On Point: A. Ch. 51, Mental health

Whether the subject of a §51.20(1)(a) extension of involuntary commitment and medication order has a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel where his lawyer fails to object to, prevent the admission of, or request a curative instruction to address, evidence of his prisoner status during his jury trial?

Whether the subject of a §51.20(1)(a) extension of involuntary commitment and medication order is entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice where the jury repeatedly sees and hears evidence of his prisoner status?

Marathon County v. P.X., 2016AP1490, 4/18/17, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

P.X., who has longstanding diagnoses of autism, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and intellectual disabilities, was the subject of a Chapter 54 guardianship and a Chapter 55 protective placement, when the County sought to extend his Chapter 51 civil commitment. P.X. argues that he is not a “proper subject for treatment” under Chapter 51 because he is not “capable of rehabilitation” under Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179. Instead, the county is using medication to “control” his behavior.

Marathon County v. R.O., 2016AP1898-FT, 2/27/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In 2016 R.O. was detained under § 51.15 after she was evicted and went to a local shelter but wasn’t able to do the paperwork to stay at the shelter. According to the two doctors who examined her while she was under emergency detention, R.O. was angry, defiant, irritable, displayed some paranoia, refused to cooperate with certain parts of the exams, and ‘lacked insight” into her illness. (¶¶2-6). These observations, in conjunction with information in her records describing past episodes that ended in hospitalization, were sufficient to justify the circuit court’s finding she was dangerous to herself.

Dodge County v. J.T., 2016AP613, District 4, 2/9/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The threats J.T. made in a letter provided sufficient evidence to find him dangerous to others under § 51.30(1)(a)2.b.

Iowa County v. J.L.R., 2016AP1459, 1/12/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

J.L.R. challenges her ch. 51 commitment on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that she was dangerous to herself or others. The court of appeals finds sufficient evidence as to danger to others, and so affirms.

Winnebago County v. J.M., 2016AP619, District 2, 11/9/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 5/15/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 37; case activity

J.M.’s lawyer didn’t secure civilian clothes for him to wear at his ch. 51 recommitment hearing, so he appeared before the jury in his prison greens (sans the shackles, at least; and the stun belt wasn’t visible to the jury). The court of appeals rejects the claim J.M.’s lawyer was ineffective for failing to make a modest outlay at the local Goodwill to purchase J.M. an outfit without the negative stigmata and for failing to ask for a curative instruction.

Which are better: Involuntary Civil Commitment Courts or Mental Health Courts? This new article by New York University Law Professor Professor Michael Perlin compares and contrasts the two.

Outagamie County v. J.J., 2016AP43, 10/12/16, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

If this opinion doesn’t cross the line of Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶91, 97, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607, it at least curls its toes around the decision. 

Review of an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179 held that an individual is capable of rehabilitation, and thus a proper subject for treatment under Chapter 51, when treatment would control the symptoms of the individual’s disorder.  If, on the other hand, treatment would control only the individual’s activity or behavior, then he is not a proper subject for treatment under Chapter 51. The question is: how are courts to determine whether treatment is controlling symptoms of disorder–especially when medical experts, when describing the effects of treatment, blur the line between symptoms and behavior?

Winnebago County v. M.O.S., 2015AP2619, District 2, 6/15/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court’s oral findings at the conclusion of M.O.S.’s trial didn’t track the statutory language in either § 51.61(1)(g)4.a. or 4.b., but no matter: On the standard involuntary medication order form the court checked the box corresponding to the standard under subdivision 4.b. (¶¶4, 7), and the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support an order under that standard, despite M.O.S’s partial understanding that his delusions are caused by mental illness.