On Point: G. Sec. 971.17, NGI

State v. Larry W. Olson, 2019 WI App 61; case activity (including briefs)

Olson and the state resolved some felony counts with an agreement that he’d plead not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The court found him NGI and committed him for 19 years, placing him on conditional release immediately. A few weeks later, Olson admitted violating his release conditions by smoking methamphetamine. DHS, which supervises NGI committees, immediately took him into custody. For reasons unknown, it held him for eight days before filing a petition to revoke his supervised release. This, everyone agrees, violated Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3)(e), which says such a petition “shall” be filed within 72 hours of detention (excluding weekends and holidays). The dispute on appeal is what that violation means: the state says there’s no consequence at all; Olson says a late petition is no good and must be dismissed. In legalese, the question is whether the word “shall” is mandatory or directory.

Kahler v. Kansas, USSC No. 18-6135, certiorari granted 3/18/19

Question presented:

Do the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit a state to abolish the insanity defense?

State v. Justice G. Armstead, 2017AP1586-CR, 5/30/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Armstead pled NGI to 2 misdemeanors, pursuant to §971.16. The court ordered his conditional release into the community for 6 months, along with involuntary medications. Five months into the order, Armstead filed a motion for postdisposition relief  arguing that both the examining physician and the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard for ordering involuntary medications. The circuit court denied the motion. The conditional release order expired a week later but Armstead appealed anyway. The court of appeals dismissed his appeal as moot. In doing so, it made a significant error of law.

Or can you? Yesterday’s NYT Magazine featured an in-depth article on what happens to a people after they plead not guilty by reason of insanity. If you like horror stories, click here.  The author says that in 2015 he began seeking data on length-of-stay and legal status for people who have been institutionalized in every state via Freedom of Information Act requests. Wisconsin replied that it didn’t have that information. Are we complying with the law?

State v. Bruce C. Brenizer, 2015AP2181, District 3, 6/6/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including select briefs)

The Department of Health Services didn’t have authority to transfer Brenizer to the Department of Corrections because the circuit court’s commitment order unambiguously states that Brenizer is committed to DHS custody for life unless his custody is terminated under § 971.17(5) (1991-92).

on review of unpublished decision; case activity

Issues (composed by on Point) 

1. Whether Burton is entitled to a Machner hearing on his postconviction motion asserting that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise that Burton could pursue a bifurcated (NGI) plea along with his guilty plea, and have a jury determine whether he was not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect.

In the matter of State of Wisconsin v. Bryan J. Stanley: La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court for La Crosse County, 2012 WI App 42 (recommended for publication); case activity

Open Records / Public Access to Court Records – Treatment Records, Generally 

(Discussion with respect to newspaper’s Open Records request for information contained in NGI conditional release plan:)

¶25      While this is a criminal commitment case following an NGI finding under Wis.

court of appeals certification; for Bryan Stanley: Kristin M. Kerschensteiner; case activity

Open Records – Sealed Court File – NGI Condition Release Plan 

The appeal raises two significant issues at the intersection of Wisconsin’s Open Records Law and Mental Health Act, one procedural and one substantive. The procedural issue involves the proper mechanism to pursue an open records request for documents that have been placed under seal by the circuit court.  

State v. Alan Adin Randall, 2011 WI App 102 (recommended for publication); for Randall: Brian Kinstler, Craig S. Powell; case activity; prior history: State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995) (“Randall I”); State v. Randall, 222 Wis. 2d 53, 586 N.W.2d 318 (Ct.

State v. Wendy A. Brown, 2010 WI App 113; for Brown: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply

The significant risk of “serious property damage” underlying an NGI institutionalization-commitment, § 971.17(3)(a), doesn’t require physical damage to property; loss of money or goods — from identity theft in this instance — suffices:

¶13      The above definitions of property and damage are much broader than that which would be required to support Brown’s limited interpretation of property damage.