18, affirmed, 2019 WI 66; case activity

No Wisconsin case addresses how a circuit court acquires personal jurisdiction over the subject of a Chapter 51 petition. Neither Chapter 51 nor any case authorizes a circuit court to enter a default commitment against a person whom the County failed to serve with the petition. Nor does any authority authorize doctors who have not “personally examined” the subject of a Chapter 51 petition to opine that she is mentally ill, dangerous, and the proper subject for treatment.  Yet that is what is what happened in this case.  The subject of a Chapter 51 petition could be dead, living at the North Pole, or thriving under the care of a private physician in another county, yet according to the circuit court it can still, without service, issue a default commitment against her and writ of capias to detain her next time she enters the county.

Portage County v. J.W.K., 2017AP2429, 4/26/18, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

J.W.K. appealed the extension of his Chapter 51 mental commitment arguing that the County failed to present sufficient evidence that he would be the proper subject for treatment if treatment were withdrawn. He argued that Dr. Persing’s testimony on this point “was too conclusory to be probative.” The court of appeals held that it was “sufficiently on point and clear.” Opinion ¶8.

Outagamie County v. C.A., 2017AP450, District 3, 1/23/18 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The records for Chapter 51 cases are confidential, so we have not seen the briefs for this case. But, judging from this court of appeals opinion, it doesn’t take much beyond a mental illness diagnosis to get yourself committed under §51.20(1)(a)2e, Wisconsin’s 5th standard of dangerousness. A little unsubstantiated hearsay about your frustration with the justice system just might do the trick.

Dodge County v. L.A.S., 2017AP302, District 4, 8/17/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Under § 51.20(9)(a) the circuit court must appoint two licensed physicians or psychologists to examine and write reports on an individual subject to involuntary commitment proceedings. This requirement applies only to the initial commitment proceeding, not to the proceeding to extend a commitment.

Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, 6/8/2017, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, 370 Wis. 2d 262, 881 N.W.2d 359; case activity

In Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., which involved a woman with Alzheimer’s disease, SCOW held that a person is a “proper subject for treatment” under §51.20(1) if she can be “rehabilitated.” It then set forth a test for determining whether a mentally ill person has “rehabilitative potential.” In this case, J.W.J. argued that Helen E.F.’s framework should be modified because it does not account for the characteristics of mental illnesses other than Alzheimer’s, such as the one he has–paranoid schizophrenia.

Crawford County v. E.K., 2016AP2063, 5/18/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This case presents multiple SCOW-worthy issues. One is an interesting constitutional dilemma. The County sought to extend E.K.’s commitment and involuntary medication order and, as evidence, offered threatening emails that E.K. had allegedly sent. Defense counsel objected because the emails had not been authenticated. So the County called E.K. to the stand to authenticate them. Defense counsel objected on 5th Amendment grounds. This prompted E.K. to say: “I’ll waive that. Yes, those are my emails.”

Marathon County v. P.X., 2016AP1490, 4/18/17, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

P.X., who has longstanding diagnoses of autism, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and intellectual disabilities, was the subject of a Chapter 54 guardianship and a Chapter 55 protective placement, when the County sought to extend his Chapter 51 civil commitment. P.X. argues that he is not a “proper subject for treatment” under Chapter 51 because he is not “capable of rehabilitation” under Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179. Instead, the county is using medication to “control” his behavior.

Review of an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179 held that an individual is capable of rehabilitation, and thus a proper subject for treatment under Chapter 51, when treatment would control the symptoms of the individual’s disorder.  If, on the other hand, treatment would control only the individual’s activity or behavior, then he is not a proper subject for treatment under Chapter 51. The question is: how are courts to determine whether treatment is controlling symptoms of disorder–especially when medical experts, when describing the effects of treatment, blur the line between symptoms and behavior?