On Point: 5. Confessions

State v. Chad David Knauer, 2017AP2243-CR, 3/22/18, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Hats off to defense counsel, the circuit court, and court of appeals for the decision in this case. The State charged Knauer with misdemeanor theft of property. Police had interviewed him for just 1 hour at about 11 p.m. at the county jail. He admitted to stealing a trailer and storing it at his aunt’s and uncle’s house. But then police told Knauer that if any other stolen property was found at the same location they would arrest his aunt and uncle. The circuit court held that threatening to arrest Knauer’s relatives when police lacked probable cause that they had committed a crime was an improper interrogation tactic that rendered his confession involuntary. 

State v. Daniel J.H. Bartelt, 2018 WI 16, 2/20/18, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, case activity (including briefs)

Suppose you confessed to attempted homicide while sitting in a police station interrogation room with 2 officers who are positioned between you and the exit. Would you feel free to leave? The majority says a reasonable person would. The dissent by A.W. Bradley (joined by Abrahamson) says a reasonable person would not.  

Dassey v. Dittman, 2017 WL 6154050, (7th Cir. 12/8/17)

This is the decision Making a Murderer watchers have been waiting for. Critics and ivory tower dwellers will celebrate the result (a 4-3 win for the prosecution) but also the concise, dispassionate exposition of the law on involuntary confessions and its application to a hypothetical Brendan Dassey–someone mature, intelligent, unsusceptible to manipulation or coercion by “interviewers.” Documentary fans and lawyers having real world experience representing clients with diminished mental capacity will prefer Chief Judge Diane Wood’s biting dissent. She nails the flaws in the majority’s reasoning and applies the law to the human Dassey–a 16-year old with an IQ in the low 80s.

City of Hays, Kansas v. Vogt, USSC No. 16-1495, cert granted 9/28/17

Question presented:

Whether the Fifth Amendment is violated when statements are used at a probable cause hearing but not at a criminal trial.

Brendan Dassey v. Michael A. Dittman, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 16-3397, 2017 WL 2683893, 6/22/17, affirming Dassey v. Pittman, 201 F.Supp.3d 963 (E.D. Wis. 2016).

Over a dissent, the Seventh Circuit holds that the Wisconsin court of appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when they decided that Brendan Dassey voluntarily confessed to being involved with Steven Avery in the murder of Teresa Halbach.

State v. Daniel H. Bartelt, 2015AP2506-CR, 6/15/17, granting review of a published court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

1.  After confessing to an attempted homicide or other serious crimes, would a reasonable person feel free to terminate a police interview and leave an interrogation room, such that the person in not “in custody” for Miranda purposes?

2.  After confessing, did Bartelt make a clear and unequivocal request for counsel when he asked one of the detectives, “Should I or can I speak to a lawyer or anything?” the detective replied, Sure, yes, that is your option.” And Bartelt replied, “Okay, I think I’d prefer that.”

State v. Omar Quinton Triggs, 2015AP2533, 6/13/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A patrolling officer saw Triggs “close a garage door and quickly run to the driver’s door” and get into his car, which was parked nearby in an alley. Five officers in three vehicles converged, forcibly removed Triggs from his car, and handcuffed him. 

State v. Brian Harris, 2017 WI 31, 4/7/17, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 2016 WI App 2; case activity (including briefs)

“This freedom from compelled self-incrimination is one of the nation’s ‘most cherished principles.’ Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458. We are sufficiently solicitous of this protection that we guard it by patrolling a generous buffer zone around the central prohibition.” Majority Op. ¶12. That’s the principle in theory. Here’s how it applies in practice.

State v. Julius Alfonso Coleman, 2013AP2100-CR, 3/21/2017, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Julius Coleman was set up by a confidential informant to participate in an armed robbery of a nonexistent drug dealer named “Poncho.” He challenges the admission of various statements at trial on the ground that they were taken in violation of Miranda. The court of appeals concludes that any error in their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but along the way (and not for the first time) seems to confuse the test for harmless error with that for sufficiency of the evidence.

State v. Daniel J.H. Bartelt, 2017 WI App 23, petition for review granted 6/15/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 16, ; case activity (including briefs)

During a police interview about an attempted homicide, Bartelt made incriminating statements and then unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. A few minutes later, police arrested him. The next day, different officers advised Bartelt of his Miranda rights, which he waived before confessing to a murder. The issue is whether Bartelt was in custody when he invoked his right to counsel during the first interview.