On Point: 3. Civil Commitments

State v. Ray A. Schiller, 2003 WI App 195
For Schiller: Jack E. Schairer, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶11. However, a “serious difficulty in controlling behavior” is not about whether a person has the ability to make choices….¶12. The Crane Court further indicated that we must not only consider whether the person has the ability to make choices, but the degree to which those choices are driven by a mental disorder: [S]erious difficulty in controlling behavior …

State v. Joseph A. Lombard, 2003 WI App 163, affirmed, other grounds, 2004 WI 95
For Lombard: David R. Karpe

Issue/Holding: Evidence sufficient to support commitment though only one state’s expert supported commitment against three defense experts:

¶21 … The State’s expert, a psychologist who evaluated Lombard for the purpose of determining whether proceedings under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 should be instituted,

State v. James Lalor, 2003 WI App 68, PFR filed 4/15/03
For Lalor: T. Christopher Kelly

Issue/Holding: Evidence based on actuarial instruments (RRASOR; PCL-R; MnSOST-R; V-RAG), to the effect that of people with similar scores about 50% reoffend within five years and 70% within ten years, supports finding of substantial likelihood to engage in sexual violence. ¶¶15-25.

State v. John Lee Laxton, 2002 WI 82, affirming unpublished court of appeals decision
(Affirmed on habeas review, John L. Laxton v. Bartow, 421 F.3d 565 (7th Cir 2005))
For Laxton: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether ch. 980 is unconstitutional by failing to adequately narrow the class of commitment subjects to those with serious difficulty controlling dangerous behavior.

State v. John Lee Laxton, 2002 WI 82, affirming unpublished court of appeals decision
(Affirmed on other grounds, habeas review, John L. Laxton v. Bartow, 421 F.3d 565 (7th Cir 2005))
For Laxton: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the jury instructions adequately conveyed the requirement of mental disorder causing serious difficulty in controlling behavior.

State v. Dennis H., 2002 WI 104, on certification
For Dennis H.: Ellen Henak, SPD Milwaukee Appellate

Issue: Whether the “fifth standard” for mental commitment, § 51.20(1)(a)2.e. (roughly: refusing treatment due to incapacity for making rational treatment decision), is constitutional.

Holding: The statute isn’t vague — the state must prove the various “elements” of this standard (which the court spells out and won’t be repeated here).

Dunn County v. Judy K., 2002 WI 87, on certification

Issue: Whether a county is required to find an fund an appropriate placement under § 55.06(9)(a).

Holding:

¶28. We therefore determine that in protective placements pursuant to § 55.06(9)(a), counties must make an affirmative showing of a good faith, reasonable effort to find an appropriate placement and to secure funding to pay for an appropriate placement.

State v. Ronald G. Sorenson, 2002 WI 78, affirming as modified, 2001 WI App 251, 248 Wis. 2d 237, 635 N.W.2d 787
For Sorenson: T. Christopher Kelly

Issue: Whether, given the constitutional protections afforded Ch. 980 respondents, issue preclusion applies so as to prevent Sorenson from attacking the reliability of his qualifying conviction with evidence that the complainant subsequently recanted.

Holding:

¶22.

Dodge County v. Ryan E.M., 2002 WI App 71
For Ryan E.M.: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the 72-hour deadline, necessary for the court’s competency over the ch. 51 commitment proceeding, is measured from the subject’s time of detention. (“¶4. The issue in this case is whether the method of computing time set forth in Wis. Stat. § 990.001(4)(a) and (d), in which the first day is excluded,

Kindcare, Inc. v. Judith G., 2002 WI App 36

Issue/Holding:

¶3 The issue presented by this appeal is whether the circuit court loses competence to adjudicate a person’s need for protective placement if the probable-cause hearing is not held within seventy-two hours after the person was taken into custody, or whether, as the trial court determined, the seventy-two-hours clock can be reset by the simple expedient of filing a new petition for protective placement.