On Point: b. Prejudice not found

Freddie L. Byers, Jr., v. Basinger, 7th Cir No. 09-1833, 7/9/10

7th Circuit decision

Habeas – Exhaustion

To exhaust a federal claim, a 2254 petitioner must have “fairly presented” it to the state court.

… We use four factors to evaluate whether a petitioner has “fairly presented” his claim: “1) whether the petitioner relied on federal cases that engage in a constitutional analysis; 2) whether the petitioner relied on state cases which apply a constitutional analysis to similar facts;

John Ebert v. Gaetz, 7th Circuit No. 09-1627, 6/23/10

7th circuit court of appeals decision

When the ineffective assistance claim is based on counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress, as it is here, the defendant must also prove “that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice.” Kimmelman v.

State v. Michael James Carter, 2010 WI 40

Wisconsin supreme court decision, reversing unpublished summary order; for Carter: John T. Wasielewski; BiC (State); Resp.; Reply

Counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to search for admissibility of sexual conduct evidence as an exception to the rape shield law. Therefore, Carter can’t show deficient performance. Separately, this evidence wouldn’t have fallen within an exception anyway,

State v. Chester C., 2009AP2824, District I, 5/4/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Chester C.: Dianne M. Erickson

TPR – Effective Assistance of Counsel
Failure to demonstrate prejudice within the meaning of Strickland dooms this ineffective-assistance claim that trial counsel failed to object to various hearsay statements:

¶7     Other than complaining that his trial lawyer did not object to the hearsay we have recounted,

State v. Roberto Vargas Rodriguez, 2006 WI App 163, PFR filed 8/28/06
For Rodriguez: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶39      Questions that call for a narrative are generally improper because they do not alert court and counsel to the subject about which the witness is about to testify. There are exceptions, however, and whether to permit a question calling for a narrative response is within the trial court’s discretion under Wis.

State v. Derryle S. McDowell, 2004 WI 70, affirming 2003 WI App 168; habeas relief denied, McDowell v. Kingston, 497 F.3d 757 (7th Cir 2007)
For McDowell: Christopher J. Cherella
Amici: Keith A. Findley, John A. Pray

Issue/Holding: (Given the significance of the holding, at-length quoting is required in regard to counsel’s performance obligations relative to a client whose testimony may be perjurious:)

¶2.

State v. David Arredondo, 2004 WI App 7, PFR filed 1/22/04
For Arredondo: James A. Rebholz

Issue/Holding: “Second, Arredondo claims that his trial attorney failed to impeach Garza’s testimony with false statements Garza made to the police. This claim fails on both the deficiency and prejudice prongs. Arredondo cannot show prejudice because Garza admitted on direct-examination that he lied to the police….,” ¶33.

State v. Jimmie R.R., 2004 WI App 168, motion for reconsideration denied 9/15/04

For Jimmie R.R.: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Counsel’s failure to research admissibility of testimony which controlling caselaw plainly regards as confidential was deficient:

¶23. While Swierenga’s testimony was admissible, Geske’s was not. Crowell, which Greve reaffirmed, plainly instructs that information obtained during a court-ordered presentence investigation must remain confidential unless the court has specifically authorized its use under the limited confidentiality exception provided in Wis.