On Point: i. Voluntariness of waiver

State v. Daniel J. Rejholec, 2021 WI App 45; case activity (including briefs)

Police arrested Rejholec on suspicion of sexual assault of a minor. After receiving the Miranda admonitions, Rejholec agreed to speak with a detective. The interrogation was recorded on video. That video reveals the detective’s aggressive deployment of the so-called Reid technique: a method of extracting confessions (be they true or false). The detective bullies, cajoles and wheedles until he gets what he’s after: a confession. Oh, the detective also lies, floridly.

State v. Manuel Garcia, 2018AP2319-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity

Issue for review: (adapted from the State’s PFR  and the COA’s opinion):

Whether the State may invoke the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule during its case-in-chief and thereby use a defendant’s statement, taken in violation of Miranda, to rehabilitate one of its witnesses?

State v. Manuel Garcia, 2020 WI App 71, petition to review granted, 1/20/21, affirmed by an evenly divided court, 2021 WI 76; case activity (including briefs)

Even if a court suppresses a defendant’s voluntary statement because it was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the state may use the statement to impeach the defendant if he or she elects to testify. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990). The issue in this case is whether this “impeachment exception” allows the state to use the defendant’s statement  to “rehabilitate” one of its witnesses. The court of appeals holds it does not: the state may use an illegally obtained statement only to impeach the defendant’s testimony.

State v. Isaiah N. Triggs, 2014AP204-CR, District 1, 10/28/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for waiving a preliminary hearing in Triggs’s homicide prosecution or for failing to move to suppress Triggs’s confession. Further, the circuit court’s plea colloquy with Triggs was not defective and the circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion.

State v. Ladarius Marshall, 2012AP140-CR, District 1, 7/2/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

The trial court properly denied Marshall’s motion to suppress his statements to police made during on-again off-again interrogation lasting from 10:45 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. The court first rejects Marshall’s argument he didn’t invoke his right to remain silent:

¶21      The circuit court found that Marshall never unequivocally and unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent.

State v. Jennifer L. Ward, 2009 WI 60, affirming unpublished opinion
For Ward: T. Christopher Kelly

Issue/Holding: Taken individually and collectively, Ward’s 3 statements were voluntary, weighing personal characteristics against police conduct.

Personal characteristics, ¶23. Ward was: “relatively sophisticated and intelligent”; 35 years old; a high school graduate; prior conviction; the daughter of a police chief. Her “unprompted understanding of her rights” indicated lack of vulnerability to police questioning.

State v. Scott M. Hambly, 2008 WI 10, affirming 2006 WI App 256

For Hambly: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶93      The defendant summarizes his argument that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to counsel, stating that at the time of his arrest, he was hungry, alone in the back seat of a squad car,

State v. Xavier J. Rockette, 2005 WI App 205
For Rockette: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding:

¶24     We conclude that Rockette did not waive his Miranda rights. Rockette does not argue that Chausee did anything to coerce his confession. Indeed, the purpose of Rockette’s cooperation at the interview, which his own counsel set up, was to increase his chances of securing some leniency from the State.

A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2004)

Issue/Holding:

… In fact, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that a confession or waiver of rights by a juvenile is not the same as a confession or waiver by an adult. A defendant’s age is an important factor in determining whether a confession is voluntary. ……

Here, the circumstances weigh in favor of a determination that Morgan’s inculpatory statements were involuntary.

State v. Frederick G. Jackson, 229 Wis. 2d 328, 600 N.W.2d 39 (Ct. App. 1999), affirmed on habeas review, Frederick G. Jackson v. Frank, 02-1979, 11/6/03
For Jackson: Allan D. Krezminski.

Issue/Holding: During custodial interrogation, Jackson asked for an attorney, and the detective gave erroneous advice, namely that Jackson could have an attorney once charges “were established” (erroneous, of course, because Jackson had a right to pre-charging consultation).