On Point: 5. Confessions

State v. Joseph J. Spaeth, 2012 WI 95, on certification; case activity

Probationer’s statement, compelled by rules of his supervision, is covered by derivative as well as use immunity in a criminal prosecution.

¶3   We hold that the statement that Spaeth made to Oshkosh police was derived from the compelled, incriminating, testimonial statement that he made to his probation agent.  Thus,

Howes v. Randall Lee Fields, USSC No. 10-680, 2/21/12, reversing 617 F.3d 813 (6th Cir 2010); arguably abrogating, State v. Tonnie D. Armstrong, 223 Wis.2d 331, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999)

Habeas – Review, Generally 

Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus if the state-court adjudication pursuant to which the prisoner is held “resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

State v. Zachary Ryan Wiegand, 2011AP939-CR, District 3, 2/7/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Wiegand: Brian C. Findley; case activity

Despite initially waiving his Miranda rights, Wiegand later unequivocally asserted his right to silence (“I don’t want to say anything more”); nonetheless, the interrogating officer did not scrupulously honor this invocation, and the ensuing statement along with all derivative evidence is therefore suppressed.

on review of unpublished opinion; for Lemoine: Donna L. Hintze, Katie R. York, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Involuntary Statement – Coercion 

Issue (composed by On Point): 

Whether Lemoine’s in-custody statement was involuntary given the following police tactics:

• promising that in exchange for the “true story” he would not go to jail that night;
• telling him that he would not be able to contact an attorney while at the jail;

on review of unpublished decision; for Martin: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity; prior post

Miranda – “Interrogation” 

Issue (composed by On Point):

Whether an exchange between Martin and an officer was the functional equivalent of “interrogation” so as to require interrogation.

The facts, very briefly, as taken from the court of appeals’ decision: Martin was under arrest for DC when an officer fished a gun out of his car.

Bobby v. Archie Dixon, USSC No. 10-1540, 11/7/11 (per curiam), reversing Dixon v. Houk, 627 F.3d 553 (6th Cir 2010)

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court “must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v.

State v. Dennis D. Lemoine, 2010AP2597-CR, District 4, 9/15/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Lemoine: Donna L. Hintze, Katie R. York, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; supreme court review granted, 1/25/12

¶18      We agree with the trial court that the balance of the defendant’s personal characteristics against the tactics used by the police renders this is a “close case.”  However,

State v. Devon L. Bean, 2011 WI App 129 (recommended for publication); for Bean: Scott D. Obernberger; case activity

Sew-up Confession 

The fourth interrogation of Bean within a 60-hour period following his arrest did not, under the particular facts, amount to an impermissible “sew-up” confession.

General principles. The question, in brief, is whether the time between arrest and formal charge was “inordinate.”

J.D.B. v. North Carolina, USSC No. 09-11101, 6/16/11, reversing 363 N. C. 664, 686 S. E. 2d 135

This case presents the question whether the age of a child subjected to police questioning is relevant to the custody analysis of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) . It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave.

on petition for review of unpublished decision; for Stevens: Paul G. LaZotte, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Issues (provided by court):

If a suspect in custody initiates communication with the police after previously invoking his Miranda right to consult with an attorney but has yet to again waive his Miranda rights, do the police violate the demands of Miranda by denying an attorney access to the suspect prior to the second waiver of his Miranda rights?