On Point blog, page 17 of 26
Howes v. Randall Lee Fields, USSC No. 10-680, Cert. Granted 1/24/11
Decision below (617 F.3d 813 (6th Cir 2010))
Question Presented (by Scotusblog):
Whether this Court’s clearly established precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 holds that a prisoner is always “in custody” for purposes of Miranda any time that prisoner is isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct occurring outside the prison regardless of the surrounding circumstances.
The grant appears to raise the recurrent problem of whether Miranda warnings are always and necessarily required when someone already incarcerated is interrogated by the police on a different offense.
State v. Joseph J. Spaeth, 2009AP2907-CR, District 2, 12/29/10
certification; for Spaeth: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; Spaeth BiC; State Resp.; Reply
ISSUE
In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453, 460 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that the government may compel incriminating testimony so long as it comes with a grant of use and derivative use immunity—that is to say,
Miranda – Impeachment – Harmless Error
State v. Marlon M. Anderson, 2010AP742-CR, District 1/4, 12/9/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Anderson: Angela Conrad Kachelski; Anderson BiC; State Resp.
A defendant’s statement made voluntarily but in violation of Miranda isn’t admissible in the State’s case-in-chief, but is admissible if the defendant testifies and the statement is inconsistent with his testimony. The question raised here relates to how such inconsistency is measured: whether outright contradictions are necessary,
Custodial Interrogation: Request for Counsel – Waiver of Rights – Invocation of Counsel – Assertion of Right to Silence
State v. Patrick E. Hampton, 2010 WI App 169 (recommended for publication); for Hampton: Michael S. Holzman; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Custodial Interrogation – Request for Counsel
To invoke the 5th amendment right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the suspect must assert the right unambiguously, something Hampton did not do.
¶30 Hampton alleges that detectives ignored him and continued to inappropriately question him five minutes into the July 20 interview,
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, USSC No. 09-11121, cert granted 11/1/10
Decision below (N.C. supreme court)
Question Presented:
Whether, in the context of interrogating a juvenile in a school setting, “custody” for purposes of triggering Miranda warnings is determined by a purely objective test; or includes subjective considerations such as the subject’s age and status as a special education student.
The nub of the lower court holding:
…
State v. Gregory M. Sahs, 2009AP2916-CR, District 1, 10/26/10, review granted 11/14/12
Voluntariness – Statements to Probation Officer
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication), supreme court review granted 11/14/12; for Sahs: Mark S. Rosen; BiC; Resp.
Sahs’ claim that his statements to his probation officer were given under compulsion is rejected, because the premise for the claim – a DOC form cautioning that he must reveal his activities else face probation revocation –
Compelled Self-Incrimination – Sentencing after Revocation
State v. Ronnie L. Peebles, 2010 WI App 156 (recommended for publication); for Peebles: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Use, at Peebles’ sentencing after revocation, of his incriminating statements made during counseling ordered as a condition of probation, violated the 5th amendment and requires resentencing. The court canvasses the leading cases – State v.
Interrogation Request for Counsel – Re-Initiation by Suspect; Assertion-Waiver, Right to Silence
State v. Robert Allen, Jr., 2009AP2596-CR , District 1, 9/14/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Allen: Bradley J. Lochowicz; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Interrogation Request for Counsel – Re-Initiation by Suspect
Allen’s invocation of right to counsel terminated his interrogation, but he immediately re-initiated communication with the police by asking “what’s going on”:
¶15 “Even after a suspect in custody asks to speak with a lawyer,
Interrogation – Ambiguous Request for Counsel; Joinder/Severance; Evidence – Autopsy Photos
State v. Adamm D.J. Linton, 2010 WI App 129; for Linton: Joseph E. Redding; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Interrogation – Ambiguous Request for Counsel
Initial custodial questioning terminated when Linton invoked his right to silence. During subsequent re-interrogation, Linton said, “when I asked for a lawyer earlier, why wasn’t he appointed to me?” The detective indicated that if Linton was asking for a lawyer then the police would “just stop talking to”
Aris Etherly v. Davis, 7th Cir. No. 09-3535, 08/25/2010
7th Cir. decision; Order denying rehearing and amending opinion, 10/10/15
Habeas – Voluntary Statement – Juvenile
State court determination that juvenile’s custodial statement to police was voluntary wasn’t objectively unreasonable., notwithstanding his age (15), borderline intellectual functioning and lack of criminal background. “(I)t is the totality of the circumstances underlying a juvenile confession, rather than the presence or absence of a single circumstance, that determines whether or not the confession should be deemed voluntary.”