On Point: 5. Confessions

State v. Xavier J. Rockette, 2005 WI App 205
For Rockette: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding:

¶24     We conclude that Rockette did not waive his Miranda rights. Rockette does not argue that Chausee did anything to coerce his confession. Indeed, the purpose of Rockette’s cooperation at the interview, which his own counsel set up, was to increase his chances of securing some leniency from the State.

State v. Richard Allen Hassel, 2005 WI App 80
For Hassel: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Hassel’s noncustodial statement, “I can’t talk to you,” did not amount to a Miranda-protected assertion of rights, largely because such rights can’t be invoked “anticipatorily,” ¶¶8-15. (State v. Fencl, 109 Wis. 2d 224, 325 N.W.2d 703 (1982) distinguished as a rule of evidence safeguarding against substantive use at trial of prearrest silence.)

State v. Charles W. Mark, 2005 WI App 62, affirmed, 2006 WI 78
For Mark: Glenn L. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶14 … (I)f probationers are required to choose between answers that will incriminate them in pending or subsequent criminal prosecutions and loss of their conditional liberty as a price for exercising their right to remain silent, the statements are compelled. 

State v. Maurice S. Ewing, 2005 WI App 206
For Ewing: David R. Karpe

Issue/Holding: Where the defendant waived his rights and gave pre-trial statements to the police and presented an alibi defense at trial, prosecutorial evidence that the defendant had not revealed the alibi during those statements, and exploitation of that omission during closing argument, did not amount to impermissible comment on silence. “Rather, the prosecutor was highlighting the inconsistency between what Ewing did say and what his alibi witnesses testified to at trial.” ¶¶10-13.

 A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2004)

Issue/Holding1:

In determining whether a person is “in custody,” the question is whether, examining the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the petitioner’s position would have felt “at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). In making this determination, “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.”Berkemer v.

A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2004)

Issue/Holding:

… In fact, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that a confession or waiver of rights by a juvenile is not the same as a confession or waiver by an adult. A defendant’s age is an important factor in determining whether a confession is voluntary. ……

Here, the circumstances weigh in favor of a determination that Morgan’s inculpatory statements were involuntary.

State v. Jimmie R.R., 2004 WI App 168, motion for reconsideration denied 9/15/04
For Jimmie R.R.: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Because the “presentence investigation was not part of the accusatory stage of a criminal proceeding”; and because the PSR “interview was routine and was not conducted while Jimmie’s jeopardy was still in doubt, Jimmie, “unlike the defendant in Estelle,

State v. Matthew J. Knapp, 2003 WI 121, on certification
For Knapp: Robert G. LeBell

Issue: In essence, this court is presented with the question of whether a custodial inculpatory statement, obtained without proper Miranda warnings, and extracted through the use of police deception, is an “involuntary” self-incriminatory statement and inadmissible at trial for any purpose,” ¶95. (The police ruse involved inducing Knapp into talking by telling him that they were investigating constitutional violations committed by the department when they were in fact investigating Knapp’s involvement in a homicide.)

Holding: Given Knapp’s intelligence,

State v. Paul D. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, affirming unpublished opinion
For Hoppe: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶46. Both Connelly and Clappes support the proposition that some coercive or improper police conduct must exist in order to sustain a finding of involuntariness. However, both of these cases also recognize that police conduct does not need to be egregious or outrageous in order to be coercive.

State v. Paul D. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, affirming unpublished opinion
For Hoppe: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Under “somewhat unique” facts, a suspect’s statements made during interviews in a hospital over a three-day period while delusional and in the throes of acute alcohol withdrawal were involuntary despite the absence of any egregious police pressure. ¶¶47-59.

As suggested, this case is highly fact-specific,