On Point blog, page 5 of 5
Confrontation – Generally: Statements Made by Prosecutor and Judge in Transcript Read to Jury
State v. Donald W. Jorgensen, 2008 WI 60, reversing unpublished decision
For Jorgensen: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: The present convictions stemmed from Jorgensen showing up for an otherwise unrelated hearing intoxicated; without objection, the prosecutor obtained admission of that hearing’s transcript, which the trial court read to the jury: is Jorgensen entitled to relief on the ground of violation of right to confrontation,
Confrontation – Prosecutor’s Closing Argument
State v. Donald W. Jorgensen, 2008 WI 60, reversing unpublished decision
For Jorgensen: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶39 Jorgensen’s right to confrontation was also violated during the prosecutor’s closing argument. The prosecutor took what the jury had improperly heard during the trial a step further. She “testified” that Jorgensen was a “chronic alcoholic” who did not acknowledge his problem,
Confrontation – Hearsay: Former Testimony, § 908.045(1) — Codefendant’s Separate Trial
State v. Glenn H. Hale, 2005 WI 7, affirming, as modified, 2003 WI App 238
For Hale: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: Under Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), prior testimony at a codefendant’s separate trial is inadmissible at Hale’s trial, given that the previously testifying witness cannot be located. ¶¶53-58.
Crawford says that testimonial hearsay violates confrontation absent prior opportunity to cross-examine.
Confrontation – Hearsay: General Test for Admissibility
State v. Glenn H. Hale, 2005 WI 7, affirming, as modified, 2003 WI App 238
For Hale: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶53. A threshold question for applying the Crawford framework is whether the State is proffering “testimonial” hearsay evidence. …¶54. Because Sullivan’s hearsay evidence was “testimonial” in nature, we turn next to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by Crawford: (1) unavailability of the declarant and (2) a prior opportunity for cross-examination.