On Point: A. Generally

decision below: 2010 WI App 42; for Beauchamp: Martin E. Kohler, Craig S. Powell

Issues (from Table of Pending Cases):

Does the confrontation clause bar admission of testimonial dying declarations against a defendant in light of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 and State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 697 N.W.2d 811?

Does a defendant’s right to due process of law restrict the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements?

7th circuit decision

Habeas – Limits on Cros-Examination

State court limitation on impeachment of a witness — so as to exclude that portion of a pre-trial conversation containing the defendant’s “self-serving,” thus inadmissible hearsay, statement — wasn’t an unreasonable application of controlling caselaw.

Determination of whether “state interests, including those reflected in the state’s evidentiary rules, may need to bend in order to ensure that defendants have the right to confront the witnesses against them …

State v. Olu A. Rhodes, No. 2009AP25, District I, 7/7/10; reversed, 2011 WI 73

court of appeals decision (3-judge; not recommended for publication), reversed, 2011 WI 73; for Rhodes: John J. Grau; BiC; Resp.; Reply

¶10      A defendant’s “right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute[,]” however, and “‘trial judges retain wide latitude … to impose reasonable limits.’” Id.

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Sterling: Dianne M. Erickson; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Charging Decision – Judicial Involvement
Increase in the charge, following trial judge’s veiled suggestion to the prosecutor that such an increase would be appropriate, wasn’t occasioned by judicial interference with prosecutorial discretion, ¶¶16-22.

Initially charged with first-degree reckless injury, Sterling was ultimately convicted on an amended charge of attempted first-degree intentional homicide.

court of  appeals decision (3-judge; not recommended for publication); for Jackson: Mark S. Rosen; BiC: Resp.; Reply

Double Jeopardy – Retrial Following Mistrial
Mistrial on defendant’s motion, occasioned by prosecutorial failure to disclose that witness was cooperating with police in separate investigation of Jackson, didn’t bar retrial: there was no showing that the prosecutor was aware of the undisclosed information, or that failure to disclose was intended to provoke mistrial,

7th Circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas – Procedural Bar
Smith defaulted one claim by failing to raise it “in a full round of appellate review” in state court (i.e., he failed to include the issue in his request for Illinois supreme court review). He is unable to overcome the resultant bar on habeas review, on a cause-and-prejudice analysis. Among other things, the claim (trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a witness ID instruction) would likely fail on the merits because counsel didn’t act in an objectively unreasonable manner by failing to object to a pattern instruction.

court of appeals decision; for Carter: Melinda A. Swartz, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

Ex Parte Judicial Questioning, Pretrial Proceeding
Pretrial judicial questioning of a witness at return of a bench warrant worked deprivation of the defendant’s rights to counsel and presence at trial when the witness was subsequently impeached with statements she made during that exchange, ¶¶17-21. The error, though occurring but once and limited to impeachment,

7th Circuit decision; granting habeas relief in: Wis App Nos. 2002AP791 and 2006AP2708 (earlier decision, 1/21/10, now amended); appeal following remand, 11-3228

Habeas – Confrontation
“Because it was error for the state court to admit the co-actors’ statements through the police detective’s testimony at trial, violating Ray’s right of confrontation, we reverse and remand.”

Confrontation – Lab Report
USSC decision. An order, really, not an opinion, tantamount to a “GVR” (Grant, Vacate, Remand):

PER CURIAM. We vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U. S. ___ (2009).

Significance, as explained by Briscoe’s attorney and leading Confrontation Clause expert Richard Friedman: “the critical point confirmed by Melendez-Diaz remains the law: A prosecution witness must testify live,

court of appeals decision, affirmed, 2011 WI 27; for Beauchamp: Martin E. Kohler, Craig S. Powell; case activity

Dying Declaration, § 908.045(3)

¶8        …  dying declaration, codified in Wisconsin Stat. Rule 908.045(3): “A statement made by a declarant while believing that the declarant’s death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the declarant’s impending death.” Under established law,