On Point blog, page 13 of 16
Once committed, always committed . . . at least under Chapter 51
Waukesha County v. M.J.S., 2017AP1843, 8/1/18, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity
In May On Point reported a defense win in this case. One week later, Waukesha County moved for reconsideration. The court of appeals just granted the motion and issued this new opinion. The difference between the two is that the May opinion only addressed (and reversed) the circuit court’s involuntary medication order. The August opinion addresses (and affirms) the circuit court’s order to extend M.J.S.’s commitment, while maintaining the reversal of his involuntary medication order. The court of appeals’ reasons for affirming the extension of commitment are unsettling.
Court of appeals erases line between civil commitments and protective placements
Marathon County v. P.X., 2017AP1497, 6/26/18, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
P.X. is autistic, non-verbal, intellectually and developmentally disabled and has obsessive compulsive disorder and pica. The question is whether he is capable of “rehabilitation,” which would make him a proper subject for treatment on Chapter 51. If not, then he should be placed under Chapter 55. The court of appeals held that even though P.X.’s disabilities cannot be cured and he can never function in society, his OCD and pica could be controlled with medication, so Chapter 51 applies. Under Chapter 51, a person can be committed to a mental institution for years, but Chapter 55 bars protective placement in a unit for the acutely mentally ill. See §55.12(2). This decision seems to let the county accomplish through Chapter 51 what it cannot do through Chapter 55. Let’s hope P.X. petitions SCOW for review.
SCOW to review mootness and sufficiency of doctor’s testimony in Chapter 51 cases
Portage County v. J.W.K., 2017AP1574, petition for review of a memorandum opinion granted, 6/11/18; affirmed, 5/21/19; case activity
Whether an appeal of the extension of a Chapter 51 commitment based on insufficient evidence becomes moot when the circuit court enters a new extension order?
Whether an examining physician’s testimony is sufficient to support the extension of a commitment where the physician merely recites the statutory language?
Court of appeals upholds questionable recommitment; query whether sec. 51.20(1)(am) is unconstitutional?
Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2018AP145-FT, 5/1/18, District 3 (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication), petition for review granted, 7/10/19, reversed, 2020 WI 41; case activity
This decision makes you wonder whether §51.20(1)(am), Wisconsin’s recommitment statute, is unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to D.J.W.
Court of appeals dismisses Chapter 51 appeal as moot, ducks issues of 1st impression
Waukesha v. S.L.L., 2017AP1468, 5/2/18, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 8/15/18, affirmed, 2019 WI 66; case activity
No Wisconsin case addresses how a circuit court acquires personal jurisdiction over the subject of a Chapter 51 petition. Neither Chapter 51 nor any case authorizes a circuit court to enter a default commitment against a person whom the County failed to serve with the petition. Nor does any authority authorize doctors who have not “personally examined” the subject of a Chapter 51 petition to opine that she is mentally ill, dangerous, and the proper subject for treatment. Yet that is what is what happened in this case. The subject of a Chapter 51 petition could be dead, living at the North Pole, or thriving under the care of a private physician in another county, yet according to the circuit court it can still, without service, issue a default commitment against her and writ of capias to detain her next time she enters the county.
Court of appeals finds perfunctory testimony by doctor sufficient to uphold extension of Chapter 51 commitment
Portage County v. J.W.K., 2017AP2429, 4/26/18, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
J.W.K. appealed the extension of his Chapter 51 mental commitment arguing that the County failed to present sufficient evidence that he would be the proper subject for treatment if treatment were withdrawn. He argued that Dr. Persing’s testimony on this point “was too conclusory to be probative.” The court of appeals held that it was “sufficiently on point and clear.” Opinion ¶8.
An unconstitutional application of the 5th standard of dangerousness?
Outagamie County v. C.A., 2017AP450, District 3, 1/23/18 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
The records for Chapter 51 cases are confidential, so we have not seen the briefs for this case. But, judging from this court of appeals opinion, it doesn’t take much beyond a mental illness diagnosis to get yourself committed under §51.20(1)(a)2e, Wisconsin’s 5th standard of dangerousness. A little unsubstantiated hearsay about your frustration with the justice system just might do the trick.
Petitioner isn’t required to present testimony of a physician or psychologist at a ch. 51 extension hearing
Dodge County v. L.A.S., 2017AP302, District 4, 8/17/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Under § 51.20(9)(a) the circuit court must appoint two licensed physicians or psychologists to examine and write reports on an individual subject to involuntary commitment proceedings. This requirement applies only to the initial commitment proceeding, not to the proceeding to extend a commitment.
SCOW declines to clarify test for determining whether mentally ill person is a “proper subject for treatment”
Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, 6/8/2017, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, 370 Wis. 2d 262, 881 N.W.2d 359; case activity
In Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., which involved a woman with Alzheimer’s disease, SCOW held that a person is a “proper subject for treatment” under §51.20(1) if she can be “rehabilitated.” It then set forth a test for determining whether a mentally ill person has “rehabilitative potential.” In this case, J.W.J. argued that Helen E.F.’s framework should be modified because it does not account for the characteristics of mental illnesses other than Alzheimer’s, such as the one he has–paranoid schizophrenia.
Too mentally ill to grasp the advantages and disadvanages of treatment, but well enough to waive the 5th Amendment?
Crawford County v. E.K., 2016AP2063, 5/18/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
This case presents multiple SCOW-worthy issues. One is an interesting constitutional dilemma. The County sought to extend E.K.’s commitment and involuntary medication order and, as evidence, offered threatening emails that E.K. had allegedly sent. Defense counsel objected because the emails had not been authenticated. So the County called E.K. to the stand to authenticate them. Defense counsel objected on 5th Amendment grounds. This prompted E.K. to say: “I’ll waive that. Yes, those are my emails.”