On Point blog, page 22 of 60
Defense win: Evidence insufficient to extend ch. 51 commitment
Jackson County v. W.G., 2020AP961, District 4, 11/5/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence presented at a ch. 51 extension hearing is found wanting because it doesn’t establish dangerousness as required by Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.
Evidence at ch. 51 extension hearing sufficient to prove dangerousness, need for medication order
Portage County v. L.E., 2020Ap1239-FT, District 4, 10/29/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence presented at L.E.’s ch. 51 extenstion hearing was sufficient to prove she was dangerous and was not competent to refuse medication.
COA clarifies when Chapter 51’s 72-hour clock begins for persons detained on criminal charges
Columbia County v. J.M.C., Jr., 2020AP1001, District 4, 10/22/20 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
J.M.C. was taken to jail on possible criminal charges. Two days later, the County filed a Chapter 51 petition for his commitment. Section 51.20(7) provides that the circuit court must hold a probable cause hearing within 72 hours of taking a person into custody under §51.20. The circuit court dismissed the petition for violation of the 72-hour rule, and the County appealed arguing that the circuit court erred in determining what triggered 72-hour clock triggered.
Defense win: County failed to prove dangerousness at ch. 51 extension hearing
Portage County v. E.R.R., 2020AP870-FT, District 4, 10/1/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
As the supreme court recently emphasized, at a proceeding to extend a ch. 51 commitment, proving dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(am) requires evidence establishing that the person is likely to be dangerous under one of the specific standards in § 51.20(1)(a)2. if treatment is withdrawn. Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶40, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. There was not enough evidence in this case to prove E.R.R. was dangerous under one of those standards.
COA contradicts itself on mootness and the collateral effects of Chapter 51 recommitments
Jackson County v. C.A.D, 2020AP69, District 4, 9/17/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
This is the second time in a week District 4 has dismissed a recommitment appeal as moot despite the claim of collateral effects: a firearm restriction, stigma, possible liability for costs of care. D4 says: “prove they exist!” A fundamental principle of appellate procedure is that the parties to an appeal cannot cite to evidence outside the record. So query how District 4 thinks appellants should prove these effects? This is why appellate courts around the country presume that committiments have collateral effects and decide them. Click here. Meanwhile, District 3 just took the opposite approach in denying a motion to dismiss a recommitment appeal for mootness. Click here.
COA affirms commitment based on hearsay and meds based on outdated exam
Waukesha County v. C.A.E., 2020AP834-FT, District 2, 9/16/20 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
“Carly” argued that the circuit court committed plain error when it admitted and relied on hearsay evidence of dangerousness introduced through the County’s testifying doctor at her recommitment hearing. She also challenged the court’s involuntary med order because the last time the testifying doctor had discussed the “advantages and disadvantages of medication” with her, as required by §51.61(1)(g)4, was 5 years prior to the hearing. Both arguments failed on appeal.
COA dismisses Chapter 51 appeal re level of confinement for mootness
Waukesha County v. H.M.B., 202AP570, District 2, 9/16/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
This is not your typical Chapter 51 mootness decision. The county petitioned for the initial commitment of “Heather,” who was suffering from anorexia nervousa. She stipulated to a commitment but not to confinement at a mental hospital or to involuntary treatment. The court of appeals dismissed her appeal as moot despite the collateral consequences of a firearm restriction and stigma.
Court of appeals won’t presume that mental commitments have collateral consequences for the patient
Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2019AP1033, 9/3/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), reversed, 2022 WI 46; case activity
Wisconsin involuntarily commits mentally ill people at a higher rate than any other state in the United States–close to 5 times the national average. Click here. Wisconsin is also in the minority of states that will dismiss an appeal from an expired commitment order as moot. Unless we’re prepared to accept that, compared to the rest of the country, Wisconsin has a much larger percentage of residents who are both mentally ill and dangerous, this is troubling. It suggests that Wisconsin may be unlawfully committing and medicating people and then denying them their right to appeal. SCOW is poised to decide whether commitment appeals are ever moot. So the court of appeals could have stayed this appeal until SCOW resolved the point. Instead, it walked out on a limb to dismiss the appeal as moot.
SCOW to review meaning of “preliminary contested matter” under civil judicial substitution statute
State v. Tavodess Matthews, 2018AP2142, petition to review a published court of appeals decision granted 8/26/20; case activity (including briefs)
Issue presented:
Is an adjourned probable cause hearing under ch. 980 a “preliminary contested matter” that terminates litigants’ opportunity to request judicial substitution?
SCOW to decide whether an appeal from an expired recommitment order may be dismissed as moot
Portage County v. E.R.R., 2019AP2033, petition for review of an unpublished dismissal order granted 8/20/20; case activity
Issues presented:
Whether an appeal from a Wis. Stat. §51.20(1)(am) recommitment order may properly be dismissed as moot.
Whether the County met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. R. was currently dangerous as required by Wis. Stat. §51.20(1)(am).