On Point blog, page 2 of 9
Over strong dissent, court of appeals rejects challenge to voluntariness of confession
State v. John S. Finley, 2018AP258-CR, District 2, 6/12/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Here’s a succinct summary of this decision: “The Majority supports the government’s ‘interview,’ which utilized lies, threats, and fabrication of evidence to wrestle a statement from a thirty-six-year-old man, who has the mind of a twelve year old and the social skills of a first grader.” (¶24 (Reilly, P.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted)).
Failure to present expert on interrogation tactics and defendant’s suggestibility held not prejudicial
State v. Dedric Earl Hamilton, Jr., 2018AP200-CR, 12/26/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A jury convicted Hamilton of 1st-degree sexual assault of his 8-year old niece. On appeal, he argued that: (1) he was he entitled to a hearing on his postconviction motion in which he alleged, with the support of two experts, that his attorney provided ineffective assistance when she failed either to challenge the voluntariness of his Miranda waiver and subsequent confession or to present evidence calling its reliability into question at trial; and (2) he was entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice.
Bomb scare adjudication upheld, but restitution order reversed in part
State v. J.P., 2017AP1905, District 1, 9/5/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
J.P. was adjudicated delinquent for calling in two bomb scares to his high school. The court of appeals rejects his claims that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and unlawfully searched his phone and that his confession was involuntary. However, the court agrees with J.P. that part of the restitution order is invalid.
COA says trial court didn’t sentence on improper factors
State v. Dion Lashay Byrd, 2017AP1968, 6/26/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Byrd was convicted of making a bomb threat to the Fox 6 TV station in Milwaukee. He claims the sentencing court relied on two improper factors in imposing the maximum sentence for this Class I felony. First, he says the court coerced him into making self-incriminating statements during his sentencing allocution–statements that could not be used against him at sentencing under the Fifth Amendment. Second, he contends the court should not have based its sentencing decision on its stated dissatisfaction with the statutory maximum.
Helpful resources on involuntary and false confessions
When last we wrote about we Brendan Dassey, the 7th Circuit, sitting en banc, had vacated the writ of habeas corpus issued the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Dassey has since filed a cert petition in SCOTUS, and numerous organizations have filed amicus briefs in support of it. If you have a case involving a possibly involuntary or false confession (whether by a juvenile or an adult), you might want to take a look at the pro-defense research and arguments presented by the Juvenile Law Center,
Defense win on suppression of involuntary statement due to improper police tactics sticks on appeal
State v. Chad David Knauer, 2017AP2243-CR, 3/22/18, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Hats off to defense counsel, the circuit court, and court of appeals for the decision in this case. The State charged Knauer with misdemeanor theft of property. Police had interviewed him for just 1 hour at about 11 p.m. at the county jail. He admitted to stealing a trailer and storing it at his aunt’s and uncle’s house. But then police told Knauer that if any other stolen property was found at the same location they would arrest his aunt and uncle. The circuit court held that threatening to arrest Knauer’s relatives when police lacked probable cause that they had committed a crime was an improper interrogation tactic that rendered his confession involuntary.
The 7th Circuit: Making a mess of confession law
Dassey v. Dittman, 2017 WL 6154050, (7th Cir. 12/8/17)
This is the decision Making a Murderer watchers have been waiting for. Critics and ivory tower dwellers will celebrate the result (a 4-3 win for the prosecution) but also the concise, dispassionate exposition of the law on involuntary confessions and its application to a hypothetical Brendan Dassey–someone mature, intelligent, unsusceptible to manipulation or coercion by “interviewers.” Documentary fans and lawyers having real world experience representing clients with diminished mental capacity will prefer Chief Judge Diane Wood’s biting dissent. She nails the flaws in the majority’s reasoning and applies the law to the human Dassey–a 16-year old with an IQ in the low 80s.
SCOTUS will decide whether Fifth Amendment bars use of statements at pretrial hearings, or only at trial
City of Hays, Kansas v. Vogt, USSC No. 16-1495, cert granted 9/28/17
Whether the Fifth Amendment is violated when statements are used at a probable cause hearing but not at a criminal trial.
Seventh Circuit affirms grant of new trial for Brendan Dassey
Brendan Dassey v. Michael A. Dittman, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 16-3397, 2017 WL 2683893, 6/22/17, affirming Dassey v. Pittman, 201 F.Supp.3d 963 (E.D. Wis. 2016).
Over a dissent, the Seventh Circuit holds that the Wisconsin court of appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when they decided that Brendan Dassey voluntarily confessed to being involved with Steven Avery in the murder of Teresa Halbach.
Court of appeals again blurs harmless error test
State v. Julius Alfonso Coleman, 2013AP2100-CR, 3/21/2017, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Julius Coleman was set up by a confidential informant to participate in an armed robbery of a nonexistent drug dealer named “Poncho.” He challenges the admission of various statements at trial on the ground that they were taken in violation of Miranda. The court of appeals concludes that any error in their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but along the way (and not for the first time) seems to confuse the test for harmless error with that for sufficiency of the evidence.