On Point blog, page 21 of 60
Evidence sufficient to satisfy Chapter 51’s 4th standard of dangerousness
Vilas County DHS v. N.J.P., 2019AP1567, 12/15/20, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
In this appeal from an initial commitment, the county conceded that it had not offered clear and convincing evidence to mee the 4th standard of dangerousness. It asked the court of appeals to affirm the commitment based on the 5th standard of dangerousness. The court of appeals rejected the county’s concession and affirmed on the 4th standard because N.J.P., who is mentally ill, had been expelled from a homeless shelter and was found dressed in tattered clothes on a bitterly cold day.
COA says hospital’s BAC data was independent source after cop’s draw suppressed
State v. Daniel J. Van Linn, 2019AP1317, 11/17/20, District 3 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 4/27/21, affirmed, 3/22/22; case activity (including briefs)
Police found Van Linn injured and intoxicated near the scene of an accident, and an ambulance took him to the hospital for treatment. At the hospital Van Linn refused an officer’s request that consent to a blood draw; the officer, claiming exigency, ordered blood taken anyway. Van Linn moved to suppress and the court held there was no exigency, and accordingly suppressed the BAC results. Shortly thereafter, the district attorney asked the court to approve a subpoena of Van Linn’s treatment records from the hospital; the court issued the subpoena and the hospital turned over the records, which included the results of the hospital’s own blood test. Van Linn asked the court to suppress those as well, but it declined. He was convicted and appealed.
Good cause is no excuse for failure to file timely jury demand for Chapter 51 final hearing
Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2020AP370, 11/4/20, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 2/26/21; case activity
Section 51.20(11)(a) provides that an individual or his counsel must demand a jury trial at least 48 hours before the time set for his final commitment hearing. At the start of his hearing, E.J.W requested a substitution of trial counsel and a jury trial. The court granted the substitution of counsel and postponed the trial 7 days, but it would not reset the clock for demanding a jury. The court of appeal affirmed.
COA takes close look at 51 extension, sees problems, affirms
Waukesha County v. L.J.M., 2020AP820, 11/4/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
L.J.M. (“Lisa”) appeals the extension of her commitment under ch. 51. In a thorough opinion, the court of appeals affirms, though not without pointing out deficiencies in the county’s case and the circuit court’s decision.
Court rejects hearsay, sufficiency claims in ch. 51 appeal
Waukesha County v. I.R.T., 2020AP996, 11/4/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity
The county sought to extend I.R.T.’s commitment but could not be located for a time. Eventually the court issued a capias and I.R.T. was arrested. At the extension hearing, there was testimony that after his parole in a criminal matter ended I.R.T. had become homeless and had not taken medications or communicated with the county or his “outpatient prescribers.” (¶14). A psychologist opined that I.R.T. would be dangerous if treatment were withdrawn due to his history of noncompliance with treatment and his “history of psychotic symptoms, and threatening behaviors toward others” and referred to information received from “staff” at an unnamed facility and I.R.T.’s parents. (¶16).
Defense win: Evidence insufficient to extend ch. 51 commitment
Jackson County v. W.G., 2020AP961, District 4, 11/5/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence presented at a ch. 51 extension hearing is found wanting because it doesn’t establish dangerousness as required by Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.
Evidence at ch. 51 extension hearing sufficient to prove dangerousness, need for medication order
Portage County v. L.E., 2020Ap1239-FT, District 4, 10/29/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence presented at L.E.’s ch. 51 extenstion hearing was sufficient to prove she was dangerous and was not competent to refuse medication.
COA clarifies when Chapter 51’s 72-hour clock begins for persons detained on criminal charges
Columbia County v. J.M.C., Jr., 2020AP1001, District 4, 10/22/20 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
J.M.C. was taken to jail on possible criminal charges. Two days later, the County filed a Chapter 51 petition for his commitment. Section 51.20(7) provides that the circuit court must hold a probable cause hearing within 72 hours of taking a person into custody under §51.20. The circuit court dismissed the petition for violation of the 72-hour rule, and the County appealed arguing that the circuit court erred in determining what triggered 72-hour clock triggered.
Defense win: County failed to prove dangerousness at ch. 51 extension hearing
Portage County v. E.R.R., 2020AP870-FT, District 4, 10/1/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
As the supreme court recently emphasized, at a proceeding to extend a ch. 51 commitment, proving dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(am) requires evidence establishing that the person is likely to be dangerous under one of the specific standards in § 51.20(1)(a)2. if treatment is withdrawn. Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶40, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. There was not enough evidence in this case to prove E.R.R. was dangerous under one of those standards.
COA contradicts itself on mootness and the collateral effects of Chapter 51 recommitments
Jackson County v. C.A.D, 2020AP69, District 4, 9/17/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
This is the second time in a week District 4 has dismissed a recommitment appeal as moot despite the claim of collateral effects: a firearm restriction, stigma, possible liability for costs of care. D4 says: “prove they exist!” A fundamental principle of appellate procedure is that the parties to an appeal cannot cite to evidence outside the record. So query how District 4 thinks appellants should prove these effects? This is why appellate courts around the country presume that committiments have collateral effects and decide them. Click here. Meanwhile, District 3 just took the opposite approach in denying a motion to dismiss a recommitment appeal for mootness. Click here.