On Point: 3. Civil Commitments

Outagamie County DHHS v. M.D.H., 2020AP86, District 3, 7/13/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence at M.D.H.’s final commitment hearing proved he was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.d.

Marathon County v. T.A.T., 2019AP1709, District 3, 6/29/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The testimony of the the three witnesses called by the County provided sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that T.A.T. (“Travis”) was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.

State v. Christopher W. Yakich, 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR, petition for review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals granted 6/16/21; case activity (including briefs)

Issue Presented (from the PFR):

When a defendant has been found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect in two separate cases and is subject to two separate commitment orders, does the circuit court have authority to run the terms of commitment consecutive to one another?

Outagamie County v. X.Z.B., 2020AP2058, 6/22/2121, District 3, (1 judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This case involves the recommitment of a protectively placed person based on §51.20(1)(a)2.c., the 3rd standard of dangerousness.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit courts’ recommitment order for insufficient evidence. And, for the second time in one week, it held that when circuit courts fail to make the requisite factual findings for a commitment that has expired, the remedy is reversal not remand for further fact-finding.

Eau Claire County v. J.M.P., 2020AP2014-FT, 6/22/21, District 3; (1-judge opinion, ineligble for publication); case activity

A month ago District 3 reversed the recommitment order in this case because the circuit court had violated Langlade County v. D.J.W. That is, the circuit court ordered a recommitment without making specific factual findings tied to one or more the standards of dangerousness in §51.20(1)(a)2. Thus, the court of appeals remanded the case and ordered the required factfinding. Upon reconsideration, the court of appeals has issued a new decision holding that the correct remedy is outright reversal.

Sheboygan County v. M.J.M., 2020AP1744, 6/9/21, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is new. M.J.M. appealed a recommitment order which expired during the course of his appeal. The usual kerfuffle regarding mootness ensued but this time (unlike here and here) the court of appeals acknowledged that the issue of whether recommitment may be dismissed as moot was pending before SCOW in Sauk v. S.A.M, and so reached the merits of this case. It then found sufficient evidence of dangerousness based on threats M.J.M. made during his expiring commitment and because of what he would do if treatment were withdrawn.

State v. Roy C. O’Neal, 2020AP1270, 6/2/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A person who’s been indefinitely committed under ch. 980 is entitled to a discharge trial if he can show … well, er, nobody really knows what he has to show. In State v. Hager, our supreme court failed to reach a majority for any view on the statute (while arguably striking down the court of appeals’ attempt at a gloss). Given the absence of an ascertainable rule, it’s not too surprising that we get incoherent decisions like this one. What is a little surprising is the court of appeals’ decision to “treat [Hager‘s] lead opinion as controlling” on one aspect of the statute’s meaning. That was a three-justice lead opinion; four other justices disagreed on the point. Arguably. Is the court of appeals here treating a supreme court minority view as binding?

Eau claire County v. J.M.P., 2020AP2014, 5/25/21, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Last term, SCOW ordered circuit courts deciding recommitment cases to make specific factual findings referencing the standard of dangerousness that supported a person’s recommitment. See Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶3, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. In J.M.P., the circuit court violated this rule, so the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for additional fact-finding. Unfortunately, this remedy creates significant burdens for people recommitted in violation of D.J.W and due process.

Milwaukee County v. T.L.T, 2020AP426, District 1, 5/18/21 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Two court-appointed examiners failed to file their reports on whether T.L.T. should be recommitted 48 hours before her final hearing. Trial counsel moved to dismiss arguing that the violation of §51.20(10)(b)’s 48-hour rule deprived the circuit court of competency to adjudicate the case.  The circuit court denied the motion, and without the defense’s agreement, adjourned the case so that counsel could review the reports before the hearing. T.L.T. appealed but the court of appeals dismissed her appeal as moot.

State v. Tavodess Matthews, 2021 WI 42, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2020 WI App 33, 5/14/21, case activity (including briefs)

Section 801.58(1) allows a party to a civil case to request a new judge if, among other things, he files a written substitution request before “the hearing of any preliminary contested matter.” Matthews’ case concerns a substitution request made after the circuit court granted a motion to adjourn a Chapter 980 probable cause hearing regarding sexually violent persons. But since Chapter 980 commitments are civil proceedings, this unanimous SCOW opinion, which reverses a published court of appeals’ opinion, is an important clarification of the law governing all civil cases.