On Point blog, page 4 of 22
COA rejects several claims in felon-in-possession case
State v. Michael James Brehm, 2020AP266, 6/29/21, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Brehm was arrested after a neighbor called 911 to report that he was firing a gun out his window into the air. Police recovered a gun and Brehm admitted to the shooting. He eventually pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.
COA holds declining to give a “statement” doesn’t invoke Miranda right not to answer “questions”
State v. Chardez Harrison, 2019AP2151, 3/23/21, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Harrison was arrested on suspicion of some armed robberies and carjackings. While he was in custody, a detective read him the Miranda warnings. The version of the warnings printed on cards for the Milwaukee police to use apparently concludes with a question: “Realizing that you have these rights, are you now willing to answer some questions or make a statement?” (¶6). Harrison responded to this question by saying “I don’t want to make no statement right now.” Pretty clear invocation, right? Wrong, says the court of appeals.
COA splits on prejudice caused by counsel’s ineffective presentation of Denny defense
State v. General Grant Wilson, 2018AP183-CR, 1/12/21, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This marks the 3rd time the court of appeals has addressed Wilson’s case. In this appeal, the sole question is whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court found deficient performance but not prejudice. Two judges, White and Blanchard affirm. Brash filed an 18-page dissent arguing that the cumulative effect of several deficiencies warrants a new trial.
Read-in images were “associated” with child porn conviction for surcharge purposes
State v. William Francis Kuehn, 2018AP2355, 7/28/20, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Kuehn pleaded to 5 counts of possession of child pornography; 10 more were dismissed and read-in. The court of appeals rejects Kuehn’s three challenges to his conviction and sentence. It holds trial counsel wasn’t deficient in deciding a third-party-perpetrator (Denny) defense wasn’t viable at trial. It says the circuit court properly assessed the $500 per-image surcharge for the 10 images that made up the read-ins. And, it finds not overbroad the circuit court’s imposition of an ES condition that Kuehn have no contact with his girlfriend.
No harm where the defendant’s lawyer was also the judge who bound him over for trial
State v. Keith C. Henyard, 2020 WI App 51; case activity (including briefs)
The State charged Henyard with 8 crimes potentially leading to 157 years in prison. Commissioner Parise engaged Henyard in a colloquy, accepted his waiver of a preliminary hearing, and bound him over for trial. Parise left the bench and 5 months later sold his professional services to Henyard to get him a better deal. The majority denied Henyard’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim for lack of a prejudicial “actual conflict of interest.” Judge Reilly, in another Emperor’s New Clothes moment, dissented expressing concern about the integrity of a judiciary that obscures errors and shifts blame to defendants.
SCOW approves exclusion of DNA evidence and admission “other acts” evidence in child sexual assault case
State v. David Gutierrez, 2020 WI 52, reversing in part a published court of appeals opinion, 6/3/20; case activity (including briefs)
In a 5-0 decision, SCOW affirms all parts of this published court of appeals decision but one. The court of appeals held that the circuit court erred in refusing to admit evidence that excluded Gutierrez as the source of male DNA in the underwear and around the mouth of a victim of child sexual assault. The assaults involved oral sex and attempted vaginal intercourse. SCOW reversed the court of appeals on that point.
COA holds no speedy trial violation; most delays were attributable to defendant
State v. Ronald Eugene Provost, 2020 WI App 21; case activity (including briefs)
It’s unclear why this opinion is recommended for publication. Best guess is that is provides a (rather thin) gloss on the “systemic breakdown” exception to the rule that delays attributable to defense counsel don’t weigh in favor of a speedy trial violation. The court cites and adopts a statement from a New Mexico court that defense counsel’s delays represent a “systemic breakdown” only when they are caused by “problems that are both institutional in origin and debilitating in scope.” (¶40). Sounds like a slightly longer way of saying “systemic breakdown,” no?
Failing to raise joint-account defense to embezzlement charge wasn’t ineffective
State v. Phyllis M. Schwersenska, 2018AP1619-CR, District 4, 4/30/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Schwersenska was convicted of embezzling money from a joint bank account she held with her daughter, H.R. The court of appeals holds trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to raise the defense that, as joint owner of the account, none of the money in the account belonged solely to H.R. and so she can’t be guilty of theft from H.R.
Challenges to termination of parental rights are forfeited or meritless
Iron County DHS v. N.H.-D., 2019AP1520, District 3, 2/12/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
N.H.-D.’s claims that the termination of her parental rights violated various due process rights, but those claims are forfeited and undeveloped. Her claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is meritless.
Trial counsel’s failure to disclose officer’s mental health issues before plea wasn’t prejudicial
State v. Jacqueline A. Ziriax Anderson, 2018AP2410-CR, District 3, 2/11/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The state offered Anderson a deal: plead to OWI 2nd and it would recommend the minimum mandatory penalties. The state made that offer because the arresting officer had resigned from the department due to some “mental health issues” and the prosecutor apparently wasn’t eager to call him as a witness. Anderson’s lawyer found this out immediately before Anderson entered her plea—but didn’t tell Anderson. She learned about it afterward. (¶¶3-4, 8-11). While trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to tell Anderson that information before she pled, that doesn’t entitle her to plea withdrawal because she fails to show she would have insisted on going to trial if trial counsel would have told her, as required by State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 312, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).