On Point: 3. Assertion/waiver of rights

Johnnie Mertice Wesley v. Randall Hepp, No. 22-2968, 1/5/24

Wesley’s challenges to law enforcement conduct which resulted in him giving inculpatory statements fail, as the Seventh Circuit concludes that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably applied SCOTUS precedent.

Jones v. Cromwell, 75 F.4th 722 (7th Cir. 2022).

In a disappointing defense loss, the Seventh Circuit holds that, at least under these circumstances, the defendant’s request for a “public pretender” was sufficiently ambiguous such that police had no obligation to cease their interrogation.

State v. Daniel J. Rejholec, 2021 WI App 45; case activity (including briefs)

Police arrested Rejholec on suspicion of sexual assault of a minor. After receiving the Miranda admonitions, Rejholec agreed to speak with a detective. The interrogation was recorded on video. That video reveals the detective’s aggressive deployment of the so-called Reid technique: a method of extracting confessions (be they true or false). The detective bullies, cajoles and wheedles until he gets what he’s after: a confession. Oh, the detective also lies, floridly.

State v. Chardez Harrison, 2019AP2151, 3/23/21, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Harrison was arrested on suspicion of some armed robberies and carjackings. While he was in custody, a detective read him the Miranda warnings. The version of the warnings printed on cards for the Milwaukee police to use apparently concludes with a question: “Realizing that you have these rights, are you now willing to answer some questions or make a statement?” (¶6). Harrison responded to this question by saying “I don’t want to make no statement right now.” Pretty clear invocation, right? Wrong, says the court of appeals.

State v. Manuel Garcia, 2018AP2319-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity

Issue for review: (adapted from the State’s PFR  and the COA’s opinion):

Whether the State may invoke the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule during its case-in-chief and thereby use a defendant’s statement, taken in violation of Miranda, to rehabilitate one of its witnesses?

State v. Manuel Garcia, 2020 WI App 71, petition to review granted, 1/20/21, affirmed by an evenly divided court, 2021 WI 76; case activity (including briefs)

Even if a court suppresses a defendant’s voluntary statement because it was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the state may use the statement to impeach the defendant if he or she elects to testify. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990). The issue in this case is whether this “impeachment exception” allows the state to use the defendant’s statement  to “rehabilitate” one of its witnesses. The court of appeals holds it does not: the state may use an illegally obtained statement only to impeach the defendant’s testimony.

Ladarius Marshall v. Scott Eckstein, No. 15-CV-008 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 22, 2020)

Marshall pleaded to homicide and other charges. Before he did so, though, he moved to suppress statements he’d made during more than 12 hours of interrogation at the police station (he was 16 years old at the time). The trial court and our court of appeals held that the interrogating officers “scrupulously honored” Marshall’s multiple assertions that he didn’t want to talk with them anymore. The federal district court finds this conclusion unreasonable because the officers deflected his refusals to talk and cajoled him into continuing. What’s more, the court says that even his later statements–given to officers who did follow Miranda‘s rules–must be suppressed because they were too closely connected to his original, unlawfully-taken statements.

State v. Keith M. Abbott, 2020 WI App 25; case activity (including briefs)

After losing a suppression motion, Abbott pled “no contest” to 2nd degree intentional homicide. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of suppression for some evidence and reversed it as to other evidence. It held that Abbott’s mental breakdown during questioning did not relieve him of his duty make an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel. And while it rejected the State’s request that it adopt a new harmless error test for cases where the defendant appeals the denial of suppression after pleading guilty, it nevertheless affirmed under the existing harmless error rule.

State v. Ulanda M. Green, 2018AP1350-CR, petition for review granted 9/3/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

1. Whether law enforcement’s “dialogue” with Green amounted to an “interrogation” that should have been preceded by a Miranda warning?

2. Whether Green invoked her right to remain silent when law enforcement asked her if she would like to make a statement and she responded: “No. I don’t know nothing.”

State v. Ulanda M. Green, 2018AP1350-CR, District 1, 5/29/19 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted, 9/3/19; case activity (including briefs)

Green sought to suppress incriminating statements she made to police both before and after being given the Miranda warnings. The court of appeals holds that the pre-Miranda statement Green made was not the product of interrogation, so it’s admissible. As for the statements she made after the warnings, the court rejects her argument that she invoked her right to remain silent and so interrogation should have ceased.