On Point blog, page 6 of 17
Retractable juvenile confessions
Should people be able to retract uncounseled Miranda waivers elicited by law enforcement officers while they were juveniles? This UCLA law review article by Loyola Law School Professor Kevin Lapp explores the problems with interrogating juveniles and the pros and cons of retractable Fifth Amendment waivers.
Rejection of guilty plea, admission of rebuttal expert affirmed
State v. Mychael R. Hatcher, 2015AP297-CR, District 3, 8/16/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Hatcher was convicted of sexually assaulting an intoxicated person, obstructing an officer, and bail-jumping. This 38-page court of appeals decision rejects claims that the trial court erred in refusing to accept Hatcher’s guilty plea, admitting expert testimony during the State’s rebuttal, admitting evidence of the victim’s flirting, and ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for suppression and for introducing into evidence a report showing the victim’s BAC.
Brendan Dassey conviction overturned
Brendan Dassey v. Michael A. Dittmann, U.S. District Court (E.D. Wis.) No. 14-CV-1310, 2016 WL 4257386, 8/12/16
Brendan Dassey was charged with homicide and sexual assault after confessing to being involved in the murder of Teresa Halbach along with his uncle, Steven Avery. He challenged his confession, arguing it was involuntary, but the trial court and court of appeals disagreed. In a lengthy, fact-intensive decision, a federal magistrate holds that the state courts’ conclusions involve both an unreasonable determination of the facts and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Juvenile in residential facility was in custody for Miranda purposes
State v. J.T.M., 2015AP1585, 7/19/16, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
A detective interrogated 16-year-old J.T.M. while he was in a juvenile residential facility without first giving Miranda warnings. Because J.T.M. was in custody and wasn’t given the warnings, his statement regarding a sexual assault allegation must be suppressed.
Resuming questioning of suspect didn’t violate his invocation of right to remain silent
State v. Johnnie Mertice Wesley, 2015AP590-CR, District 1, 7/6/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Wesley asserted his right to remain silent during an initial interrogation, and the detectives stopped questioning him. Detectives approached him two more times to resume questioning, and during the third interrogation Wesley made incriminating statements. The court of appeals holds that the detectives didn’t violate Wesley’s invocation of the right to remain silent by resuming interrogation. The court also rejects Wesley’s claim that he invoked the right to remain silent again during the third interrogation.
SCOW makes it easier for the state to satisfy the “inevitable discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule
State v. Mastella L. Jackson, 2016 WI 56, 7/1/16, affirming a published decision of the court of appeals, 2015 WI App 49, 363 Wis. 2d 553, 866 N.W.2d 768; case activity (including briefs)
Despite the “flagrant” and “reprehensible” violations of Jackson’s Fifth Amendment rights by police, the supreme court holds that physical evidence seized based in part on information obtained from those violations should not be suppressed because the evidence would have been inevitably discovered. In the course of this ruling, the court alters Wisconsin’s long-established inevitable discovery standard and refuses to rule out using the doctrine in cases where the police intentionally violate a suspect’s rights.
50 Years of Miranda v. Arizona: Has it done any good?
Today marks the 50th anniversary of Miranda v. Arizona. In honor of the occasion, The Marshall Project asks: For 50 years, you’ve had “the right to remain silent.” So why do so many suspects confess to crimes they did not commit? Read the full report here.
Defendant not in Miranda custody during search of home
State v. Bradley L. Kilgore, 2016 WI App 47; case activity (including briefs)
The execution of the search warrant at Kilgore’s home started with a heavily armed officers, including a SWAT team, entering and putting Kilgore down on the floor at gunpoint; but once the home was “cleared” and weapons were secured and the SWAT team left, Kilgore was not in custody for Miranda purposes. Thus, the statements he made to police while they searched his home were admissible despite the lack of a Miranda warning.
State v. Brian I. Harris, 2014AP1767-CR, petition granted 4/6/16
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issue (from petition for review):
Is a defendant deprived of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and his rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution by the admission at trial in the state’s case-in chief of his unwarned custodial statements made in response to law enforcement’s asking for a statement?
No Miranda warning, no problem, thanks to attenuation doctrine, lack of interrogation
State v. Brian I. Harris, 2016 WI App 2, petition for review granted 4/6/16, affirmed 2017 WI 31; case activity (including briefs)
Incriminating statements Harris made while he was in custody were admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings because the statements were either sufficiently attenuated from the taint of police questioning or were not made in response to police interrogation.