On Point: 3. Assertion/waiver of rights

State v. Daniel J.H. Bartelt, 2018 WI 16, 2/20/18, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, case activity (including briefs)

Suppose you confessed to attempted homicide while sitting in a police station interrogation room with 2 officers who are positioned between you and the exit. Would you feel free to leave? The majority says a reasonable person would. The dissent by A.W. Bradley (joined by Abrahamson) says a reasonable person would not.  

State v. Daniel H. Bartelt, 2015AP2506-CR, 6/15/17, granting review of a published court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

1.  After confessing to an attempted homicide or other serious crimes, would a reasonable person feel free to terminate a police interview and leave an interrogation room, such that the person in not “in custody” for Miranda purposes?

2.  After confessing, did Bartelt make a clear and unequivocal request for counsel when he asked one of the detectives, “Should I or can I speak to a lawyer or anything?” the detective replied, Sure, yes, that is your option.” And Bartelt replied, “Okay, I think I’d prefer that.”

State v. Daniel J.H. Bartelt, 2017 WI App 23, petition for review granted 6/15/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 16, ; case activity (including briefs)

During a police interview about an attempted homicide, Bartelt made incriminating statements and then unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. A few minutes later, police arrested him. The next day, different officers advised Bartelt of his Miranda rights, which he waived before confessing to a murder. The issue is whether Bartelt was in custody when he invoked his right to counsel during the first interview.

State v. Christopher E. Masarik, 2015AP194-CR, District 1, 10/4/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Masarik didn’t unequivocally assert his right to have counsel present while he was being questioned about an arson that resulted in the death of another, and his statement wasn’t involuntary despite his mental health difficulties.

State v. Armin G. Wand, III, 2015AP1366-CR, 9/8/16, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Armin Wand and his brother Jeremy were convicted of crimes relating to a fire at Wand’s residence that killed his three sons, seriously injured his wife and caused the death of the fetus she was carrying. Before he pled, Wand moved to suppress statements he made to officers on two consecutive days; the court suppressed the first day’s as involuntary but admitted the second day’s. He appeals on various grounds connected to the admission of those later statements.

State v. Joe Bonds Turney, 2015AP1651-CR & 2015AP1652-CR, District 1, 8/30/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Turney claims the trial court erred in permitting joinder of two cases for trial and in denying his motion for substitution of judge following his arraignment. He also argues he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which was based on trial counsel’s failure to object to a witness’s reference to his post-arrest silence. The court of appeals rejects his claims.

State v. Johnnie Mertice Wesley, 2015AP590-CR, District 1, 7/6/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Wesley asserted his right to remain silent during an initial interrogation, and the detectives stopped questioning him. Detectives approached him two more times to resume questioning, and during the third interrogation Wesley made incriminating statements. The court of appeals holds that the detectives didn’t violate Wesley’s invocation of the right to remain silent by resuming interrogation. The court also rejects Wesley’s claim that he invoked the right to remain silent again during the third interrogation.

State v. Johnny Jerome Jones, 2014AP342-CR, 3/24/14, District 1 (not recommended for publication); click here for docket and briefs

Jones turned himself in for a hit-and-run accident that resulted in death.  During the interrogation, and after being Mirandized, he asked the detective: “So ya’ll can get a public pretender right now?” The detective laughed and replied: “You said it right, pretender . . . . they’re called public defenders . . . Um, we obviously due to the time right now, we can’t, um . . . .” Jones moved to suppress his subsequent statement and lost at the circuit court and on appeal.

State v. Isaiah N. Triggs, 2014AP204-CR, District 1, 10/28/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for waiving a preliminary hearing in Triggs’s homicide prosecution or for failing to move to suppress Triggs’s confession. Further, the circuit court’s plea colloquy with Triggs was not defective and the circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion.

State v. Carlos Cummings and State v. Adrean L. Smith, 2014 WI 88, 7/24/14, affirming per curiam court of appeals decisions in 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR, majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; concurrence/dissent by Justice Prosser (joined by Justice Bradley); dissent by Chief Justice Abrahamson; case activity for Cummings and Smith

These cases address whether two Mirandized suspects unequivocally invoked their respective rights to remain silent, or cut off questioning, during police interrogations.  Citing State v. Markwardt, 2007 WI App 242 the majority held that both defendants seem to have meant something other than what they literally said.  Their attempts to cut off questioning were “equivocal” and thus their statements need not be suppressed.