On Point: 5. Confessions

State v. Johnny Jerome Jones, 2014AP342-CR, 3/24/14, District 1 (not recommended for publication); click here for docket and briefs

Jones turned himself in for a hit-and-run accident that resulted in death.  During the interrogation, and after being Mirandized, he asked the detective: “So ya’ll can get a public pretender right now?” The detective laughed and replied: “You said it right, pretender . . . . they’re called public defenders . . . Um, we obviously due to the time right now, we can’t, um . . . .” Jones moved to suppress his subsequent statement and lost at the circuit court and on appeal.

Practitioners take note. This opinion holds the seeds of controversy.  SCOW’s ruling–that forcing a defendant to bare his teeth to the jury does not violate the 5th Amendment–is not so surprising.  But Chief Justice Abrahamson’s concurrence, which announces the elimination of “opinion conferences” and new restrictions on the preparation of concurring and dissenting opinions seems alarming.

State v. Isaiah N. Triggs, 2014AP204-CR, District 1, 10/28/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for waiving a preliminary hearing in Triggs’s homicide prosecution or for failing to move to suppress Triggs’s confession. Further, the circuit court’s plea colloquy with Triggs was not defective and the circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion.

State v. David A. Myhre, 2014AP376-CR, District 4, 10/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Myhre was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he answered questions posed by a DNR warden while sitting in the warden’s truck. Thus, the warden was not required to advise Myhre of his Miranda rights.

State v. Joel I.-N., 2014 WI App 119; case activity

The unrecorded statement Joel I.N., a juvenile, gave to the police was admissible despite the fact the police failed to record the statement as required by §§ 983.195(2)(b) and 938.31(3)(b) because “exigent public safety circumstances” rendered recording his statement infeasible under § 938.31(3)(c)5. Joel also knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent.

State v. Jody A. Bolstad, 2014AP915-CR, 10/2/14, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Bolstad shot a deer decoy from the window of his friend’s pick-up truck while a DNR warden was watching.  Afterwards, while sitting in a DNR car, he confessed to the warden and signed a written statement. The State charged Bolstad with various game regulation violations, and he moved to suppress his statements because the warden failed to inform him of his Miranda rights. The court of appeals held that Bolstad was not “in custody,” so Miranda did not apply.

State v. Marie A. Ezell, 2014 WI App 101; case actvity

Prison guards overheard Ezell tell her incarcerated boyfriend that she would smuggle in drugs for him on her next visit. When she tried to follow through, the guards detained her in a conference room, questioned her, and obtained damning evidence.  Due to the lack of Miranda warnings, this custodial interrogation violated the 5th Amendment, but the court nevertheless declined to suppress the physical evidence derived from the Miranda violations.

State v. Carlos Cummings and State v. Adrean L. Smith, 2014 WI 88, 7/24/14, affirming per curiam court of appeals decisions in 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR, majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; concurrence/dissent by Justice Prosser (joined by Justice Bradley); dissent by Chief Justice Abrahamson; case activity for Cummings and Smith

These cases address whether two Mirandized suspects unequivocally invoked their respective rights to remain silent, or cut off questioning, during police interrogations.  Citing State v. Markwardt, 2007 WI App 242 the majority held that both defendants seem to have meant something other than what they literally said.  Their attempts to cut off questioning were “equivocal” and thus their statements need not be suppressed.

State v. Christopher T. Seiler, 2013AP1911-CR, District 2, 7/23/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Seiler’s compelled statement to his probation agent didn’t taint a subsequent police investigation that led to new charges because, the court of appeals holds, the police investigation was based on sources “independent” of his statements to the agent.

State v. Russell S. Krancki, 2014 WI App 80; case activity

In the first Wisconsin case to address how Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013), affects the admission of evidence of a defendant’s silence, the court of appeals reads Salinas to apply to a narrow factual scenario not present in this case. The court goes on to assume that trial counsel should have objected to testimony about Krancki’s silence, but finds his failure to object wasn’t prejudicial. The court also concludes trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for saying in his opening statement that Krancki would testify or for failing to exclude references to the .02 blood alcohol limit.