On Point: A. In-Custody, 5th Amendment

on review of unpublished decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point) 

Whether, after asserting his right to counsel, Lonkonski initiated further communication with the police so as to allow admissibility of his ensuing statement, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483-85 (1981).

There may be a threshold dispute as to whether Lonkoski was in custody at the time he asserted his right to counsel,

State v. Pierre R. Conner, 2012 WI App 105 (recommended for publication); case activity

Interrogations – Miranda-Edwards Rule – Unequivocal Request for Counsel 

The issues on a request-for-counsel challenge to in-custody interrogation are whether the individual  unequivocally invoked his right to counsel and, if so, whether he subsequently reinitiated questioning, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). Although the trial court found that Conner’s requests for counsel were equivocal,

seventh circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas Review – Miranda-Edwards 

Coleman’s argument that his confession violated Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (interrogation must cease immediately if suspect requests counsel) was rejected by the state court based upon a determination that he did not in fact assert his to counsel. Denial of relief is affirmed:

Coleman admits but downplays the crucial difference here: In Edwards,

State v. David W. Stevens, 2012 WI 97, affirming unpublished decision; case activity

Miranda-Edwards Rule – Invocation of Counsel, Initiation of Contact by Suspect

Where an in-custody suspect invokes his right to counsel and interrogation immediately ceases, but the suspect himself then initiates a request to continue the interrogation, the police may proceed with questioning if fresh Miranda warnings are given and validly waived. 

State v. Randy L. Martin, 2012 WI 96, reversing unpublished decision; case activity

Miranda – “Custodial Interrogation”  

Martin was arrested for disorderly conduct and handcuffed at the scene of an otherwise unrelated incident (¶6, id. n. 6). Search of his car yielded a gun. When an officer asked him, Martin denied ownership. The officer then prepared to arrest Henry, Martin’s companion,

Howes v. Randall Lee Fields, USSC No. 10-680, 2/21/12, reversing 617 F.3d 813 (6th Cir 2010); arguably abrogating, State v. Tonnie D. Armstrong, 223 Wis.2d 331, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999)

Habeas – Review, Generally 

Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus if the state-court adjudication pursuant to which the prisoner is held “resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

State v. Zachary Ryan Wiegand, 2011AP939-CR, District 3, 2/7/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Wiegand: Brian C. Findley; case activity

Despite initially waiving his Miranda rights, Wiegand later unequivocally asserted his right to silence (“I don’t want to say anything more”); nonetheless, the interrogating officer did not scrupulously honor this invocation, and the ensuing statement along with all derivative evidence is therefore suppressed.

on review of unpublished decision; for Martin: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity; prior post

Miranda – “Interrogation” 

Issue (composed by On Point):

Whether an exchange between Martin and an officer was the functional equivalent of “interrogation” so as to require interrogation.

The facts, very briefly, as taken from the court of appeals’ decision: Martin was under arrest for DC when an officer fished a gun out of his car.

Bobby v. Archie Dixon, USSC No. 10-1540, 11/7/11 (per curiam), reversing Dixon v. Houk, 627 F.3d 553 (6th Cir 2010)

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court “must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v.

State v. Devon L. Bean, 2011 WI App 129 (recommended for publication); for Bean: Scott D. Obernberger; case activity

Sew-up Confession 

The fourth interrogation of Bean within a 60-hour period following his arrest did not, under the particular facts, amount to an impermissible “sew-up” confession.

General principles. The question, in brief, is whether the time between arrest and formal charge was “inordinate.”