On Point blog, page 6 of 26
Non-custodial interrogation became custodial, so Miranda warnings were required
State v. Brian D. Frazier, 2017AP1249-CR, District 4, 8/2/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Frazier agreed to drive himself to the police station to answer some questions and was assured when the questioning began that he was not under arrest and did not have to answer questions. But the initial non-custodial encounter was transformed into custody for purposes of Miranda by the officer’s subsequent words and actions, triggering the need for the Miranda warning. The officer never read Frazier the warning, so the confession he gave must be suppressed.
COA says trial court didn’t sentence on improper factors
State v. Dion Lashay Byrd, 2017AP1968, 6/26/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Byrd was convicted of making a bomb threat to the Fox 6 TV station in Milwaukee. He claims the sentencing court relied on two improper factors in imposing the maximum sentence for this Class I felony. First, he says the court coerced him into making self-incriminating statements during his sentencing allocution–statements that could not be used against him at sentencing under the Fifth Amendment. Second, he contends the court should not have based its sentencing decision on its stated dissatisfaction with the statutory maximum.
SCOTUS denied Brendan Dassey’s cert. petition
On Point is sorry to report that on Monday SCOTUS denied Brendan Dassey’s petition for writ of certiorari. Click here. This means that the 7th Circuit’s decision en banc stands and Dassey remains in custody. Dassey’s cert petition and the many amicus briefs supporting it make great arguments. With different facts, they might prevail. So take full advantage of the effort.
Police lies during interrogation
It happens all the time, and it’s been dubbed an art. This new article, Extending Miranda: Prohibition on Police Lies Regarding the Incriminating Evidence (54 San Diego Law Review 611 (2017), argues that police lies increase the risk of false confessions and infringe upon the defendant’s right to remain silent, the presumption of innocence, and the prosecution’s obligation to prove its accusations.
Helpful resources on involuntary and false confessions
When last we wrote about we Brendan Dassey, the 7th Circuit, sitting en banc, had vacated the writ of habeas corpus issued the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Dassey has since filed a cert petition in SCOTUS, and numerous organizations have filed amicus briefs in support of it. If you have a case involving a possibly involuntary or false confession (whether by a juvenile or an adult), you might want to take a look at the pro-defense research and arguments presented by the Juvenile Law Center,
Defense win on suppression of involuntary statement due to improper police tactics sticks on appeal
State v. Chad David Knauer, 2017AP2243-CR, 3/22/18, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Hats off to defense counsel, the circuit court, and court of appeals for the decision in this case. The State charged Knauer with misdemeanor theft of property. Police had interviewed him for just 1 hour at about 11 p.m. at the county jail. He admitted to stealing a trailer and storing it at his aunt’s and uncle’s house. But then police told Knauer that if any other stolen property was found at the same location they would arrest his aunt and uncle. The circuit court held that threatening to arrest Knauer’s relatives when police lacked probable cause that they had committed a crime was an improper interrogation tactic that rendered his confession involuntary.
SCOW: Confession to violent felony doesn’t transform interrogation room interview into custodial interrogation
State v. Daniel J.H. Bartelt, 2018 WI 16, 2/20/18, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, case activity (including briefs)
Suppose you confessed to attempted homicide while sitting in a police station interrogation room with 2 officers who are positioned between you and the exit. Would you feel free to leave? The majority says a reasonable person would. The dissent by A.W. Bradley (joined by Abrahamson) says a reasonable person would not.
The 7th Circuit: Making a mess of confession law
Dassey v. Dittman, 2017 WL 6154050, (7th Cir. 12/8/17)
This is the decision Making a Murderer watchers have been waiting for. Critics and ivory tower dwellers will celebrate the result (a 4-3 win for the prosecution) but also the concise, dispassionate exposition of the law on involuntary confessions and its application to a hypothetical Brendan Dassey–someone mature, intelligent, unsusceptible to manipulation or coercion by “interviewers.” Documentary fans and lawyers having real world experience representing clients with diminished mental capacity will prefer Chief Judge Diane Wood’s biting dissent. She nails the flaws in the majority’s reasoning and applies the law to the human Dassey–a 16-year old with an IQ in the low 80s.
SCOTUS will decide whether Fifth Amendment bars use of statements at pretrial hearings, or only at trial
City of Hays, Kansas v. Vogt, USSC No. 16-1495, cert granted 9/28/17
Whether the Fifth Amendment is violated when statements are used at a probable cause hearing but not at a criminal trial.
Seventh Circuit affirms grant of new trial for Brendan Dassey
Brendan Dassey v. Michael A. Dittman, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 16-3397, 2017 WL 2683893, 6/22/17, affirming Dassey v. Pittman, 201 F.Supp.3d 963 (E.D. Wis. 2016).
Over a dissent, the Seventh Circuit holds that the Wisconsin court of appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when they decided that Brendan Dassey voluntarily confessed to being involved with Steven Avery in the murder of Teresa Halbach.