On Point: A. In-Custody, 5th Amendment

State v. Timothy E. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64, 7/3/20, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2018AP319; case activity (including briefs)

There’s really only one important holding here: despite adoption of the Daubert standard, Wisconsin continues to permit expert testimony in the form of “dissertation or exposition.” That is, an expert can educate the jury about the principles or findings of his or her field without talking about the facts of the case, and an expert who does so is not subject to the requirement that he or she “appl[y] the principles and methods” of that field “reliably to the facts of the case.” Though the court also decides a separate Miranda issue, the discussion is fact-intensive and breaks no legal ground. What’s notable (and regrettable) about the Miranda decision is a meandering three-justice concurrence that repeats the court’s error in State v. Bartelt, 2018 WI 16, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 906 N.W.2d 684, by grafting a third step onto the familiar two-part Miranda-custody inquiry.

State v. Adam W. Vice, 2020 WI App 34, petition for review granted 8/30/20, reversed, 2021 WI 63; case activity (including briefs)

This is a “recommended for publication”, split court of appeals opinion where the State lost in a child sexual assault case. In other words the State will surely petition for review, and SCOW will take it. Applying State v. Davis, 2008 WI 71, 310 Wis. 2d 583, 751 N.W.2d 332, the majority held that the defendant’s polygraph test and the confession were two discrete events, but based on the facts of this case, the confession was involuntary. The dissent by Judge Hruz would hold the confession voluntary.

State v. D.R.C., 2019AP1155, District 2, 5/13/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police detained, initially handcuffed, patted down, and then questioned D.R.C. about his involvement in a car crash from which he had fled. The court of appeals holds the officers’ actions were part of an investigatory Terry stop and didn’t amount to custody requiring that D.R.C. be given Miranda warnings before being questioned.

Ladarius Marshall v. Scott Eckstein, No. 15-CV-008 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 22, 2020)

Marshall pleaded to homicide and other charges. Before he did so, though, he moved to suppress statements he’d made during more than 12 hours of interrogation at the police station (he was 16 years old at the time). The trial court and our court of appeals held that the interrogating officers “scrupulously honored” Marshall’s multiple assertions that he didn’t want to talk with them anymore. The federal district court finds this conclusion unreasonable because the officers deflected his refusals to talk and cajoled him into continuing. What’s more, the court says that even his later statements–given to officers who did follow Miranda‘s rules–must be suppressed because they were too closely connected to his original, unlawfully-taken statements.

State v. Keith M. Abbott, 2020 WI App 25; case activity (including briefs)

After losing a suppression motion, Abbott pled “no contest” to 2nd degree intentional homicide. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of suppression for some evidence and reversed it as to other evidence. It held that Abbott’s mental breakdown during questioning did not relieve him of his duty make an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel. And while it rejected the State’s request that it adopt a new harmless error test for cases where the defendant appeals the denial of suppression after pleading guilty, it nevertheless affirmed under the existing harmless error rule.

State v. Brian Halverson, 2018AP858-CR, review of a published court of appeals opinion granted 3/17/20; affirmed 1/29/21; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

Whether a person who is interrogated by police while incarcerated is “in custody” and entitled to a Miranda warning under either the federal or state constitution?

Whether, under the totality of the circumstances, Halverson, who was incarcerated in jail was “in custody” when police interrogated him?

State v. Dobbs, 2018AP319-CR, petition for review of a per curiam opinion granted 1/14/20; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (based on Dobbs’ petition for review and SCOW’s order granting review:

1. Did the trial court err in precluding the defense’s expert on false confessions from testifying where, consistent with State v. Smith, 2016 WI App 8, 366 Wis. 2d 613, 874 N.W.2d 610, his opinions were relevant to a material issue, but he would not be offering an opinion on the specific facts of the case?

2. Did the trial court err in allowing Mr. Dobbs’ statements to law enforcement into evidence despite the delay in reading him his Miranda rights and because his statements were involuntary due to his mental and physical conditions?

3. Whether the court of appeals’ decision that Dobbs was in custody for purposes of Miranda warnings is consistent with State v. Morgan, 2002 WI App 124, 254 Wis. 2d 602, 648 N.W.2d 23. If not, whether Morgan should be overruled?

The 5th Amendment is an invincible shield against takings claims but not against self-incrimination and double jeopardy claims.  And, of course, the justices political leanings influence their positions. Click SCOWstats for the justice-by-justice analysis.

State v. Brian L. Halverson, 2019 WI App 66; petition for review granted 3/17/20; affirmed 1/29/21; case activity (including briefs)

Until now, Wisconsin held that a person who is interviewed by law enforcement while incarcerated is per se in custody and thus must receive a Miranda warning. State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 588 N.W. 2d 606 (1999). This published court of appeals’ decision holds that the SCOTUS effectively overturned Armstrong in Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012). Going forward, courts must determine whether an inmate is in custody by analyzing the totality of the circumstances surrounding his interrogation.

State v. Ulanda M. Green, 2018AP1350-CR, petition for review granted 9/3/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

1. Whether law enforcement’s “dialogue” with Green amounted to an “interrogation” that should have been preceded by a Miranda warning?

2. Whether Green invoked her right to remain silent when law enforcement asked her if she would like to make a statement and she responded: “No. I don’t know nothing.”