On Point: 3. Civil Commitments

Waukesha County v. M.J.S., 20221AP105-FT, District 2, 7/28/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Under § 51.20(11)(a), a demand for a jury trial must be made “48 hours in advance of the time set for final hearing,” if notice of final hearing was provided to the subject individual or his or her lawyer. Applying Marathon County v. R.J.O., 2020 WI App 20, 392 Wis. 2d 157, 943 N.W.2d 898, the “time set for final hearing” is the original hearing date, not the date set after an adjournment.

Trempealeau County v. B.K., 2020AP1166, District 3, 7/27/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

B.K. (“Brian”) argues he was denied procedural due process because he was not given particularized notice of which standard of dangerousness the County intended to prove at the final commitment hearing. He also contends the evidence presented at the hearing was insufficient to prove he was dangerous. The court of appeals rejects with both claims.

Rusk County v. A.A., 2019AP839 & 2020AP1580, District 3, 7/20/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (2019AP839; 2020AP1580)

A.A. appeals two recommitment orders, raising multiple constitutional issues as to both and challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of dangerousness as to one of the cases and the admission of hearsay evidence regarding the other. The court of appeals acknowledges that A.A.’s constitutional claims raise “important” and “thorny” issues about recommitment petition pleading requirements and the constitutionality of recommitment proceedings, but it it resolves both cases on the evidentiary issues. (¶¶15, 31-32).

Outagamie County DHHS v. M.D.H., 2020AP86, District 3, 7/13/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence at M.D.H.’s final commitment hearing proved he was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.d.

Marathon County v. T.A.T., 2019AP1709, District 3, 6/29/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The testimony of the the three witnesses called by the County provided sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that T.A.T. (“Travis”) was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.

State v. Christopher W. Yakich, 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR, petition for review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals granted 6/16/21; case activity (including briefs)

Issue Presented (from the PFR):

When a defendant has been found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect in two separate cases and is subject to two separate commitment orders, does the circuit court have authority to run the terms of commitment consecutive to one another?

Outagamie County v. X.Z.B., 2020AP2058, 6/22/2121, District 3, (1 judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This case involves the recommitment of a protectively placed person based on §51.20(1)(a)2.c., the 3rd standard of dangerousness.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit courts’ recommitment order for insufficient evidence. And, for the second time in one week, it held that when circuit courts fail to make the requisite factual findings for a commitment that has expired, the remedy is reversal not remand for further fact-finding.

Eau Claire County v. J.M.P., 2020AP2014-FT, 6/22/21, District 3; (1-judge opinion, ineligble for publication); case activity

A month ago District 3 reversed the recommitment order in this case because the circuit court had violated Langlade County v. D.J.W. That is, the circuit court ordered a recommitment without making specific factual findings tied to one or more the standards of dangerousness in §51.20(1)(a)2. Thus, the court of appeals remanded the case and ordered the required factfinding. Upon reconsideration, the court of appeals has issued a new decision holding that the correct remedy is outright reversal.

Sheboygan County v. M.J.M., 2020AP1744, 6/9/21, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is new. M.J.M. appealed a recommitment order which expired during the course of his appeal. The usual kerfuffle regarding mootness ensued but this time (unlike here and here) the court of appeals acknowledged that the issue of whether recommitment may be dismissed as moot was pending before SCOW in Sauk v. S.A.M, and so reached the merits of this case. It then found sufficient evidence of dangerousness based on threats M.J.M. made during his expiring commitment and because of what he would do if treatment were withdrawn.

State v. Roy C. O’Neal, 2020AP1270, 6/2/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A person who’s been indefinitely committed under ch. 980 is entitled to a discharge trial if he can show … well, er, nobody really knows what he has to show. In State v. Hager, our supreme court failed to reach a majority for any view on the statute (while arguably striking down the court of appeals’ attempt at a gloss). Given the absence of an ascertainable rule, it’s not too surprising that we get incoherent decisions like this one. What is a little surprising is the court of appeals’ decision to “treat [Hager‘s] lead opinion as controlling” on one aspect of the statute’s meaning. That was a three-justice lead opinion; four other justices disagreed on the point. Arguably. Is the court of appeals here treating a supreme court minority view as binding?