On Point: 2. Recommitment

Outagamie County v. X.Z.B., 2020AP2058, 6/22/2121, District 3, (1 judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This case involves the recommitment of a protectively placed person based on §51.20(1)(a)2.c., the 3rd standard of dangerousness.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit courts’ recommitment order for insufficient evidence. And, for the second time in one week, it held that when circuit courts fail to make the requisite factual findings for a commitment that has expired, the remedy is reversal not remand for further fact-finding.

Sheboygan County v. M.J.M., 2020AP1744, 6/9/21, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is new. M.J.M. appealed a recommitment order which expired during the course of his appeal. The usual kerfuffle regarding mootness ensued but this time (unlike here and here) the court of appeals acknowledged that the issue of whether recommitment may be dismissed as moot was pending before SCOW in Sauk v. S.A.M, and so reached the merits of this case. It then found sufficient evidence of dangerousness based on threats M.J.M. made during his expiring commitment and because of what he would do if treatment were withdrawn.

Eau claire County v. J.M.P., 2020AP2014, 5/25/21, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Last term, SCOW ordered circuit courts deciding recommitment cases to make specific factual findings referencing the standard of dangerousness that supported a person’s recommitment. See Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶3, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. In J.M.P., the circuit court violated this rule, so the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for additional fact-finding. Unfortunately, this remedy creates significant burdens for people recommitted in violation of D.J.W and due process.

Milwaukee County v. T.L.T, 2020AP426, District 1, 5/18/21 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Two court-appointed examiners failed to file their reports on whether T.L.T. should be recommitted 48 hours before her final hearing. Trial counsel moved to dismiss arguing that the violation of §51.20(10)(b)’s 48-hour rule deprived the circuit court of competency to adjudicate the case.  The circuit court denied the motion, and without the defense’s agreement, adjourned the case so that counsel could review the reports before the hearing. T.L.T. appealed but the court of appeals dismissed her appeal as moot.

Rock County v. J.J.K., 2020AP1085, 4/29/21, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity

This is an appeal from the initial commitment and involuntary medication order entered against J.J.K. The court of appeals affirmed both contrary to published precedent on the rule against hearsay, the plain error doctrine, and procedural and substantive due process.

Rock County v. J.J.K., 2020AP2105, District IV, 5/6/21 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is the sequel to the Rock County v. J.J.K.. 2020AP1085 above. The decision is alarming because the circuit court found J.J.K. dangerous enough for a recommitment based on the 5th standard, but the court of appeals affirmed based on the 4th standard. The opinion also further highlights the need for SCOW to elaborate its decision in Winnebago County v. C.S., 2020 WI 33, 391 Wis. 2d 35, 940 N.W.2d 875. Specifically, can a court order involuntary medication for a person undergoing recommitment without evidence that he is dangerous as defined by §51.61(1)(g)3?

Rusk County v. A.A., Appeal No. 2019AP839 and 2020AP1580 (consolidated); certification granted 4/13/21, District 3; case activity here and here

SCOW recently held that recommitment proceedings are governed only by the procedures in §§51.20(10)-(13). Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, 387 Wis. 2d 333, 929 N.W.2d 140. Thus, the procedural requirements in §§(1)-(9) do not apply. Id., ¶¶24, 27. This court of appeals certification asks SCOW to decide whether S.L.L. violates the plain language of Chapter 51. If not, then does Chapter 51 violate 14th Amendment due process and equal protection given that, under S.L.L.‘s construction, it denies people undergoing recommitment fundamental procedural rights guaranteed to people undergoing initial commitments.

Milwaukee County v. K.M., 2019AP1166, 4/13/21, District 1; (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity

The saga continues. Portage County v. E.R.R. 2019AP20133 presented the question of whether appeals from recommitment orders are ever moot due to their collateral effects. When SCOW split 3-3 in that case, it granted review in Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2019AP1033 and ordered the parties to brief whether it may order the court of appeals to decide commitment appeals before they expire. See our post here. Some might see the S.A.M. order as a red flag signaling “proceed with caution” on mootness. But, like a bull, the court of appeals charges ahead to dismiss another recommitment appeal as moot.

Rock County Department of Human Services v. J.E.B., 2020AP1954-FT, 4/7/21, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Good news/bad news. It’s terrific that the court of appeals is going to enforce the new requirement that circuit courts ground their recommitment orders on factual findings tied to a specific standard of dangerousness in §51.20(1)(a)2.a-e.  See Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶3, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. However, J.E.B. requested reversal. Period. Without any objection by the county or briefing by the parties, the court of appeals decided to remand the case for the circuit court to make the missing factual findings. But published case law suggests that the circuit court lacks competency to act on an expired commitment.

Fond du Lac County v. J.L.H., 2020AP2049, 3/24/21, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)e. lays out the “fifth standard” for dangerousness; a person can be committed under it if his or her mental illness prevents him or her from understanding the advantages and disadvantages of treatment, and a lack of treatment will cause a substantial probability that the person will be harmed and become unable to function. But there’s a limitation on this standard that the other standards lack: a person can’t be dangerous under it if care is available, either in the community at large or through ch. 55, that diminishes the threat of harm so that it is not substantial.