On Point: 5. Confessions

State v. Adam W. Vice, 2021 WI 63, 6/16/21, reversing a published decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court and court of appeals held Vice’s post-polygraph confession was involuntary because the police officers interrogating him referred multiple times to Vice’s polygraph results (he failed), told him that proved he remembered the crime despite his denials, but never told him the polygraph results were inadmissible as evidence. As we predicted, the state petitioned for review, the supreme court took the case, and, in an opinion essentially devoid of law development, holds Vice’s confession wasn’t coerced.

State v. Daniel J. Rejholec, 2021 WI App 45; case activity (including briefs)

Police arrested Rejholec on suspicion of sexual assault of a minor. After receiving the Miranda admonitions, Rejholec agreed to speak with a detective. The interrogation was recorded on video. That video reveals the detective’s aggressive deployment of the so-called Reid technique: a method of extracting confessions (be they true or false). The detective bullies, cajoles and wheedles until he gets what he’s after: a confession. Oh, the detective also lies, floridly.

State v. Chardez Harrison, 2019AP2151, 3/23/21, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Harrison was arrested on suspicion of some armed robberies and carjackings. While he was in custody, a detective read him the Miranda warnings. The version of the warnings printed on cards for the Milwaukee police to use apparently concludes with a question: “Realizing that you have these rights, are you now willing to answer some questions or make a statement?” (¶6). Harrison responded to this question by saying “I don’t want to make no statement right now.” Pretty clear invocation, right? Wrong, says the court of appeals.

State v. Brian L. Halverson, 2021 WI 7, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 2018AP858CR; case activity (including briefs)

Halverson was interrogated over the phone by a police officer while he was in jail on an unrelated matter. Wisconsin courts once treated incarceration as per se Miranda custody, believing that was the law SCOTUS had established. But Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012), held that it’s not. Halverson argued the Wisconsin Supreme Court should adopt the per se rule under our state’s Constitution, but SCOW now declines. It also holds that the particular circumstances here didn’t amount to custody in the absence of such a rule.

State v. Manuel Garcia, 2018AP2319-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity

Issue for review: (adapted from the State’s PFR  and the COA’s opinion):

Whether the State may invoke the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule during its case-in-chief and thereby use a defendant’s statement, taken in violation of Miranda, to rehabilitate one of its witnesses?

State v. Brian v. Rotolo, 2019AP2061-CR, petition for review granted 12/28/20; case activity

Issue presented (adapted from the petition for review):

In State v. Lonkoski, 2013 WI 30, ¶6, 346 Wis. 2d 523, 828 N.W.2d 552, SCOW held that the test for Fifth Amendment Miranda custody is whether “a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the interview and leave the scene.” Does this test for determining Miranda custody also apply when police legally detain a suspect under Terry?

State v. Manuel Garcia, 2020 WI App 71, petition to review granted, 1/20/21, affirmed by an evenly divided court, 2021 WI 76; case activity (including briefs)

Even if a court suppresses a defendant’s voluntary statement because it was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the state may use the statement to impeach the defendant if he or she elects to testify. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990). The issue in this case is whether this “impeachment exception” allows the state to use the defendant’s statement  to “rehabilitate” one of its witnesses. The court of appeals holds it does not: the state may use an illegally obtained statement only to impeach the defendant’s testimony.

State v. Adam W. Vice, 2018AP2220-CR, petition for review of a published, split opinion granted August 20, 2020, case activity

Issue for review: (State’s petition for review; Vice’s response)

During a post-polygraph interview, police repeatedly referenced Vice’s polygraph test results and failed to inform him that the results would be inadmissible in court. Did the court of appeals give undue weight to these factors in assessing the voluntariness of Vice’s confession to sexual assault of a four year old?

State v. Timothy E. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64, 7/3/20, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2018AP319; case activity (including briefs)

There’s really only one important holding here: despite adoption of the Daubert standard, Wisconsin continues to permit expert testimony in the form of “dissertation or exposition.” That is, an expert can educate the jury about the principles or findings of his or her field without talking about the facts of the case, and an expert who does so is not subject to the requirement that he or she “appl[y] the principles and methods” of that field “reliably to the facts of the case.” Though the court also decides a separate Miranda issue, the discussion is fact-intensive and breaks no legal ground. What’s notable (and regrettable) about the Miranda decision is a meandering three-justice concurrence that repeats the court’s error in State v. Bartelt, 2018 WI 16, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 906 N.W.2d 684, by grafting a third step onto the familiar two-part Miranda-custody inquiry.

State v. Adam W. Vice, 2020 WI App 34, petition for review granted 8/30/20, reversed, 2021 WI 63; case activity (including briefs)

This is a “recommended for publication”, split court of appeals opinion where the State lost in a child sexual assault case. In other words the State will surely petition for review, and SCOW will take it. Applying State v. Davis, 2008 WI 71, 310 Wis. 2d 583, 751 N.W.2d 332, the majority held that the defendant’s polygraph test and the confession were two discrete events, but based on the facts of this case, the confession was involuntary. The dissent by Judge Hruz would hold the confession voluntary.