On Point: 3. Civil Commitments

Winnebago County v. C.S., 2020 WI 33,  reversing a published court of appeals opinion; 4/10/20; case activity

This is a BIG case for Chapter 51 lawyers! In a 4-3 opinion, SCOW held that when a court commits a prison inmate under Chapter 51, it cannot order involuntary medication without finding the inmate dangerous first. The decision changes trial procedure for inmates commitments, but also has implications for the involuntary medication of non-inmates under  Chapter 51.

State v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, 2018AP2104, petition to review a published court of appeals decision granted 3/17/20; case activity

Issues:

1. To prove that a person meets the criteria for commitment under Chapter 980, must the state present expert opinion testimony that the person is “dangerous” as defined under ch. 980?
2. Should the standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence of dangerousness in a Chapter 980 case be changed to require that a reviewing court conduct a de novo review of whether the evidence satisfies the legal standard of dangerousness?

Jefferson County v. M.P., 2019AP2229, 3/5/20, District 4 (One-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.P. has schizophrenia. In 2018, she was committed for six months after she made statements about shooting some relatives and burning down a house. In 2019, the county sought and received an extension of the commitment. M.P. argues that recommitment was invalid because the evidence went only to her conduct before her initial commitment, and thus didn’t show her to be currently dangerous. The court of appeals disagrees.

Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, 2/4/2020, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; 2017AP2217; (case activity)

The caption is the most confusing part of this opinion:

ZIEGLER, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I., II., III., IV.A., IV.B., and IV.C.1, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, KELLY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, the majority opinion of the Court with respect to Part V., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., KELLY and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV.C.2., and IV.D., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined. DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined.

But it’s not as bad as it looks! And this decision makes (some) law: specifically, that an appeal of an original commitment is not moot where the commitment has the continuing effect of forbidding its subject to possess firearms.

State v. Anthony James Jendusa, 2018AP2357-CRLV, review of a decision of the court of appeals denying the state’s petition for leave to appeal; case activity

Before turning to the issues presented, we’ll start with an observation about how this case might seem to affect appellate litigation in all kinds of cases, civil and criminal.

Milwaukee County v. E.C.H., 2019AP772, District 1, 1/14/20, (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

This appeal asks: Is evidence of homelessness, by itself, sufficient to prove that a person is dangerous to himself or will become dangerous if treatment is withdrawn? And the answer is . . . we don’t know. Hiding behind the mootness doctrine, the court of appeals declined offer guidance to the circuit courts on this important issue of law.

Portage County v. L.E., 2019AP1841-FT, District 4, 1/9/19 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Welcome to another chapter in the Wisconsin saga “once committed, always committed.” L.E. has been under commitment for 25 years. At her most recent recommitment hearing, the County offered a doctor’s testimony that “if treatment were withdrawn she’d become a proper subject for commitment.” What facts supported that legal conclusion?  Well, not what Portage Cty v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, seems to require.

Monroe County v. D.J., 2019AP1133, 1/2/19, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Oh, this issue again. Monroe County pursued a Chapter 51 original commitment against D.J. but didn’t say which of the 5 standards of dangerousness it was proceeding under. One doctor opined that commitment was warranted under the 1st or 2nd standards. The other doctor specified 2nd or 5th standards. The trial court instructed the jury on all 3 standards. D.J.’s trial counsel didn’t object. And the jury found commitment warranted.

You’ve read a lot about the use of algorithms at the sentencing stage of criminal proceedings, but they are also used at the bail and parole stages. This new paper looks at the bias embedded in algorithms (including the STATIC-99R) and zeroes in on our own State v. Loomis.

La Crosse County v. J.M.A., 2018AP1258, 11/21/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

J.M.A. appeals his recommitment under ch. 51. He argues the psychiatrist who was the sole witness at his trial provided only conclusory testimony on dangerousness; the court of appeals disagrees.