On Point blog, page 23 of 25
Statements – Voluntariness – Juveniles
A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2004)
Issue/Holding:
… In fact, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that a confession or waiver of rights by a juvenile is not the same as a confession or waiver by an adult. A defendant’s age is an important factor in determining whether a confession is voluntary. ……
Here, the circumstances weigh in favor of a determination that Morgan’s inculpatory statements were involuntary.
Presentence report – Miranda-Related Safeguards
State v. Jimmie R.R., 2004 WI App 168, motion for reconsideration denied 9/15/04
For Jimmie R.R.: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: Because the “presentence investigation was not part of the accusatory stage of a criminal proceeding”; and because the PSR “interview was routine and was not conducted while Jimmie’s jeopardy was still in doubt, Jimmie, “unlike the defendant in Estelle,
Statements – Voluntariness – Police Deception/Promises
State v. Matthew J. Knapp, 2003 WI 121, on certification
For Knapp: Robert G. LeBell
Issue: In essence, this court is presented with the question of whether a custodial inculpatory statement, obtained without proper Miranda warnings, and extracted through the use of police deception, is an “involuntary” self-incriminatory statement and inadmissible at trial for any purpose,” ¶95. (The police ruse involved inducing Knapp into talking by telling him that they were investigating constitutional violations committed by the department when they were in fact investigating Knapp’s involvement in a homicide.)
Holding: Given Knapp’s intelligence,
Statements – Voluntariness – Police Coercion, Necessity of
State v. Paul D. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, affirming unpublished opinion
For Hoppe: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶46. Both Connelly and Clappes support the proposition that some coercive or improper police conduct must exist in order to sustain a finding of involuntariness. However, both of these cases also recognize that police conduct does not need to be egregious or outrageous in order to be coercive.
Statements – Voluntariness – Suspect’s “Severely Debilitated” Condition Coupled with “Subtle” Police Coercion
State v. Paul D. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, affirming unpublished opinion
For Hoppe: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: Under “somewhat unique” facts, a suspect’s statements made during interviews in a hospital over a three-day period while delusional and in the throes of acute alcohol withdrawal were involuntary despite the absence of any egregious police pressure. ¶¶47-59.
As suggested, this case is highly fact-specific,
Physical Evidence Derived from (Intentional) Miranda Violation
State v. Matthew J. Knapp (I), 2003 WI 121, on certification; vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Patane, 542 U. S. ____ (2004), Wisconsin v. Knapp, No. 03-590; Knapp I reaffirmed on remand, State v. Matthew J. Knapp (II),
Motion to Suppress Statement – State’s Burden of Proof, Unsworn Police Reports
State v. Joseph F. Jiles, 2003 WI 66, reversing unpublished decision of court of appeals
For Jiles: Mark S. Rosen
Issue/Holding:
¶35. We think it will be a rare case that the State is able to meet its burden of proof at a Miranda–Goodchild hearing by relying exclusively on an unsworn police report.
¶36.
Confessions – Post-Polygraph – Admissibility
State v. Jeremy T. Greer, 2003 WI App 112, on remand following equally-divided result,2003 WI 30; PFR filed 6/12/03
For Greer: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶14. In this case it is not disputed that before he confessed to Detective Williams, Greer was told, both orally and in writing, that the polygraph test was over.
Statements – Voluntariness – Private Citizen’s Coercion
State v. Marvin J. Moss, 2003 WI App 239, PFR filed 10/27/03
For Moss: F.M. Van Hecke
Issue/Holding:
¶2. The issue in this case is whether a defendant’s incriminating statement improperly coerced by a person who is not a state agent offends constitutional due process such that the statement is inadmissible. We conclude that there is no due process violation where, as in this case,
Involuntary Statement of Witness (Not Defendant) — Admissibility — Test
State v. Stanley A. Samuel, 2002 WI 34, reversing 2001 WI App 25, 240 Wis. 2d 756, 623 N.W.2d 565; habeas denied, Samuel v. Frank, 525 F. 3d 566 (7th Cir 2008)
For Samuel: Robert A. Henak
Issue/Holding:
¶30. With due process as our touchstone, we conclude that when a defendant seeks to suppress witness statements as the product of coercion,