On Point: A. Ch. 51, Mental health

The moment Chapter 51 lawyers have been waiting for has . . . been postponed.  This term SCOW was set to decide whether appeals from expired recommitment orders are ever moot. See our post on Portage County v. E.R.R., 2019AP20133. After briefing and oral argument (in which Justice Anne Walsh Bradley did not participate), SCOW split 3-3 on the issue.  This means that the order dismissing E.R.R.’s appeal as moot stands. That’s the bad news.  Here’s the good news.

Jefferson County v. S.M.S., 2020AP814, 3/11/21, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

It is blackletter law that the probable cause hearing for a Chapter 51 commitment must be held within a statutorily-prescribed time from the subject individual’s detention or the circuit court must dismiss the proceeding for lack of competency to adjudicate it. See §51.20(7)(a) and Dodge Cnty. v. Ryan E.M., 2002 WI App 71, ¶5, 252 Wis. 2d 490, 642 N.W.2d 592. In this case, the court of appeals held that the Ryan E.M. rule did not apply because the individual’s conduct (he was pro se) made it necessary for the circuit court to adjourn the probable cause hearing beyond the 72-hour period expired.

Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2019AP1033, petition for review granted 2/24/21; case activity

Issues for review:

1. Whether S.A.M.’s appeal from his recommitment is moot because it expired before S.A.M. filed his notice of appeal.

2. Whether the county failed to meet its burden of proving dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence.

3. Whether S.A.M. was denied procedural due process because the county failed to provide particularized notice of the basis for his recommitment. including which standard of dangerousness was being alleged.

4.  Whether this court has the authority, through its “superintending and administrative authority over all courts” (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(1)) and/or its authority to “regulate pleading, practice, and procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts” (Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1)), to require the court of appeals to expedite the disposition of appeals under Wis. Stat. ch. 51, or in some other manner to ensure that appellants under Wis. Stat. ch. 51 receive an appeal that addresses the merits of the appellants’ contentions?*

Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2020AP370, petition for review granted 2/26/21, reversed, 2021 WI 85; case activity

Issue for review:

Section 51.20(11) provides that the subject of a commitment proceeding must demand a jury trial 48 hours in advance of the time set for the final hearing. When the court adjourns the hearing for good cause to appoint new counsel, does that reset the 48 hours for demanding a jury trial?

Waupaca County v. K.E.K., 2021 WI 9, 2/9/21, affirming an unpublished COA opinion, 2018AP1887; case activity

Waupaca County sought to extend Kate’s initial commitment for one year. The County’s examiner and witnesses agreed that she had not been dangerous during her initial commitment. She had taken her medication and was doing really well. She even agreed to take medication going forward, provided that it was not the one that had caused horrible side effects because it made her feel better. The circuit court recommitted her because the doctor opined that she would stop treatment in the future and become a proper subject of commitment. She challenged the constitutionality of §51.20(1)(am) on its face and as applied under the 14th Amendment. In a 5-2 decision, SCOW upheld the statute.

Adams County v. D.R.D., 2020AP1426, 1/28/21, District 4; case activity

This appeal posed a simple question about due process in a Chapter 51 commitment proceeding. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) held that the 14th Amendment requires the county to give a person sufficient notice of the legal standard under which she is being detained so that she has a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense. D.R.D. raised this issue on appeal but since trial counsel had not preserved the objection, the court of appeals held the issue forfeited.

Outagamie Countyv. G.S., 2019AP1950, 1/20/21, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“George” called law enforcement claiming to be a federal authority who wanted to make a citizen’s arrest of some duck hunters. When a deputy arrived at the lake he saw George in a boat with 2 encased firearms about 100 yards from shore where a group of duck hunters were upset about George’s verbal encounter with them. George never pointed a gun at anyone.  Based on this evidence, a doctor’s report, and substantial hearsay evidence, the circuit court committed Geoge under the 3rd standard of dangerousness, which requires a pattern of recent acts demonstrating a substantial probability that he would injure himself or others.

Winnebago County v. D.D.A., 2020AP1351, District 2, 12/23/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals rejects D.D.A.’s challenges to the sufficiency of the petition to extend his ch. 51 commitment and to the evidence presented at the extension hearing.

Calumet County v. J.M.K., 2020AP1183-FT, District 2, 12/23/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence proved J.M.K. (“Jane”) was not competent to refuse psychotropic medication.

Outagamie County v. R.W., 2020AP1171-FT, 12/17/20, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Nobody testified that Rachel behaved dangerously during her extant commitment. Her doctor had no knowledge of medication non-compliance.  A social worker once saw a Haldol pill on a plate on a counter and inferred that Rachel had not taken her meds on that occasion.  The reason that doctor and social worker recommended recommitment is that several times in the past Rachel was released from commitment, stopped medication, and decompensated. To prevent that cycle, she had to be recommited. Rachel cannot change the past, so by that logic, she must be recommitted forever.