On Point: 3. Civil Commitments

Or can you? Yesterday’s NYT Magazine featured an in-depth article on what happens to a people after they plead not guilty by reason of insanity. If you like horror stories, click here.  The author says that in 2015 he began seeking data on length-of-stay and legal status for people who have been institutionalized in every state via Freedom of Information Act requests. Wisconsin replied that it didn’t have that information. Are we complying with the law?

Review of a summary order of the court of appeals; affirmed 5/4/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (from the petition for review):

Anthony Jones was committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 after a trial at which the state presented expert testimony relying in part on two actuarial instruments: the MnSOST-R and the RRASOR. Mr. Jones had moved pretrial to exclude these instruments as unreliable under Wisconsin’s new Daubert standard, because they are decades old and were constructed using questionable means. The circuit court permitted their introduction on the ground that they are still in use and that the state’s expert had testified that they are reliable. Did the court adequately scrutinize the instruments for reliability, as is its responsibility under Daubert?

Dodge County v. L.A.S., 2017AP302, District 4, 8/17/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Under § 51.20(9)(a) the circuit court must appoint two licensed physicians or psychologists to examine and write reports on an individual subject to involuntary commitment proceedings. This requirement applies only to the initial commitment proceeding, not to the proceeding to extend a commitment.

Winnebago County v. C.S., 2016AP1955, 8/16/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

C.S. argues that §51.61(1)(g) is unconstitutional because it allows the government to administer involuntary medication to a prisoner without a finding of dangerousness. The court of appeals elected not to decide the issue due to mootness, but that seems like a mistake.

Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, 6/8/2017, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, 370 Wis. 2d 262, 881 N.W.2d 359; case activity

In Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., which involved a woman with Alzheimer’s disease, SCOW held that a person is a “proper subject for treatment” under §51.20(1) if she can be “rehabilitated.” It then set forth a test for determining whether a mentally ill person has “rehabilitative potential.” In this case, J.W.J. argued that Helen E.F.’s framework should be modified because it does not account for the characteristics of mental illnesses other than Alzheimer’s, such as the one he has–paranoid schizophrenia.

State v. Bruce C. Brenizer, 2015AP2181, District 3, 6/6/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including select briefs)

The Department of Health Services didn’t have authority to transfer Brenizer to the Department of Corrections because the circuit court’s commitment order unambiguously states that Brenizer is committed to DHS custody for life unless his custody is terminated under § 971.17(5) (1991-92).

Crawford County v. E.K., 2016AP2063, 5/18/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This case presents multiple SCOW-worthy issues. One is an interesting constitutional dilemma. The County sought to extend E.K.’s commitment and involuntary medication order and, as evidence, offered threatening emails that E.K. had allegedly sent. Defense counsel objected because the emails had not been authenticated. So the County called E.K. to the stand to authenticate them. Defense counsel objected on 5th Amendment grounds. This prompted E.K. to say: “I’ll waive that. Yes, those are my emails.”

State v. Michael McGee, 2017 WI App 39; case activity (including briefs)

This is an important decision for the few, the happy few, who represent persons committed under ch. 980 in seeking supervised release. The court of appeals holds that the municipalities in which a committed person may be placed have the right to intervene in supervised release proceeding. It also holds that if the circuit court and Department of Health Services fail to adhere strictly to the statutory requirements governing supervised release planning, the supervised release order is invalid.

Whether the subject of a §51.20(1)(a) extension of involuntary commitment and medication order has a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel where his lawyer fails to object to, prevent the admission of, or request a curative instruction to address, evidence of his prisoner status during his jury trial?

Whether the subject of a §51.20(1)(a) extension of involuntary commitment and medication order is entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice where the jury repeatedly sees and hears evidence of his prisoner status?

State v. David Hager, 2015AP330, and State v. Howard Carter, 2015AP1311, petitions for review granted 5/15/17, reversed 4/19/18; review of published court of appeals decisions (Hager) (Carter); case activity (Hager) (Carter) (including briefs)

We’ve posted on these cases a few times. The first time was when the court of appeals certified them (together) to the supreme court. The supreme court refused that certification, so the court of appeals decided them (separately), as we discussed here and here.