On Point blog, page 24 of 26
Physical Evidence Derived from (Intentional) Miranda Violation
State v. Matthew J. Knapp (I), 2003 WI 121, on certification; vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Patane, 542 U. S. ____ (2004), Wisconsin v. Knapp, No. 03-590; Knapp I reaffirmed on remand, State v. Matthew J. Knapp (II),
Motion to Suppress Statement – State’s Burden of Proof, Unsworn Police Reports
State v. Joseph F. Jiles, 2003 WI 66, reversing unpublished decision of court of appeals
For Jiles: Mark S. Rosen
Issue/Holding:
¶35. We think it will be a rare case that the State is able to meet its burden of proof at a Miranda–Goodchild hearing by relying exclusively on an unsworn police report.
¶36.
Confessions – Post-Polygraph – Admissibility
State v. Jeremy T. Greer, 2003 WI App 112, on remand following equally-divided result,2003 WI 30; PFR filed 6/12/03
For Greer: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶14. In this case it is not disputed that before he confessed to Detective Williams, Greer was told, both orally and in writing, that the polygraph test was over.
Statements – Voluntariness – Private Citizen’s Coercion
State v. Marvin J. Moss, 2003 WI App 239, PFR filed 10/27/03
For Moss: F.M. Van Hecke
Issue/Holding:
¶2. The issue in this case is whether a defendant’s incriminating statement improperly coerced by a person who is not a state agent offends constitutional due process such that the statement is inadmissible. We conclude that there is no due process violation where, as in this case,
Involuntary Statement of Witness (Not Defendant) — Admissibility — Test
State v. Stanley A. Samuel, 2002 WI 34, reversing 2001 WI App 25, 240 Wis. 2d 756, 623 N.W.2d 565; habeas denied, Samuel v. Frank, 525 F. 3d 566 (7th Cir 2008)
For Samuel: Robert A. Henak
Issue/Holding:
¶30. With due process as our touchstone, we conclude that when a defendant seeks to suppress witness statements as the product of coercion,
Ambiguous Assertion of Rights — Counsel
State v. Edward Terrell Jennings, 2002 WI 44, on certification
For Jennings: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether the police may continue to interrogate a suspect who has ambiguously asserted rights, — in this instance, “I think maybe I need to talk to a lawyer.”
Holding:
¶36. Applying Davis, we conclude that Jennings’ statement to Detective Kreitzmann, “I think maybe I need to talk to a lawyer,”
Involuntary Statement — Test
State v. Stanley A. Samuel, 2002 WI 34, reversing 2001 WI App 25, 240 Wis. 2d 756, 623 N.W.2d 565
For Samuel: Robert A. Henak
Issue/Holding: “¶30. With due process as our touchstone, we conclude that when a defendant seeks to suppress witness statements as the product of coercion, the police misconduct must be more than that set forth in Clappes.
Custody — Handcuffed in Squad
State v. Zan Morgan, 2002 WI App 124
For Morgan: Timothy A. Provis
Issue: Whether Morgan was in custody, for Miranda purposes, after being handcuffed and placed in the back of a squad car.
Holding: Custody is determined under “the totality of the circumstances, including such factors as: the defendant’s freedom to leave; the purpose, place, and length of the interrogation; and the degree of restraint.”
Right to Silence During Pendency of Direct Appeal
State ex rel. Gary Tate v. Schwarz, 2002 WI 127, reversing 2001 WI App 131
For Tate: Jerome F. Buting, Pamela S. Moorshead, Buting & Williams
Issue/Holding: The Evans-Thompson rule — “the state may compel a probationer to answer self-incriminating questions from his probation or parole agent, or suffer the consequence of revocation for refusing to do so, only ‘if he is protected by a grant of immunity that renders the compelled testimony inadmissible against the [probationer] in a criminal prosecution’”
Drug Tax Stamp, §§ 139.87-139.96 — Constitutionality
State v. Glover B. Jones, 2002 WI App 196, PFR filed 8/22/02
For Jones: Mark D. Richards
Issue/Holding: The drug tax stamp law, §§ 139.87-139.96, amended to address State v. Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 54, 557 N.W.2d 778 (1997), doesn’t violate the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, ¶33-36.