On Point blog, page 21 of 60
Evidence sufficient to support commitment under 51.20(1)(a)2.c
Outagamie Countyv. G.S., 2019AP1950, 1/20/21, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
“George” called law enforcement claiming to be a federal authority who wanted to make a citizen’s arrest of some duck hunters. When a deputy arrived at the lake he saw George in a boat with 2 encased firearms about 100 yards from shore where a group of duck hunters were upset about George’s verbal encounter with them. George never pointed a gun at anyone. Based on this evidence, a doctor’s report, and substantial hearsay evidence, the circuit court committed Geoge under the 3rd standard of dangerousness, which requires a pattern of recent acts demonstrating a substantial probability that he would injure himself or others.
Maximum length of NGI commitment equals maximum terms of confinement for all cases, added together
State v. Christopher W. Yakich, 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR, District 4, 1/14/21 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted, 6/16/21; affirmed, 2022 WI 8; case activity (including briefs)
A defendant who is found not guilty by reasons of mental disease or defect (NGI) of a crime may be committed under § 971.17 for the maximum term of confinement (for felonies under Truth-in-Sentencing II, § 971.17(1)(b)) or two-thirds the maximum term of imprisonment (for misdemeanors or pre-TIS II felonies, § 971.17(1)(a) and (d)). The court of appeals holds that if a defendant is found NGI for more than one offense, the maximum term of commitment is determined by adding together the maximum terms on each offense, as if they were consecutive.
Ch. 51 recommitment pleadings and evidence both sufficient
Winnebago County v. D.D.A., 2020AP1351, District 2, 12/23/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals rejects D.D.A.’s challenges to the sufficiency of the petition to extend his ch. 51 commitment and to the evidence presented at the extension hearing.
Medication order supported by sufficient evidence
Calumet County v. J.M.K., 2020AP1183-FT, District 2, 12/23/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence proved J.M.K. (“Jane”) was not competent to refuse psychotropic medication.
SCOW: Expert opinion on risk not needed in ch. 980 proceeding
State v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, 2020 WI 92, 12/18/20, affirming a published decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)
A five-justice majority of the supreme court holds that the state does not need to present expert opinion testimony that a person subject to commitment under Chapter 980 is dangerous to others because his mental disorder makes it more likely than not that he will engage in one or more future acts of sexual violence.
Court of appeals affirms recommitment based on person’s past behavior
Outagamie County v. R.W., 2020AP1171-FT, 12/17/20, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
Nobody testified that Rachel behaved dangerously during her extant commitment. Her doctor had no knowledge of medication non-compliance. A social worker once saw a Haldol pill on a plate on a counter and inferred that Rachel had not taken her meds on that occasion. The reason that doctor and social worker recommended recommitment is that several times in the past Rachel was released from commitment, stopped medication, and decompensated. To prevent that cycle, she had to be recommited. Rachel cannot change the past, so by that logic, she must be recommitted forever.
COA decides appeal from expired commitment order due to recurring issue on sufficiency of evidence
Fond Du Lac County v. R.O.V., 2019AP1228, 2020AP853, 12/16/20, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
In these consolidated cases, the court of appeals reviewed both Ray’s initial commitment and his 2nd recommitment (not his 1st recommitment), which has not yet ended. Although the initial commitment order expired long ago, the court held that it was not moot due to a recurring, “sufficiency of the evidence” regarding dangerousness that might affect the outcome of his appeal from the 2nd recommitment.
The doctors who examined Ray for his initial commitment and for his 2nd recommitment agreed that he is mentally ill and a proper subject for treatment. They diagnosed him with either bipolar disorder with psychotic features, schizoaffective disorder bipolar type, or schizophrenia. The main dispute was over his alleged dangerousness.
SCOW to address 48-hour deadline for filing Chapter 51 examiners’ report
Fond du Lac County v. S.N.W., 2019AP2073, petition for review granted 11/19/20; case activity
Issues presented:
1. Did the circuit court lack competency to adjudicate this Chapter 51 commitment proceeding due to the county’s violation of the rule requiring it to file psychiatric reports 48 hours before the final hearing?
2. If the circuit court retained competency, did it err in admitting a tardy report and the testimony of the report’s author?
Evidence sufficient to satisfy Chapter 51’s 4th standard of dangerousness
Vilas County DHS v. N.J.P., 2019AP1567, 12/15/20, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
In this appeal from an initial commitment, the county conceded that it had not offered clear and convincing evidence to mee the 4th standard of dangerousness. It asked the court of appeals to affirm the commitment based on the 5th standard of dangerousness. The court of appeals rejected the county’s concession and affirmed on the 4th standard because N.J.P., who is mentally ill, had been expelled from a homeless shelter and was found dressed in tattered clothes on a bitterly cold day.
COA says hospital’s BAC data was independent source after cop’s draw suppressed
State v. Daniel J. Van Linn, 2019AP1317, 11/17/20, District 3 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 4/27/21, affirmed, 3/22/22; case activity (including briefs)
Police found Van Linn injured and intoxicated near the scene of an accident, and an ambulance took him to the hospital for treatment. At the hospital Van Linn refused an officer’s request that consent to a blood draw; the officer, claiming exigency, ordered blood taken anyway. Van Linn moved to suppress and the court held there was no exigency, and accordingly suppressed the BAC results. Shortly thereafter, the district attorney asked the court to approve a subpoena of Van Linn’s treatment records from the hospital; the court issued the subpoena and the hospital turned over the records, which included the results of the hospital’s own blood test. Van Linn asked the court to suppress those as well, but it declined. He was convicted and appealed.