On Point: 5. Confessions

seventh circuit decision, denying habeas relief in 641 N.E.2d 371 (Ill. 1994) and 521 N.E.2d 38 (1988)

Habeas Review – 6th Amendment Attachment of Counsel – State Court Findings

The Seventh Circuit rejects, on habeas review of his Illinois conviciton, Thompkins’ challenge to admissibility of his statement. Thompkins made his statement after his arrest and, according to the state court, before his initial bond hearing.

on review of unpublished decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point) 

Whether, after asserting his right to counsel, Lonkonski initiated further communication with the police so as to allow admissibility of his ensuing statement, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483-85 (1981).

There may be a threshold dispute as to whether Lonkoski was in custody at the time he asserted his right to counsel,

seventh circuit decision

Habeas Review – Confessions – Voluntariness 

Given the deferential nature of habeas review, the state court reasonably determined that a 16-year-old’s confession after 55 hours of interrogation was voluntary:

Particularly in light of the highly deferential standard due to the state court, we have no reason to doubt that it took into account all of the relevant facts, highlighting only those that seemed especially pertinent to the voluntariness of the confession.

State v. Pierre R. Conner, 2012 WI App 105 (recommended for publication); case activity

Interrogations – Miranda-Edwards Rule – Unequivocal Request for Counsel 

The issues on a request-for-counsel challenge to in-custody interrogation are whether the individual  unequivocally invoked his right to counsel and, if so, whether he subsequently reinitiated questioning, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). Although the trial court found that Conner’s requests for counsel were equivocal,

seventh circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas Review – Miranda-Edwards 

Coleman’s argument that his confession violated Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (interrogation must cease immediately if suspect requests counsel) was rejected by the state court based upon a determination that he did not in fact assert his to counsel. Denial of relief is affirmed:

Coleman admits but downplays the crucial difference here: In Edwards,

State v. David W. Stevens, 2012 WI 97, affirming unpublished decision; case activity

Miranda-Edwards Rule – Invocation of Counsel, Initiation of Contact by Suspect

Where an in-custody suspect invokes his right to counsel and interrogation immediately ceases, but the suspect himself then initiates a request to continue the interrogation, the police may proceed with questioning if fresh Miranda warnings are given and validly waived. 

State v. Randy L. Martin, 2012 WI 96, reversing unpublished decision; case activity

Miranda – “Custodial Interrogation”  

Martin was arrested for disorderly conduct and handcuffed at the scene of an otherwise unrelated incident (¶6, id. n. 6). Search of his car yielded a gun. When an officer asked him, Martin denied ownership. The officer then prepared to arrest Henry, Martin’s companion,

State v. Joseph J. Spaeth, 2012 WI 95, on certification; case activity

Probationer’s statement, compelled by rules of his supervision, is covered by derivative as well as use immunity in a criminal prosecution.

¶3   We hold that the statement that Spaeth made to Oshkosh police was derived from the compelled, incriminating, testimonial statement that he made to his probation agent.  Thus,

Howes v. Randall Lee Fields, USSC No. 10-680, 2/21/12, reversing 617 F.3d 813 (6th Cir 2010); arguably abrogating, State v. Tonnie D. Armstrong, 223 Wis.2d 331, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999)

Habeas – Review, Generally 

Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus if the state-court adjudication pursuant to which the prisoner is held “resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

State v. Zachary Ryan Wiegand, 2011AP939-CR, District 3, 2/7/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Wiegand: Brian C. Findley; case activity

Despite initially waiving his Miranda rights, Wiegand later unequivocally asserted his right to silence (“I don’t want to say anything more”); nonetheless, the interrogating officer did not scrupulously honor this invocation, and the ensuing statement along with all derivative evidence is therefore suppressed.