On Point: 3. Civil Commitments

State v. Shawn Virlee, 2003 WI App 4, PFR filed 1/3/03
For Virlee: Jack E. Schairer

Issue/Holding: Barring introduction of the post-petition grant of sentence credit was proper: this evidence “would have been irrelevant to whether the State filed its petition within ninety days of Virlee’s release and would have confused the jury on this issue.” ¶19.

State v. Shawn Virlee, 2003 WI App 4, PFR filed 1/3/03
For Virlee: Jack E. Schairer

Issue: Whether post-petition grant of jail credit deprived the court of competency to proceed, where the petition was filed within 90 days of the pre-grant release date, but would be untimely when calculated against the post-grant date.

Holding:

¶17. Virlee claims the court lost its competency to proceed with his commitment proceeding when it retroactively granted him sentence credit that placed his mandatory release date prior to the petition’s filing date.

State v. Henry Pocan, 2003 WI App 233
For Pocan: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Pocan established probable cause for a discharge hearing where the psychologist conducting the reevaluation and using actuarial tables unavailable at the time of original commitment found no substantial probability of reoffending:

¶11. The State argues that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 thus requires the court to focus on progress or improvement in Pocan’s condition.

State v. Shawn Virlee, 2003 WI App 4, PFR filed 1/3/03
For Virlee: Jack E. Schairer

Issue: Whether ch. 980 violates due process and/or equal protection because it doesn’t allow for pretrial release.

Holding:

¶14. We decline to address Virlee’s due process and equal protection arguments because he fails to establish, and we do not see, how the statute’s lack of a provision for pretrial release affects the trial court’s judgment.

State v. Ray A. Schiller, 2003 WI App 195
For Schiller: Jack E. Schairer, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶11. However, a “serious difficulty in controlling behavior” is not about whether a person has the ability to make choices….¶12. The Crane Court further indicated that we must not only consider whether the person has the ability to make choices, but the degree to which those choices are driven by a mental disorder: [S]erious difficulty in controlling behavior …

State v. Joseph A. Lombard, 2003 WI App 163, affirmed, other grounds, 2004 WI 95
For Lombard: David R. Karpe

Issue/Holding: Evidence sufficient to support commitment though only one state’s expert supported commitment against three defense experts:

¶21 … The State’s expert, a psychologist who evaluated Lombard for the purpose of determining whether proceedings under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 should be instituted,

State v. James Lalor, 2003 WI App 68, PFR filed 4/15/03
For Lalor: T. Christopher Kelly

Issue/Holding: Evidence based on actuarial instruments (RRASOR; PCL-R; MnSOST-R; V-RAG), to the effect that of people with similar scores about 50% reoffend within five years and 70% within ten years, supports finding of substantial likelihood to engage in sexual violence. ¶¶15-25.

State v. John Lee Laxton, 2002 WI 82, affirming unpublished court of appeals decision
(Affirmed on habeas review, John L. Laxton v. Bartow, 421 F.3d 565 (7th Cir 2005))
For Laxton: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether ch. 980 is unconstitutional by failing to adequately narrow the class of commitment subjects to those with serious difficulty controlling dangerous behavior.

State v. John Lee Laxton, 2002 WI 82, affirming unpublished court of appeals decision
(Affirmed on other grounds, habeas review, John L. Laxton v. Bartow, 421 F.3d 565 (7th Cir 2005))
For Laxton: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the jury instructions adequately conveyed the requirement of mental disorder causing serious difficulty in controlling behavior.

State v. Dennis H., 2002 WI 104, on certification
For Dennis H.: Ellen Henak, SPD Milwaukee Appellate

Issue: Whether the “fifth standard” for mental commitment, § 51.20(1)(a)2.e. (roughly: refusing treatment due to incapacity for making rational treatment decision), is constitutional.

Holding: The statute isn’t vague — the state must prove the various “elements” of this standard (which the court spells out and won’t be repeated here).