On Point blog, page 29 of 60
SCOW says prisoner wasn’t prejudiced by appearing before jury in prison garb flanked by uniformed gaurds
Winnebago County v. J.M., 4/18/18, 2018 WI 37, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2016AP619, case activity.
This opinion will interest lawyers who handle Chapter 51 cases and appellate lawyers of all stripes. It establishes that persons undergoing Chapter 51 mental commitments are entitled to the effective assistance of counsel and formally adopts the Strickland test for ineffective assistance. It further holds that, due to the overwhelming evidence of dangerousness in this case, J.M. was not prejudiced when his counsel failed to object to him appearing before the jury wearing prison clothes accompanied by uniformed guards–even as he testified. Of particular interest to appellate lawyers, SCOW granted a motion to strike significant parts of Winnebago County’s oral argument because its lawyer asserted facts outside the appellate record.
An unconstitutional application of the 5th standard of dangerousness?
Outagamie County v. C.A., 2017AP450, District 3, 1/23/18 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
The records for Chapter 51 cases are confidential, so we have not seen the briefs for this case. But, judging from this court of appeals opinion, it doesn’t take much beyond a mental illness diagnosis to get yourself committed under §51.20(1)(a)2e, Wisconsin’s 5th standard of dangerousness. A little unsubstantiated hearsay about your frustration with the justice system just might do the trick.
Evidence supported dangerousness finding
Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2017AP1313-FT, District 3, 11/7/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
There was sufficient evidence at D.J.W.’s commitment trial to establish he met the standard for dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.d.
Defense win! County’s effort to convert Chapter 55 protective services order to protective placement order violated due process
Waushara County v. B.G., 2017AP956, 10/26/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
When the circuit court entered a protective services order for B.G., it did not include any conditions or labels such as “temporary” or “conditional.” It did, however, state that B.G. “does not meet the standards for protective placement.” When B.G. tried to resist services, the County filed a “Notice of Transfer of Protective Placement” asking the circuit court to remove him from his home and place him in a facility. The court did as asked. The court of appeals now reverses.
You can’t punish someone for being mentally ill
Or can you? Yesterday’s NYT Magazine featured an in-depth article on what happens to a people after they plead not guilty by reason of insanity. If you like horror stories, click here. The author says that in 2015 he began seeking data on length-of-stay and legal status for people who have been institutionalized in every state via Freedom of Information Act requests. Wisconsin replied that it didn’t have that information. Are we complying with the law?
State v. Anthony Jones, 2015AP2665, petition for review granted 9/11/2017
Review of a summary order of the court of appeals; affirmed 5/4/18; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (from the petition for review):
Anthony Jones was committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 after a trial at which the state presented expert testimony relying in part on two actuarial instruments: the MnSOST-R and the RRASOR. Mr. Jones had moved pretrial to exclude these instruments as unreliable under Wisconsin’s new Daubert standard, because they are decades old and were constructed using questionable means. The circuit court permitted their introduction on the ground that they are still in use and that the state’s expert had testified that they are reliable. Did the court adequately scrutinize the instruments for reliability, as is its responsibility under Daubert?
Petitioner isn’t required to present testimony of a physician or psychologist at a ch. 51 extension hearing
Dodge County v. L.A.S., 2017AP302, District 4, 8/17/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Under § 51.20(9)(a) the circuit court must appoint two licensed physicians or psychologists to examine and write reports on an individual subject to involuntary commitment proceedings. This requirement applies only to the initial commitment proceeding, not to the proceeding to extend a commitment.
Can Wisconsin medicate prisoners against their will without first finding them dangerous?
Winnebago County v. C.S., 2016AP1955, 8/16/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
C.S. argues that §51.61(1)(g) is unconstitutional because it allows the government to administer involuntary medication to a prisoner without a finding of dangerousness. The court of appeals elected not to decide the issue due to mootness, but that seems like a mistake.
SCOW declines to clarify test for determining whether mentally ill person is a “proper subject for treatment”
Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, 6/8/2017, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, 370 Wis. 2d 262, 881 N.W.2d 359; case activity
In Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., which involved a woman with Alzheimer’s disease, SCOW held that a person is a “proper subject for treatment” under §51.20(1) if she can be “rehabilitated.” It then set forth a test for determining whether a mentally ill person has “rehabilitative potential.” In this case, J.W.J. argued that Helen E.F.’s framework should be modified because it does not account for the characteristics of mental illnesses other than Alzheimer’s, such as the one he has–paranoid schizophrenia.
DHS’s transfer of NGI acquittee to DOC custody violated circuit court’s commitment order
State v. Bruce C. Brenizer, 2015AP2181, District 3, 6/6/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including select briefs)
The Department of Health Services didn’t have authority to transfer Brenizer to the Department of Corrections because the circuit court’s commitment order unambiguously states that Brenizer is committed to DHS custody for life unless his custody is terminated under § 971.17(5) (1991-92).