On Point blog, page 25 of 33
Court of appeals upholds involuntary medication order, tests limits of Melanie L.
Outagamie County v. J.J., 2016AP43, 10/12/16, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
If this opinion doesn’t cross the line of Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶91, 97, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607, it at least curls its toes around the decision.
Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2016AP46-FT, petition for review granted 9/13/16
Review of an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity
Issue (composed by On Point)
Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179 held that an individual is capable of rehabilitation, and thus a proper subject for treatment under Chapter 51, when treatment would control the symptoms of the individual’s disorder. If, on the other hand, treatment would control only the individual’s activity or behavior, then he is not a proper subject for treatment under Chapter 51. The question is: how are courts to determine whether treatment is controlling symptoms of disorder–especially when medical experts, when describing the effects of treatment, blur the line between symptoms and behavior?
Evidence was sufficient to justify involuntary medication order
Winnebago County v. M.O.S., 2015AP2619, District 2, 6/15/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court’s oral findings at the conclusion of M.O.S.’s trial didn’t track the statutory language in either § 51.61(1)(g)4.a. or 4.b., but no matter: On the standard involuntary medication order form the court checked the box corresponding to the standard under subdivision 4.b. (¶¶4, 7), and the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support an order under that standard, despite M.O.S’s partial understanding that his delusions are caused by mental illness.
Evidence sufficient to show dangerousness for Chapter 51 civil commitment
Rock County v. S.J.M., 2016AP255-FT, 5/19/16, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
A circuit court involuntarily committed S.J.M. under §51.20(1)(a)1 -2 after finding him mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous. S.J.M. challenged the “dangerous” determination and, specifically, the finding that he threatened his mother with serious physical harm, which made her reasonably fear violent behavior and serious harm from him.
Evidence supported extension of involuntary commitment
Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2016AP46-FT, 5/4/16 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication),petition for review granted 9/13/16, affirmed, 2017 WI 57; case activity
To commit a person involuntarily, the county must show that the person is mentally ill and dangerous. To extend the commitment, the county may prove “dangerousness” by showing that “there is a substantial likelihood, based on the subject individual’s treatment record, he would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.” §51.20(1)(am).
Finding of dangerousness to support Chapter 51 commitment affirmed
Outagamie County v. Adam B., 2015AP718, 4/12/16, District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court neglected to specify which of the 5 statutory “dangerousness” standards in §51.20(1)(a)2.a-e supported the Ch. 51 commitment of Adam B. But that did not trouble the court of appeals. Given the “de novo” standard of review, it could (and did) decide for itself which statutory “dangerousness” test the facts satisfied.
Three-word answer sufficient to prove patient was advised of advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to medication
Marquette County v. T.F.W., 2015AP2603-FT, 3/24/16, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
At T.F.W.’s ch. 51 extension hearing, one of the examining physicians was asked “have the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to [T.F.W.’s] medication been explained to [him]?” Her answer: “Yes, they have.” (¶7). That was the extent of the testimony on the matter, but the court of appeals holds it was good enough to satisfy the requirement of § 51.61(1)(g)4.(intro.) and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607.
SCOW: Ch. 51’s inmate commitment procedure is constitutional
Winnebago County v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, on certification from the court of appeals, and affirming the circuit court’s orders for commitment and involuntary medication; majority opinion by Justice Gableman, concurrence/dissent by Justice Abrahamson; case activity
The provisions of ch. 51 allowing the involuntary mental health commitment of prison inmates without a finding of dangerousness does not violate substantive due process because the statute’s provisions are reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.
Evidence supported involuntary medication order
State v. Thomas Treadway, 2015AP591, District 1, 12/1/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The evidence in the record is sufficient to support an order for involuntary medication under § 51.61(1)(g)4(intro.) and b.
Involuntary medication order was supported by the evidence
Winnebago County v. B.C., 2015AP1192-FT, District 2, 10/14/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Applying Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607, the court of appeals holds the County proved B.C. was incompetent to refuse medication, § 51.61(1)(g)4.(intro.) and b., rejecting B.C.’s arguments that: 1) the record doesn’t document how and when he was advised of advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to medication; and 2) the evidence doesn’t prove B.C. was incapable of making an informed choice about accepting or refusing medication.